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Abstract 
This thesis exammes how place images are being constructed and exploited in inward 
investment promotion on the regional scale. The study focuses on old-industrial areas as they 
suffer from a double disadvantage: they are in desperate need to attract inward investment to 
replace jobs lost through de-industrialisation, but at the same time are subject to negative 
stereotyping and are therefore often perceived as places where nobody would want to live or 
base their business. However, competition for inward investment is stiff, and a review of 
studies on the investment decision-making process reveals that perceptions of potential 
investment locations can have a significant impact on the decision. Using the examples of 
North East England and the Ruhr, theories of governance, social and policy learning as well 
as leadership are used to shed light on processes of image building. The key question is 
whether and how economic development stakeholders co-ordinate their efforts to achieve a 
targeted and coherent set of messages. The Ruhr has a history of 20 years of successful image 
management, mainly based on well-planned, sustained and well-resourced advertising 
campaigns, whereas image improvement efforts in the North East have largely been 
intermittent and piecemeal. The explanation of these differences centres on the rescaling of 
governance and the regional institutional landscape. The empirical findings suggest that 
elements of an emerging regional government in the North East find themselves in a 'pre-
devolution vacuum' where a high degree of decentralisation of economic governance has not 
been matched by the creation of strong regional institutions. The image building efforts 
therefore largely have to rely on unstable policy networks which do not provide a suitable 
forum for stakeholder consultation. In the Ruhr, in contrast, the success in turning around 
negative perceptions is largely based on institutional continuity and well-developed 
administrative routines. The thesis concludes with recommendations for a re-design of 
institutional structures in both regions to enable a more robust and effective image 
management process. 
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ll. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more entertaining diversions while standing in the supermarket check-
out queue is to peruse women s magazines for 'make-avers '. Before her cosmetic 
transformation the woman s skin is blotchy and wrinkled, her hair limp and drab, 
her eyes tired and careworn. She is usually overweight. After her make-over, she is 
a portrait of health, vitality and happiness. Her clear skin, sparkling eyes, and 
bouncy, shining hair make her almost unrecognisable from Ms Before. While she 
still has that crooked tooth and a little too much chin, she exudes a new confidence. 
Her image is transformed. At the beauty salons where such metamorphoses are 
achieved, a final service is sometimes available -full colour portraits of the new 
you. These permanent representations of the ephemeral conversion can serve as 
promotional material for potential employers or mates. Perhaps the transformation 
of the surface induces change within. 
(Holcomb, 1994: 115) 
This metaphor illustrates the efforts of many old-industrial or post-industrial regions of 
the developed world to change the ways in which they are being perceived. However, this 
not simply a beauty contest. The stakes are high: if jobs lost through de-industrialisation 
are to be replaced, cities and regions must be attractive to residents, tourists and 
financially potent inward investors. Old-industrial regions suffer a combination of several 
disadvantages: they have lost the bulk of their industrial workplaces, but self-employment 
and indigenous business start-ups that could replace the lost jobs are generally on a low 
level. According to a study of Kingston University Business School, the North East of 
England has the UK's lowest rate of business start-ups. Over the last four years, just 4% 
of 16 to 50 year-olds started their own business, compared to more than 7 % in the UK as 
a whole (Brown 2004). The need for inward investment to create jobs is therefore high in 
most places, but at the same time old-industrial cities and regions often suffer from a 
negative image of 'having failed' and are perceived by many as polluted, ugly and 
backwards; in short, as a place where few would want to live or base their business. 
As changing the material realities of the place requires significant public and private 
investment and takes a very long time, many places have resorted to manipulating their 
image in order to project as real the confidence and the success that they are looking to 
achieve. Just like Ms Before cannot change her physical properties or her character but is 
able to look more attractive after a make-over, most places cannot be completely rebuilt 
and every negative memory of the industrial past erased. Even if this was desirable it 
would not be viable in most cases, as the vast majority of old-industrial regions suffer 
from a dwindling tax base and a lack of potent, well-established local companies that are 
willing and able to invest private capital in the region. 
At the same time that Western European old-industrial regions- the focus of this study-
are desperate to attract inward investment, the 'investment cake' for them as a group is 
getting smaller. While many of these regions have previously been able to pursue policies 
of re-industrialisation and sell themselves on price, many manufacturing businesses now 
choose to locate in Central and Eastern European countries which provide a similar ease 
of access to European markets at a fraction of the cost. Between 1990 and 2000 the share 
of ex-Soviet Bloc countries in the world's foreign direct investment (FDI) stock has 
grown from 0.2 %to 2.0 %, a tenfold increase (Dicken 2003: 59). Unfortunately, there 
are no reliable statistics that allow a comparison between Western and Eastern European 
countries of the sectoral composition of FDI inflows. It is evident, however, that capital 
has become more mobile and overall competition between places for inward investment 
has intensified (Dicken 2003). At the same time, many Western European old-industrial 
regions are in a position where they find it difficult to increase or even maintain their 
share of global inward investment. 
This thesis looks at two examples of old-industrial regions in Western Europe: North East 
England and the Ruhr in Germany. They both have experienced rapid de-
industrialisation, efforts of re-industrialisation, and an attempted re-structuring towards 
the service economy. However, as these processes have taken place in fundamentally 
different political environments a comparison of the two regions promises to be 
rewarding. Further justification for the selection of these two regions is provided in 
chapter 3 (Methodology). 
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1.1. :Backgl'omull 
'Inventing places' has been one of the most prominent themes of recent cultural 
geography: the term suggests that places do not exist independently of our imagination 
(Anderson and Gale 1992). Places only become objects ofthought and action through the 
meaning we attach to them. With the cultural turn, attention in economic geography has 
shifted to how- alongside more traditional locational factors- these place images (which 
ultimately are the results of individual perception and imagination) influence the 
behaviour of economic actors. Given the intensifying and increasingly global competition 
amongst localities for investment, geographers have become interested in how place 
images are being employed in economic development to foster inward investment. This 
phenomenon has occurred across the Western world, in very different political systems 
and regional contexts. Millington et al. ( 1997) have identified almost 300 publications on 
place marketing (ranging from general to case studies) in the English language, and the 
number of studies is likely to have grown considerably since. 
The increasing competition for inward investment between regions seems to be a result of 
major economic, political and cultural shifts over the last three decades or so. 
Economic shifts. Due to rising production costs, many developed countries have lost 
their competitiveness, especially in labour-intensive industry sectors. The resulting 
relocation process to cheaper countries brought major job losses and high 
unemployment in what once were the strongholds of manufacturing in Europe: places 
such as Teesside, the Ruhr or Wallonie have for some time been considered problem 
regions (Surlemont 2000, Vanhove 1999: 123) and have been desperately trying to 
attract inward investment. 
Political (and cultural) shifts have taken place both top-down (regionalisation) and 
bottom-up (regionalism). Due to their adoption of an entrepreneurial stance and under 
the pressure of financial austerity, central governments have been reducing their 
financial assistance and expecting more self-responsibility from regions in coping 
with uneven development (see fig. 2.1 in chapter 2). This greater self-reliance was 
only partially forced upon regions. In fact, many regions welcomed it, as a resurgence 
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of regionalism saw demands for greater autonomy, not just in economic, but also in 
cultural terms. The cases of Catalonia and Scotland epitomise this phenomenon. 
As the process of the regionalisation of responsibility for economic well-being prevails, 
the question is how the framework of public institutions for place promotion has adapted 
to the changing national-regional distribution of power. These scales have shifted in the 
past, as illustrated by the abolition of most Urban Development Corporations (urban) and 
the installation of Regional Development Agencies (regional level) in Britain. Some 
authors have argued that the institutional arrangements for place marketing are unclear 
(and that there are competing institutions, e.g. Lever 2001, Ward 1998). Similarly, there 
has been a re-scaling of the responsibilities for economic development in Germany, 
where there is evidence for a 'creeping centralisation' of economic policy and a shift of 
many of the costs resulting from changes in economic policy downwards to the Uinder 
and local governments (Marterbauer 2003). 
"Image" is seen as crucial for economic success of almost any kind. Exploiting the 
positive image of its "Westernness" helps Nescafe to sell better in Turkey (Askegaard, 
Christensen and Ger 1999). A "new image put [an American drug store] chain on the fast 
track" (O'Rourke 2000), innovative architecture achieved an image overhaul which 
helped an ageing industrial park find new prestigious tenants ("Image is everything", 
Cook 2000), and the English FA (Football Association) sought an agency for an image 
makeover in the 2002 World Cup build-up "to publicize its place at the heart of the 
national game in England" (Tylee 2002). Political analysts claim that Gerhard Schroder 
defeated Helmut Kohl in the 1998 German elections because of his 'dynamic' image. 
Fombrun (2002: 2) explains in his book 'Reputation, Realizing Value From Corporate 
Image' that "image has an impact on the bottom line" of a company. The (increasingly 
perceived) importance of image has encouraged a boom in the formation of specialist 
image consultancy companies (Bryson and Wellington 2003). 
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The growth ofthe importance of'image' for economic development can be attributed to a 
number of reasons: Firstly, traditional place marketing instruments can be rather 
expensive 1 and in many cases have failed to deliver the expected results (see the 
discussions in Bingham and Mier 1997). Secondly, one of the reasons for this failure 
could be that investor behaviour is increasingly image-led and often based solely on the 
vague expectation of immense profits. This phenomenon is what Tsing (2000) termed 
'spectacular accumulation' in an 'economy of appearances'. It will be examined in more 
detail in chapter 2 (Research Focus). 
The very fact that most of their 'competitors' are undertaking some form of place 
marketing sees more and more local and regional governments react and pick up this 
entrepreneurial approach. Lever (200 I) found that in 1998, 92% of all English local 
authorities undertook some form of place marketing. 
On a theoretical level, the rationale for this study is to close the knowledge gap in the 
place imagery process, especially in the question of why and how representations of place 
are being deliberately constructed and exploited in inward investment promotion. In what 
ways do organisations of regional governance seek to influence and manage the image of 
the region to promote inward investment? In particular, I want to examine the interplay 
between organisations of different scales (national, regional and sub-regional/local) and 
sectors (public, private and civil) in this process. There is a strong case that the 
conceptual frameworks for the understanding of image building are currently too narrow: 
the overwhelming majority of studies of place marketing concentrate on promotion but 
there are few on image. But even the research that does concentrate on image mostly does 
not go beyond an analysis of the outcome of the image management process, of its 
tangible results, that is the promotional material produced, be it brochures, web sites, 
print or TV advertising. What is largely missing is an examination of the process of 
1 For example, Nissan has received£ 40 million of British government subsidies for its new car plant near 
Sunderland (EU Business 17/0 l/2001 ). While this sum might have been a good investment, compared to 
the number of jobs created, other heavily subsidised inward investment projects have proved to be short-
lived. The most prominent example is the£ 160 million Siemens semiconductor plant in North Tyneside, 
which received£ 50 million in Government subsidies but closed down in 1998, just fifteen months after it 
had been opened by the Queen (BBC News 2000). 
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image building. Based on these findings, I want to make suggestions for the improvement 
of the practice of image building. 
In more detail, the research questions are: 
I. How are regional images being constructed? Which actors are involved in this 
process, and how do they interact? Is there any coordination to ensure a coherent 
message, and what means are used to achieve this? 
2. How do organisations on different scales interact? In how far is the image 
management process influenced by national as opposed to regional influences? What 
influence do national political systems of governance have on the image-management 
process? If 'the rules of the game' are set by national/Land governments, are they 
(re)interpreted in different ways on the regional scale? 
3. How do organisations of different sectors (public, private, civil society) interact? 
How much power does that state hold in the image-management process? Has its 
influence diminished, or has it merely shifted from direct to more indirect control, 
from hierarchy to coordination? What is the role of the organisations 'officially' in 
charge of the image management process, the RDA in the North East, and the KVR in 
the Ruhr? 
4. Finally, what is the content of the representations that place promotion agencies and 
economic development stakeholders are seeking to construct? 
Overall, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the advancement of the understanding 
of 'ordinary regions'. We need an examination of ordinary, 'lagging' or 'failed' regions 
just as much as the study of 'shining examples'. This need is reflected in the discussion 
of the "Normalregion" (Krumbein 1994) in Germany and was recently highlighted by a 
session at the 2003 Annual Conference of the Royal Geographical Society titled "In 
Celebration of the Ordinary Region". Place marketing and image building is no exception 
here, with the vast majority of studies concentrating on successful examples or at least on 
places that have special positions. To be fair, however, there is now a strong body of 
research on the particular group of old-industrial regions and cities. For example, the use 
of place promotion and 'image make-overs' to redress negative perceptions of post-
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industrial regions in North America, Australia and Western Europe is well-documented 
(see, for example, Barke and Harrop 1994; Benton et. al. 1993; Brownill 1994; Ganser 
1970; Holcomb 2001, 1994, 1993; Hubbard 1995; Madsen 1992; Plaza 2002; Prossek 
1999a, 1999b, 2002; Watson 1991 ). However, all too often academic interest focuses on 
successful or, on the other extreme, very unsuccessful regions, with little attention being 
paid to the 'average' region. 
1.3. Structure of thesis 
This chapter has provided a background to the study, outlined its aims and objectives, and 
provided justification as to why this study is necessary. The remainder of the thesis is 
structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 set the scene: chapter 2 introduces the object of 
analysis, and chapter 3 outlines methodological challenges and choices. Chapter 4 
introduces the two case study regions, North East England and the Ruhr, presenting a 
socio-economic snapshot of the two case study regions. It also examines the governance 
of the regional economies, placing inward investment promotion efforts into their socio-
political context. Chapter 5 looks at current and previous efforts of image building in the 
two regions. Here it becomes obvious that image building has been undertaken in very 
different forms, placing different emphasis on various tools of image building. The 
following chapters, 6 to 8, form the main analytical body of the thesis. In these three 
chapters, theory and empirical findings are integrated to explain why image building 
efforts have differed in the two regions in both process and outcome. Three main themes 
are identified in the explanation of findings: governance (chapter 6), policy learning 
(chapter 7), and leadership (chapter 8). Chapter 9 presents a summary of the main 
empirical and theoretical findings. It is theoretical as it explores new ways of looking at 
image building, but also practical as it suggests measures to improve the practice of 
image building. Special consideration is given to the political-institutional environment in 
which these processes operate. 
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2. JR1E§EAR.CH: FOCU§ 
The grim history of deindustrialisation [ha~J left most major cities in the 
advanced capitalist world with few options except to compete with each other. 
(Harvey 1990: 92) 
This chapter introduces the object of analysis, place marketing in general and image 
management in particular. lt explains why image management can provide a competitive 
advantage, or why it is perceived to be necessary, and shows examples from earlier and 
more recent times. lt also places image-building activities in the context of broader socio-
economic trends of rescaling, territoriality and the 'new regionalism', demonstrating that 
image building is both outcome of and a contributing factor to intensifying territorial 
competition on a European and world-wide scale. This chapter also illuminates inward 
investment decision-making processes of private sector companies, the organisations that 
are the targets of place marketing and in turn shape the economic environment in which 
governments of various scales operate. 
2.1. PBace marketing, place promotion and image building: defining tlhte 
object of analysis 
Despite the wealth of publications on place marketing there is little or no agreement over 
the exact meaning of the term. lt is often used in a very narrow sense as a synonym for 
the advertising or promotion of places. This is particularly prominent in the American 
literature, where 'city marketing' usually refers to promotional efforts or 'boosterism' by 
a coalition of local or regional government and business organisations. A different, but 
equally narrow definition has largely been adopted in the German literature, where 
Standortmarketing (location marketing) usually refers to the promotion of a location 
(with particular reference to inward investment) and Stadtmarketing (city marketing) is 
used to describe efforts to increase the attractiveness of city centres for shoppers in the 
face of strong competition from out-of-town retail centres. (For a systematic overview 
and a broader definition in the German context, see Helbrecht 1994.) 
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In contrast, other authors such as Ashworth and Voogd (1990) have adopted a very broad 
definition that not only includes 'promoting what we have' but also 'trying to have what 
sells well', reflecting a desire to improve the appeal of the 'place product' to potential 
investors. This can involve both improvements of the 'product', that is changes in the 
physical realities of a place (e.g. upgrading of infrastructure, (re)training of labour) to 
whet and satisfy investors' appetite, or the communication of a positive image of a place 
that may or may not have changed. In current local and regional economic development, 
a mixture of both approaches is commonly used. Holcomb ( 1994: 115) argues that there 
is "a tautology between image and reality, that the city is remade to fit a promotable 
image while the promotional image reflects a highly selective reality." In practice, the 
boundaries between physical properties and image of a place are fluid, and the ways of 
promoting either can be seen as mutually reinforcing. This is reflected in the desire to 
create appealing landscapes or cityscapes. As examined by Lenfers (2000), a commonly 
used vehicle is the building of flagship projects like the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao 
(Plaza 2002), the Sage Music Centre in Gateshead (UK) or the giant CentrO shopping 
mall in Oberhausen in the Ruhr. These projects are aimed at increasing the appeal of 
those places through the creation of world-class cultural infrastructure and architectural 
design, stressing quality of life as a selling point, but equally to influence perceptions of 
the localities in which the buildings have been erected, not least due to intensive PR and 
advertising. This is especially the case where buildings become 'icons' and symbols for 
their place, as shown by the examples of the Angel of the North in Gateshead or the 
Sydney Opera House. Helbrecht ( 1994) speaks of the 'festivalisation' of urban 
development where the fluidity of the boundaries between image and reality is especially 
clear: festivals and mega-events may have only a limited and often short-lived impact on 
the physical qualities of a place but are all the more important for influencing 
perceptions, portraying a place as 'cultured' and 'vibrant'. 
Ashworth and Voogd (1990) and several contributors to Gold and Ward's (1994) edited 
volume have illustrated how the modem idea of place marketing was borrowed from the 
management and business literature. One of the most widely accepted definitions of 
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marketing in this literature is "the process of planning and executing the conception, 
pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to create exchanges that 
satisfy individual and organizational objectives" (Onkvisit and Shaw 1993: 7). This 
definition reinforces the idea that marketing is more than just promotion and advertising 
and also includes modifying the product in a way that it can be easily sold. The definition 
also brings up two powerful metaphors: that of a place as a corporation, and that of a 
place being a product, a commodity; a metaphor of "North East England Ltd." selling a 
product called "North East England™ -The Ideal Investment Location". Indeed, a recent 
article in The Economist (2004b: 64) has argued that "promoting a city is like selling 
shampoo", demonstrating how multinational companies brought their marketing expertise 
into the promotion of places in which they were based or had a branch. Griffiths ( 1998) 
has pointed at the limitations of this analytical approach, which I will revisit later in this 
chapter. 
Traditionally, place marketers have relied on two sets of instruments: the improvement of 
physical features of their place ('product improvement'), and financial incentives for 
investors ('pricing', see figure 2.1 ). Promotion is now gaining importance as a third 
instrument, even though it had already been at the heart of some earlier place marketing 
efforts, such as the 'Metroland' residential development in north-west London in the 
interwar years (Gold and Gold 1994). Ashworth and Voogd ( 1990) identified four target 
groups of place marketing: consumers, tourists, residents, and investors. As most place 
promotion strategies vary according to target group, my study will be restricted to one 
group, investors. Wells and Wint (2000) distinguish two elements of an investor-targeting 
place promotion strategy: directly investment-generating activities, such as liaising with 
or holding seminars for potential investors, and image-building activities, such as 
advertising campaigns and, more generally, non-personal communication. 
Importantly, image building is not only a sub-category of place marketing. As figure 2.1 
demonstrates, image building activities are part of the place marketing exercise. 
However, much of the image building process happens outside the purposeful place 
marketing effort, as many sources of place images are outside the control of place 
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marketers. For example, residents are ambassadors of their place and mainly 
unconsciously contribute to the perceptions of their place abroad. In this way, the place 
marketing as purposefull y undertaken by organisations in charge of local economic 
development represents just a fraction of the sources of the overall process of image 
formation. 
uneven regional development 
'product' improvement 
e.g. upgrading of infrastructure 
government attempts 
to equal out 
central and EU government 
spending (subsidy approach) 
pricing 
(e.g. subsidies like tax breaks) 
Fig. 2.1 : Place marketing, place promotion and image building 
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One need not look far to notice how widely image building is undertaken in practice by a 
wide variety of organisations, from consumer goods manufacturers to national 
"Taking the sex out of Essex. A notorious county wants to change its 
image" 
(The Economist, 6/10/2001 :37) 
Essex County Council worries that its "brash image deters companies from locating there" and is hoping to 
secure government funding to "overhaul its brand". "'Vulgar', 'right-wing' and 'promiscuous' could be 
morphed into 'affluent', 'best of British' and 'young and energetic'." 
"Israeli governmen~ plans world-wide image campaign" 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung 08/01/2001: 7) 
The Israeli government commissioned a campaign to improve Israel's image with the global public. Over the 
last years, this image has been severely damaged as the country has been criticised for its human rights 
record and the treatment of Palestinians. The campaign will involve Israeli artists and intellectuals like 
celebrity conductor Zubin Metha and writer Amos Oz promoting their home country. The campaign also aims 
at Jews all over the world to strengthen their support for Israel. 
"Israel's Image Problem. Fire Up the Propaganda Mill" 
(www.counterpunch.org) 
American Jews want Israel and Judaism to be seen in a more positive light. "Two U.S. Jewish groups- the 
American Jewish Committee and Israel 21C- have paid for an ad campaign set to air on 100 American 
cable television networks." (Heard 2002) 
"Corporal punishment damages Iran's Image" 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung 17/08/2001: 7) 
Corporal punishment and executions damage Iran's image abroad. "The Iranian ministry of the exterior has 
announced an inquiry into how the wave of public executions in Iran impacts on the country's image." 
"The stadia of restruc~uring" t'Die Stadien des S~rukturwandels'? 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung 13/08/2001: 5) 
The city of Gelsenkirchen (Ruhr) hopes to change its image through football and other cultural events 
performed in its new stadium. "We want to leave behind our image of coal, steel, dirt, and football proles', 
says mayor Wittke." 
"Bayern MtLmich as a locational factor: illhonich benefits from the winners' 
image. Now the footbaiD club atttracts companies" 
(Suddeutsche Zeitung 23/05/2001 :47) 
"The message of a successful football club rubs off on Munich and gives the city a dynamic winner's image". 
The advertising agency ServicePian calculated that FC Bayern reaches 40% of all Germans older than 14 
years of age. "Other places have to employ expensive advertising campaigns to enter the national and 
international consciousness as a company location. But Munich's image takes care of itself. Half of the world 
is watching the broaching of the first barrel at the Oktoberfest opening, and when FC Bayern is on the pitch 
TV sets are on from Alaska to Zaire. • 
Fig. 2.2: Some headlines on place images 
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governments. Many places around the world now seem to be concerned about their 
image, for various reasons. Attempts to manipulate and improve place images are 
undertaken on all levels of government, from local to national. Figure 2.2 shows some 
recent news headlines, together with a summary of the article. 
As shown in figure 2.3, the rise of image building and image management can be 
attributed to a number of factors. The dissatisfaction with a great number of traditional 
economic development instruments (Bingham and Mier 1997) has prompted economic 
development policy-makers and practitioners to look elsewhere. In the attempts of 
narrowing the gap in Britain between the economically successful south and the lagging 
north a great range of economic development tools, both redistributive and market-based, 
have been tried out over the last decades by both central government and regional 
development bodies, to the degree that some authors (e.g. Hudson 1989) speak of the 
North of England having served as an economic development laboratory. So far, the gap 
remains, and measured against the goal of levelling socio-economic disparities the 
instruments have failed. Similarly, Germany is now faced with what can be described as a 
Why image management? 










(real or perceived) 
capital 
mobility 
image as a 
distinguishing 





Why on the regional scale? 
A 




is an obstacle 
to economic 
development 
Fig. 2.3: The most prominent factors for the adoption of image management 
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'potential mezzogiorno' (Paganetto 1997); the five ex-GDR Uinder that are set to Jag 
behind Western Germany for at least another generation. In the 14 years since the 
reunification of Germany, the eastern Uinder have seen countless government initiatives 
and programmes, but after a period of rapid progress in the early 1990s the gap between 
East and West has remained stable since the mid-1990s. 
Secondly, the adoption of image building can be seen not only as a reaction against 
traditional instruments of economic development. There are also factors that attract 
governments and agencies to image building. There seems to be an increasing realisation 
among economic development policy-makers and practitioners that 'image matters'. It 
can be argued that investor behaviour is indeed more image-led today than ever before 
(this point will be taken up later in this chapter), but the strong normative discourses of 
competitiveness (Sadler 1993) and the introduction of private-sector marketing styles 
have aided the perception among places that image is one of the crucial factors for 
economic development. 
Thirdly, even those economic development stakeholders that are satisfied with traditional 
instruments of economic development and remain unconvinced of changes in investor 
behaviour are easily persuaded that image management is necessary when they realise 
that many of their competitors are undertaking it. In a climate of increasing competition, 
many local and regional politicians and economic development practitioners are afraid to 
'lose out'. The notion of increasing competition has contributed to an 'arms race' in place 
promotion. 
This idea is supported by Maskell and Malmberg's (1999) ubiquitification thesis, 
according to which most locational factors that once were unique to only a very limited 
number of places and therefore provided these places with a competitive advantage can 
now be found in most places of the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe. For 
example, frequent flights to destinations across Europe, a motorway connection, a 
university, and well-developed cultural and sporting facilities can now be found in or 
close to most sizeable European cities. As early as 1970, Ganser ( 1970) demonstrated in a 
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case study on Western Germany that the physical realities of places have become more 
and more alike. Accordingly, the clever 'packaging' and selling, the promotion of these 
now ubiquitous locational factors can provide places with a competitive advantage, 
opening up a new round of competition. According to marketing theory, this levelling 
should lead to the diversification of marketing strategies, as evident with consumer 
products such as washing powders that are essentially alike, and brands are promoted 
with multi-million budgets. Another example is cars, where most of the adverts no longer 
praise basic qualities such as reliability and safety, but employ images that are associated 
with a certain lifestyle. Paradoxically, in the case of place promotion, image management 
also contributes, in the eyes of some observers, to "making sameness" (Griffiths 1998: 
title). Holcomb's ( 1994: 115) examination of the marketing material of several places in 
the US revealed "striking similarities in the images projected. Cities which are, in reality, 
distinctly different, become homogenised and virtually indistinguishable in their images." 
Indeed, my reading of examples of place promotion from the last three decades is that 
most places have employed the 'standard toolkit' of messages, emphasising the 'rational 
advantages' through the promotion of now almost ubiquitous place assets such as a 
central location, a well-educated workforce, good transport links and so forth. However, 
over the last decade or so a qualitative shift has occurred and there are now many 
examples where cities and regions have tried to promote themselves with emotional, 
'cool' and 'lifestyle-focused' material to potential investors that aims to convey the 
message of 'a good business climate' and 'a fun place to be'. 
The previous section provided some answers as to why image improvement initiatives are 
perceived to be necessary. One of the main causes established was the increasing inter-
regional competition for inward investment and concomitant pressures to adopt 
entrepreneurial strategies. The next section looks in more detail at one of the concepts 
that has frequently been advanced as a solution for coping more effectively with the 
increased pressures of competition: regional ism. 
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"Towards the end of the last decade, a new panacea for Britain's ills appeared: 
regionalism. Fanned by growing nationalist demands from Scotland and Wales, 
stimulated by the need for local government reform in England, and made urgent 
by the lack of success of a series of economic measures, regionalism seemed to 
provide a suitable structure for the United Kingdom." (Banks 1971: back cover) 
What reads like a contemporary comment on the 'new regionalism' was indeed written 
33 years ago. The topic has not lost any of its relevance, and regionalism is still a matter 
of heated debate, especially its suggested link to improved regional-economic 
performance. According to Le Gales and Lequesene (1998), regionalism is a political or 
cultural movement that aims to protect or advance the interests of the region in which it is 
based2• In an economic sense, much of what is now subsumed as 'regionalism' is based 
on the notion that the "regional scale, rather than that of the nation state, is uniquely 
appropriate to engender the type of formal and informal interactions conducive to the 
kind of economic interactions required to bring about the flexible economies of scope 
required for survival in globalizing markets" (Ohmae 1993, quoted in Lovering 1999: 
383). This definition is in agreement with Storper's (1995 and 1997) ideas of the region 
as the optimal scale of economic regulation. Garside (2000: 141 ff.) stresses the central 
importance of cultural identity for much of contemporary regionalism. In practice, 
though, it is almost impossible to separate economic and political-cultural dimensions of 
regionalism as they mostly occur in close interdependence, and different drivers of the 
same regionalist movement may advance economic or political arguments, depending on 
their own vested interest. What both perspectives, economic and political-cultural, 
combine, however, is the growing awareness that local regional actors are well able to 
make a difference, even in the face of allegedly 'overpoweringly' strong processes of 
globalisation (Wong 2000: 57). 
2 In some of the literature regionalism is used interchangeably with regionalisation, but I would like to keep 
the distinction between the two concepts as outlined in sub-chapters 1.1 and 2.2. In this sense, regionalism 
refers to the efforts of a central state to regionalise political, cultural or economic affairs, mainly with the 
aim of reducing central government expenditure or improving administrative effectiveness. 
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It is important to make two distinctions in the usage of the term 'regionalism': first, 
between different objects of analysis and second, between the normative and analytical 
use of the term. There is little agreement over the use and meaning of 'regionalism', and 
not all strands of the regionalism debate are relevant for this thesis. In the US this term is 
mainly used to refer to issues of inter-municipal collaboration that serves to achieve a 
more co-ordinated metropolitan governance which is better able to solve cross-
jurisdictional problems of quality of life such as urban sprawl (Katz 2000) or air 
pollution. Regionalism in this sense is largely a responsive concept, developed as a 
possible solution to concrete problems, rather than regionalism in a political sense that 
serves to assert regional cultural identity and create or defend regional autonomy in the 
face of central government dominance. In the European usage, the economic argument at 
the heart of regionalism is concerned with how to achieve and maintain an advantage in 
European and worldwide competition between regions. Particular attention is paid in 
Europe to the institutional structures that underpin successful regional economies, and on 
whether and how these arrangements can be replicated in other regions (Herrschel and 
Newman 2004: 33f.). In other words, a distinction could be drawn between "cross-
jurisdictional problems demand cross-jurisdictional solutions" (regionalism in the 
American sense) versus "region-specific problems demand region-specific solutions (and 
institutions)" (regionalism in the European sense). The remainder of this section 
concentrates on the latter, because the processes to be examined in the present thesis are 
set in the European context, both theoretically and empirically. 
The concept of regionalism is not only used in this normative, political sense but also in 
an analytic sense to describe the power struggles played out in and for the gain of 
regions, and to examine the concomitant rescaling of territory. In this sense, regionalism 
as a normative concept is as old as the political-territorial organisation of human life on 
the national scale, and as an analytic concept it has been in and out of fashion since the 
early attempts of systematic political science. In the discipline of geography, regions and 
regionalism have been the objects of analysis of various sub-disciplines, from the 
regional geography of the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the recent 'new 
regional ism' since the 1980s. 
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There seems to be broad agreement on that current forms of regionalism are qualitatively 
different from previous variants, but where exactly lie the differences between 'old' and 
'new' regionalism? Figure 2.4 summarises some ofthe key properties. When seen in the 
broader perspective of the change in accumulation regimes from Keynesianism to 
locational policy3 (Brenner 2004) it becomes clear that the older forms of regionalism 
had been orientated towards equalisation (Ausgleich in German) whereas the more recent 
forms of regionalism chiefly revolve around economic competitiveness and inter-locality 
competition, and around state spatial selectivity (the targeting of particular areas of a 
country or particular scales of policy-making). 
The scalar reference of 'old' regionalism was the nation state as regions were trying to 
capture as large as possible a piece of the redistributive resources from national 
government, whereas in the new regionalism the European or world-wide scale is the 
reference, with regions strategically positioning themselves or being positioned by their 
national government as a 'carthorse' in this increasing competition (also compare Scott's 
( 1998) idea of the global economy being driven by 'regional motors'). In this sense, both 
case study regions can be seen as disadvantaged as over the last three decades the Ruhr 
and the North East have both been among the least internationally competitive regions of 
their countries. Their national governments have therefore had little incentive to devote 
resources to position these regions as 'spearheads' in the intensifying international 
competition since both regions are seen as competitive in only very few industries, most 
of which are not part of the set of industries defined by the central governments as key 
development sectors. In Scott's (1998) scenario, this periphery contrasts sharply with the 
'regional motors'. This idea of both the Ruhr and the North East being positioned in the 
'second league' of global economic competition (or even below) will be developed more 
fully in chapter 4, where several key indicators of economic performance and social 
cohesion will be presented. 
3 Locational policy is a literal translation of the German term 'Standortpolitik' which refers to the bundle of 
policies that seek to improve the competitive position of a given locality of whatever scale, from a small 
town to supranational trading blocs such as the EU or NAFTA. 
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'old' regionalism 'new' regionalism 
Basic exchange relationships Compensation Competition 
(Ausgleich) (Wettbewerb) 
Scalar reference Nation state Europe and world 
Suggested optimum scale for Nation state Region (as part of a global 
regulation of economy economyl 
Direction of spatial development Equalisation Polarisation 
Focus of policy Supply-side Institutional frameworks I 
improvements architectures 
Associated forms of _governance Formal, hierarchy Associative, networks 
Fig. 2.4: Key properties of 'old' and 'new' regionalism 
Regionalism can also be seen as an expression of a particular set of ideas about 
territoriality. Agnew ( 1997: 823) defined territoriality as "the strategy used by 
individuals, groups and organizations to exercise power over a portion of space and its 
contents." In most countries, the territorial organisation of nation states has indeed 
changed significantly. This 'relativization of scales' (Jessop 2002, 1999, Brenner 2004: 
43ff.) has seen a reassessment of the importance of the national scale of socio-economic 
regulation, and economic governance is now largely seen as an outcome of the interaction 
of all scales of governance rather then the product of one, dominating scale, which over 
the last centuries used to be the nation state. Sack ( 1997) draws attention to the potential 
of territoriality in the construction of space. Seemingly a-spatial, sectoral policies can 
assume a crucial function in delimitating territorial units simply through their scale of 
reference. For example, a regional image strategy can be viewed as a tool of inward 
investment promotion, but it can also be seen as a tool of region-building, especially in 
territorial configurations where the regional scale is on the offensive (such as in the UK) 
or in situations like in Germany, where the regional state is under increasing pressure 
from central government. 
New regionalism's focus on competitiveness implies a strong emphasis on theories of 
institutions and learning. One key feature of the new regionalism is its focus on 
institutions and the enhancement of policy-making capacity. Chapter 6 will review 
theories and empirical evidence of governance and the role of networks, and the evidence 
from both case studies indeed suggests a strong link between success of image 
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improvement initiatives and strong and functioning regional institutions. The learning 
region has been an integral component of much of new regionalist thought and learning 
from other, more successful regions has been a vital component of most regional 
development strategies, as the adoption of 'best practice' is seen as crucial for developing 
and maintaining a competitive advantage over other regions. Chapter 7 (policy learning) 
will demonstrate that the issue of image improvement is no exception. 
However, "vulgar" (Lovering 1999) applications of the new regionalism as an analytic 
tool have been criticised on several accounts. Tomaney and Ward (2000) criticised the 
'one-solution-fits-all' approach that has sometimes been suggested for its lack of 
substance. The centrepiece of Brenner's (2003: 20) critique are the generalisations that 
many proponents of the new regionalism make, and the assumed automatism he sees in 
many of their arguments. In particular, he observes that - unlike in the idealised 
theoretical assumptions often put forward by 'new regionalists' - not all forms of 
regional institutional change subsumed as 'new regionalism' amount to "place-specific 
forms of institutional thickness, economic governance and regulatory coordination" that 
lead to sustainable regional development trajectories. To the contrary, as Brenner (2003: 
20) argues, the new institutions created mostly do little more than 
"mobilize neomercantilist place-marketing campaigns that trigger highly wasteful, 
zero-sum forms of investment poaching and regulatory downgrading. Such 
predatory, 'beggar-thy-neighbour' regional policies are an important expression of 
the 'widespread tendencies to fiddle with governance while the economy burns' 
(Peck 2000: 74); and they are considerably at odds with the high-trust, collaborative 
social environments and offensive forms of flexibility that characterize the 
industrial districts upon which much of new regionalist theory is based." 
The two case study areas chosen for the present thesis, the Ruhr and North East 
England, certainly do not conform to the economically successful and socially 
coherent prototype regions that form the basis for the bulk of theories of new 
regionalism. It will be interesting to see how much explanatory power new regionalist 
thought can hold for seemingly 'atypical' (in the sense of the theory) i.e. old-industrial 
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regions which are fraught with economic restructuring, poverty and social divisions. I 
shall return to these issues in the conclusions (chapter 9). 
Lovering ( 1999) spearheaded the ranks of critics like Brenner who lament that new 
regionalist thought in many cases fails to explain the empirical realities of many 
northern-Atlantic regions - again, especially so in the case of less successful, de-
industrialising regions. In the British example, he argues that the new regionalism has 
failed to identify the main reason why some regions have successfully 'globalised': the 
national British state, which, according to Lovering ( 1999) and MacLeod (200 I) still 
underwrites the relatively improved competitive position enjoyed by most British regions 
compared with I 0 or 20 years ago. Looking in more detail at Wales, Lovering (1999) 
demonstrates that it is not the entrepreneurial talent of Wales-based companies, nor the 
success of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) in attracting inward investment but 
largely the redistributive payments and other central state interventions that have made 
the Welsh economy look healthier now than it did ten or twenty years ago. 
While the more sophisticated strands of the 'new regionalism' have largely escaped the 
criticism of being too generalising (and idealising), they have been accused by a number 
of analysts of sharing with their 'vulgar' variants the shortcoming of being boosterist 
instead of analytic, and of being blinded by the rhetoric of powerful regional elites. 
According to Lovering ( 1999), vested interests of central government (hopes to be able to 
reduce transfer payments) and local and emerging regional government (vie for lucrative 
administrative and political jobs and hope for a free hand in moulding the economy 
according to their interests) have helped transform the new regionalism into a concept 
void of analytical value. New regionalist thought is being used to 'talk up' the region by 
journalists, politicians, "gurus of globalisation, respectable economists who have not 
looked close enough, local consultants and pressure groups who have vested interests 
( ... ), and academic researchers infected by boosterism" (Lovering 1999: 381). 
Ultimately, Lovering ( 1999: 382) concludes that "the infusion of New Regionalist 
notions into the regional development community can narrow rather than broaden 
intellectual and strategic horizons." While this scathing criticism is certainly overstating 
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the point it prompts us to look at which interests drive processes of current state rescaling 
and spatially selective attempts of reterritorialisation. MacKinnon and Phelps (200 1) 
identify an 'Inward Investment Service Class' (IISC) in Wales and North East England 
which consists of key economic development organisations and individuals but which -
in the case of the North East- has so far failed to work as an easily identifiable coalition, 
due to the "relative weakness and fragmentation of the [regional-] institutional structure" 
(MacKinnon and Phelps 200 I: 375). This will be a key focus of chapter 6 to 9. 
Vested interests are articulated not only at the regional level, and the crucial task is "to 
understand the ways in which existing institutional structures shape the emergence of 
new institutions at the regional scale. Regions are shaped by both higher and lower levels 
and by the legacies of previous attempts to govern at this scale." (Herrschel and Newman 
2004: 33, my emphasis). As briefly alluded to previously, regionalism can present a 
challenge to both lower and higher levels of government, and local and central 
governments in both countries have employed different strategies to contain regional 
expansion of powers. Indeed, in England there are many powers that central government 
has decentralised but not devolved. This form of decentralisation, often with the help of 
an array of poorly coordinated single-purpose bodies, "serves the government's 
convenience in streamlining administration, cutting costs, pushing the process of priority 
setting further down the governmental ladder, ( ... ) whilst retaining control over the 
direction of policy" (Garside 2000: 164f.). In the Ruhr, the Land government of North 
Rhine-Westphalia has curtailed the powers of the KVR (Ruhr Regional Association) in 
1979, and another restructuring of the organisation is due in late 2004. These processes of 
rescaling of policy-making capacities will be taken up in chapters 4 and 6. 
Regionalisation can also face resistance from below. In unitary states such as the United 
Kingdom, local governments can be hesitant to embrace regionalisation for fear of 
permanently losing the powers and responsibilities that they have voluntarily transferred 
to elements of regional government (Herrschel and Newman 2004: 91 ). Chapters 6 to 8 I 
will examine the empirical evidence for these explanations. 
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Notwithstanding the criticisms raised above, some of which certainly are justified, new 
regionalist thought is helpful for my thesis in that it highlights possible shifts in 
regulatory capacity away from the national and local scales towards the regional level. It 
also sheds light on the fact that the present re-scaling of governance also is, to an extent, 
a product of a bottom-up process in which regional stakeholders, but also ordinary 
citizens, are demanding more autonomy and self-management of regional - especially 
regional-economic and cultural -affairs, facilitating a mobilisation of regional forces in 
order to become involved in regional economic endeavours, including image 
improvement initiatives. 
However, I agree with MacLeod (2001), who points at the failure of much of new 
regionalist theories to conceptualise the "interscalar webs" (p. 813) of relations between 
regional and nation state. For instance, little research has been undertaken on how 
sectoral central government policies such as the funding of universities interact with 
strategies crafted at the regional level, such as the regional economic strategy which was 
one of the first major documents that all newly-created English Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) were obliged to create. In this context the rescaling of territoriality and 
the relativization of scales suggest that global, national, regional and local "operate not as 
mutually exclusive or competing geographical configurations for capitalist development, 
but rather as densely superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organisation" 
(Brenner 1999: 433, my emphasis). 
Apart from neglecting increasingly intertwined scalar webs the new regionalism, I argue, 
has overly concentrated on the regional state and supranational regimes such as the EU, 
WTO or the World Bank. This focus on interactions between the region and the global 
economy has lead to the role of a local and national governments taking the back seat in 
much of the research. Hence my thesis makes an attempt to link the image building 
activities of the past two decades to wider central state policies and initiatives. This is 
especially relevant as in England it was only in 1998/9 that the first elements of a 
possible regional government emerged, the RDAs and Regional Chambers. In contrast, 
post-war (West) Germany has been characterised by a high degree of policy interlocking 
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(Politikverflechtung) and a frequent and ongoing re-negotiation of the boundaries 
between federal and regional (i.e. Land) powers. This theme will be taken up in more 
detail in sub-chapters 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. 
The re-negotiation of scales and increased interscalar policy interlocking 
(Politikverflechtung) associated with the relativization of scales has shifted attention to 
the mode of co-ordination, or "how various strategies in the region can be translated into 
strategiesfar the region" (Valler, Phelps and Wood 2002: 189). In this fluidity of scales 
governance networks have become increasingly important. Indeed, forms of 
collaboration can be very different and range from informal, temporal and project-based 
collaboration to formalised and more or less permanent collaboration within a 
hierarchical system of organisations. This will be examined in more detail in chapter 6, 
Governance, but a short outline will be given here as the shifting arrangements of intra-
and interregional collaboration are a vital part of new regionalist and institutionalist 
thought. 
Collaboration is often single-purpose, of a limited time, and informal. This is partly due 
to the general problem of the 'many hands' (see chapter 6) in which there is a 
"bewildering tangle of municipalities, governmental and regional organizations and 
institutions, and public, private or informal cooperative approaches with differing actors, 
functions, and jurisdictions" (Heinz 2000: 27). On the other hand, project-based, 
network-enabled, voluntary collaboration arises not just as an accidental consequence of 
the 'broken' institutional landscape. It also poses less of a direct challenge to central 
governments and is therefore the preferred method of regionalisation in many unitary 
states, who on the one hand are keen to preserve the current scalar status quo of power, 
but who on the other hand also recognise the need for region-based initiatives to better 
cope with increasing inter-regional competition (Herrschel and Newman 2004: 90). 
As we have seen, regionalisation occurs in a wide variety of forms, from issue-based 
regional initiatives to constitutionally granted and fully elected regional governments. 
The ease with which these regional interests are formed and dissolved also varies 
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fundamentally. Issue-driven collaboration is normally short-lived, whereas constitutional 
arrangements are usually very durable, as constitutional changes are set to face strong 
resistance by local and national government, both of which keen to avoid a loss of power. 
Herrschel and Newman (2004: 66ff.) quote the examples of Spain, Belgium and Italy 
where regionalisation was only achieved after a long-standing campaign - sometimes 
violent- by (culturally distinct) regions with a strong national identity. 
The actual form of collaboration seems to depend significantly on local-central relations 
in a country. As Heinz (2000: 24f.) observes, "the form, organisation, and frequency of 
areawide and multisectoral cooperative approaches depend in large measure on the 
administrative and political structures of the country concerned. Whereas in centralised 
countries like France or the Netherlands, government-imposed cooperation types apply 
throughout the country, situation-specific solutions are always taken in federal countries 
like Germany or the United States." It will be interesting to see whether these 
generalisations hold true for the two case study areas. 
In summary, this section examined key propositions of the new regionalism and how 
these relate to the object of analysis of this thesis. As we have seen above, the political-
constitutional arrangements of a country also has a strong impact on the capabilities of 
policy-making on the regional level, and for this reason two countries of the opposing 
ends of the unitary-federal continuum were chosen, Britain (England in particular) and 
Germany. I criticised above the strong orientation of new regionalist thought towards 
successful regions, and to choose old-industrial regions - which are fundamentally 
different from the regions on which much of the new regionalist thought is based -
therefore seems very advisable. The selection of case study areas will be explained in 
more detail in chapter 3 
The previous section looked at the frameworks of interregional competition as manifest 
on various scales of government and governance. The following section looks at the other 
'side' of the competition and examines the behaviour and investment decision making 
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processes of private-sector companies, which both shape and respond to economic policy 
in general and place marketing in particular. 
2.41. Corporate dedsion~malking 
One of the central justifications for undertaking this thesis is the anecdotal evidence that a 
region's unfavourable image is likely to deter potential inward investors. To investigate 
this claim it is necessary to examine to what degree investors are indeed influenced by 
the perceptions they hold of potential investment locations. Most potential investors have 
little or no first-hand knowledge of most possible sites, and commonly the bulk of the 
information used for an investment decision is mediated. 
It is a central thesis of my study that corporate investors are to a certain degree image-led, 
and do not make decisions that are conventionally called one hundred per cent rational. I 
argue, therefore, that image building must be an integral part of any place marketing 
effort. This section examines how (re)location decisions are being made in private sector 
companies, and to what extent these decisions could be influenced by the perceptions the 
decision-making persons hold ofthe investment locations considered. 
This section will first look at basic concepts of investment theory and outline the stages 
of an investment decision. I will then examine the importance of image, firstly at the 
micro level of individual investment decisions, using image and framing theory, and, 
secondly, how these findings relate to image-led processes at the macro level in the 
economy as a whole. 
2.4.1. Key concepts 
The type of investment relevant for my thesis is direct investment. While almost every 
investment is made under the motivation of expected short- or long-term capital gains 
there is an important difference in as far as the level of control is concerned. Portfolio 
investment serves the purpose to yield interest on capital, while in direct investment the 
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investor also aims at gaining control over the object in which the investment is made. 
Direct investment can therefore be defined as an export of capital by an economic subject 
of an (predominantly private) enterprise to another country4 with the aim to set up 
subsidiaries, purchase foreign companies or to buy a stake in them that guarantees a 
decisive influence on its strategic management (Winter 1997: 940). It is of course open to 
debate at what stake the 'decisive influence' begins and hence where the threshold 
between portfolio and direct investment lies. In this thesis I only take into account direct 
investment, for it is very unlikely that a portfolio investor has much of a say in the 
location decision process. Another reason for the focus is the high risk of direct 
investment in relation to other forms of investment. It is therefore likely that for a direct 
investment considerably more resources are invested into the search process than for 
portfolio investment. 
Secondly, I restrict my study to investors who want to operate the investment object for 
themselves. This definition excludes real estate investment. The reason for this is that I 
assume that companies that sell on the property they have developed do not have a long-
term interest in the area in which they invest. Furthermore, they have little incentive to 
become engaged in the promotion of the region themselves, as they are likely to be highly 
spatially mobile in the choice of their next objects and thus may soon leave the region 
anyway. 
I argue that images and perceptions are most important at the very beginning of the 
decision-making process. Thus, the process of inward investment decision making needs 
to be briefly sketched out. Dichtl et al. ( 1983) divide this process into seven stages, from 
problem recognition to the implementation of the decision made. Only the first five of 
these seven stages are relevant for my study. My focus lies on the investment decision 
from the initial impetus, the realisation ofthe problem5, up to the decision whether, where 
and how the investment will be made (see fig. 2.5, p. 37). By this definition the 
4 While the concept of direct investment is usually applied to foreign direct investment it is here being 
applied to regions. According to this definition I consider all investment that comes from companies 
headquartered outside the two case study regions to be inward investment. 
5 In this context 'problem' is a neutral term and can also refer to a positive impetus, for example if a 
company perceives a cost advantage in relocating production. 
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implementation and the monitoring of success is not seen as part of the investment 
decision but as a separate process following on from the decision making process. The 
object of this section is the investment decision in the wider sense, that is including the 
preparation of the decision and not only the actual decision act that represents the 
investment decision in the narrow sense. While in practice these steps can often not be 
exactly separated, this distinction of stages is important for my thesis in that the 
individual stages are to different extents amenable to what traditional microeconomic 
theory would call 'irrational' factors 'contaminating' the decision. I will expand on this in 
the next section. 
2.4.2. Rationality and perceptions in investment decisions: micro-level processes 
In most management text books capital investment appraisal6 is considered the 
instrument of the investment decision. However, capital investment appraisal can only be 
an aid to decision making because the complexity of a real world decision situation can 
never be exactly appropriated by a theoretical model. Hence, there remains considerable 
room for manoeuvre for the decision maker that extends beyond the results of 
calculations (Bickl 2000). The resulting question of how investment decisions are made 
in real-world practice is hardly covered by management and economics literature (Sitz 
1998). Classic investment theory mainly deals with financial-mathematical calculations 
and organisation-theoretical aspects of investment. Little light has been shed on decision 
making processes and their variations as they occur within a company. 
This may be due to the fact that the 'homo oeconomicus' has long been the ideal model of 
mainstream economics: humans seek complete information on all possible alternatives of 
action and then select the alternative that promises the highest economic gain. In this 
theory of rationality there is no room for behaviour that does not directly serve the 
assumed raison d'etre of a company, profit maximisation, and this behaviour is 
consequently labelled 'sub-optimal' or 'irrational'. However, it is now widely accepted 
6 Capital investment appraisal is a financial assessment of the cost effectiveness of a capital project set 
against economic criteria. It relies purely on a number of numerical techniques aimed at forecasting 
whether or not a project will deliver a sufficiently high return on investment. For a detailed explanation, 
including many examples, see Williamson 1996 and Baker and Fox 2003. 
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within management, economics and geography that economic activities and transactions 
are framed by social values and conventions (Heinen 1991: 3). More concretely, freedom 
of action economic actors is diminished by three sets of constraints: social values and 
norms, requests and expectations by superiors and colleagues within the system 'firm', 
and commitments that the decision-maker has imposed on himself or herself through 
previous actions and decisions (see Aharoni 1966, Cyert and March 1992, Golledge and 
Stimson 1997). The decision on whether, where and under which circumstances a 
company invests is in this respect no exception. Behavioural economics contradicts the 
assumptions of neoclassical theory according to which an investment decision is made 
solely to achieve the highest possible return on investment for the firm (Schauenberg 
1998: 23f.). 
In their classic book "A behavioral theory of the firm" (1992) Cyert and March doubt the 
complete rationality of an investment decision: They refer to several actor-related 
constraints such as the bounded rationality of actors, imperfect environmental matching 
and unresolved conflict. Cyert and March (1992: 53) claim that "modem entrepreneurs 
do not know all alternatives nor do they have all information about all alternatives. They 
invest in information only so long as the expected marginal return from the information 
gained exceeds the expected marginal cost." The investment decision is therefore already 
being made in part during the process of the preparation of the decision, through the 
allocation or non-allocation of resources (in the form of time and money) to research and 
collect information. It is therefore possible that some potential locations that are less 
obvious, that do not appear on the 'mental map' of a decision maker (or decision 
preparer, in this case) are not properly investigated or not investigated at all. Regions 
perceived in a negative way or not at all are likely to fall prey to this constraint. 
Moreover, during the first stage of a company's (re)location process, standardised 
information dominates and "in this stage the investigations into a possible location do not 
go much beneath the surface" (Wins 1995: 257). 
The most severe impact on the 'objectivity' of investment decisions seems to lie in the 
bounded rationality of actors within a firm: 
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"( ... ) Rational actors are significantly constrained by limitations of 
information and calculation. Because of those limitations, explicit and timely 
calculations of optimality are costly or impossible. In neoclassical theories of 
the firm, organizations identify, choose and implement optimal alternatives. 
In behavioral theories, organizations simplify the decision problem in a 
number of ways. ( ... ) They follow rules of thumb and standard operating 
procedures." (Cyert and March 1992: 2 14f.) 
This behaviour can be attributed to the limited information processing capabilities of the 
human mind, even if an action is intended to be rational. The capacity of the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex problems is very small "compared with the size of 
the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real 
world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality" (Viale 
1991: 46). 
Furthermore there are environment-related constraints of evaluating all possible 
investment locations. Even in the age of seemingly perfect information available on the 
internet, obtaining reliable information from trustworthy sources can be difficult. Much 
of this 'insider information' only circulates in networks of business communities that are 
often hard to access for newcomers to a certain area. Sydow ( 1992) identified two 
interdependent values in information networks: the quality of the information and the 
ease of access. The richer and more useful the information circulating in a network, the 
harder it is for outsiders to gain access to this network. This is because the network is 
based on the idea of resource exchange for mutual benefit, and good intelligence that 
spreads too far and uncontrolled does no longer represent a benefit for the receiver and 
thus no advantage over a person that does not have access to this network. Especially 
with foreign investment "the stock of information appropriated by an investor shows 
great deficits. Gaining information is often impossible or associated with disproportionate 
cost. A foreign language, a lack of statistics or a lack of willingness to provide 
information in many cases act as hardly surmountable barriers" (Kortiim 1982: 28, own 
translation). 
It can therefore be expected that investment locations that are less well known or do not 
have a clearly 'matching' image tend to be not investigated. Unfortunately the empirical 
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evidence for this is patchy. In my Masters thesis I looked at how Bavarian manufacturing 
companies collected and evaluated information on possible investment locations in 
Mexico (Bickl 2000) and found a strong bias of decision-makers to investigate more 
thoroughly the locations which were already known as a cluster of certain industries or 
for which reliable information was readily available. 
As examined, decision makers can suffer from both information overload as well as a 
lack of information. Both phenomena are likely to lead to simplifications in order to limit 
search and transaction costs of the investment decision. Management and Psychology 
have been interested for quite some time in how decision makers in general, and 
corporate decision makers in particular, have simplified the information about different 
possible alternatives of action and arrived at a more generalised 'image' of options. 
Image theory suggests that 
"people create schematic knowledge structures, or images, which are used to 
help understand information and guide in choosing courses of action. These 
images provide a backdrop for interpreting and calculating all manner of 
stimuli. ( ... ) Thus, for example, we have images of appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviors, successful and less successful projects, desirable and 
undesirable ballplayers, and pleasant and unpleasant music. New stimuli are 
compared with our images, and through these comparisons we develop an 
understanding ofthe context in which we find ourselves."(Dunegan 2003: 62) 
Essentially, image theory predicts that a decision maker's actions are a function of 
perception of three images: value images, representing a consolidation of an individual's 
morals and principles; trajectory images, representing future objectives; and strategic 
images, reflecting current plans and/or tactics (Beach 1990). Together these images help 
evaluate different alternatives of action by providing a framework for comparison. 
"When an alternative 'fits' with the images, it is said to have high image compatibility. 
Conversely, alternatives that do not 'fit' have low image compatibility" (Dunegan 1996: 
414). 
One ofthe central explanatory factors in image theory is 'framing'. Several studies found 
that decision makers are systematically affected by the manner in which problems are 
worded or framed (Dunegan 1991 ). Framing is particularly relevant in the pre-decision 
stages leading up to the actual decision (see figure 2.5) as the action stage is only the end 
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result of a decision episode (Simon 1959). "Preceding the action stage is a process of 
information assimilation and evaluation through which perceptions about conditions 
surrounding the decision emerge" (Dunegan 1991: 379). In one of only a few empirical 
attempts undertaken so far, Dunegan ( 1991) examined the effects of framing on the 
decisions made by R&D managers in the oil industry. He found - in line with previous 
findings- that if perceptions about a possible alternative course of action were negatively 
framed, the decision process was more structured and critical, whereas positive framing 
led to more automatic and less systematic decision processes. This points at the 
possibility that negative perceptions of a potential inward investment location may trigger 
a more critical examination of the option whereas places with an aura of success and 
progress may be researched with a positive bias. 
This finding is consistent with the concept of 'psychological distance' or 'cultural 
distance' (Koglmayr 1990) which claims that the intensity of foreign investment not only 
depends on the actual physical distance of the investment location (that is mainly being 
measured in transport and communication cost) but above all on the perceived distance. 
Accordingly, decision makers tend to favour countries that appear more familiar and 
'closer' to them. For example, on the 'mental map' of most British investors the US seem 
closer than Ukraine, whereas in terms of physical distance the latter is much closer than 
the former. 
In addition to management and psychological research, geographical enquiry has also 
sought to explain processes of simplification and reduction of complexity. Pocock and 
Hudson ( 1978: 19) see the image as "the sum of direct sensory interaction as interpreted 
through the observer's value system, and accommodated in the existing memory store, 
where inputs from indirect sources may be of at least equal importance." They 
specifically point to the function of image as a reduction and simplification of complex 
reality, a theme picked up by Ashworth and Voogd (1990), who argue that with corporate 
decision-makers, image often serves as a substitute for 'the real world' that is far too 
complex to be fully understood. Umberto Eco coined the term 'hyper-reality' to describe 
the effect where the actions of individuals are guided by perception more than reality. 
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Baudrillard (1981) even argued the existence of' simulacra', a copy for which no original 
exists. Therefore, in many cases, "images are more important than the tangible results" 
(Ashworth and Voogd: 1990: 77), and the promotion of a favourable image is crucial for 
regional development. 
In the image formation process, inputs from indirect sources are in many cases more 
important than direct personal experience (Pocock and Hudson 1978: 19). This holds true 
in particular for place images (Zonn 1990). In inward investment, decision-makers 
involved in the investment decision mostly have little personal experience of the region 
in question. The most prominent indirect source of image-forming information is the 
media: "The media are powerful agents in constructing preferred readings and 
interpretations of places, events and people" and play "a fundamental role in discursive 
battles over place identity and, especially, attempts to establish new identities for places" 
(McGuirk and Rowe 2001: 54 f., drawing on Burgess and Gold 1985, Mitchell 1996). 
Public perception of a place is therefore likely to influence firm behaviour (most notably 
the choice of locality for investment), but empirical evidence for this causality is very 
limited (among the few studies attempting to make this link are Burgess 1982, Burgess 
and Wood 1988). 
In summary, there is considerable scope for actor- and environment-related constraints to 
influence the investment decision most in its initial, less formalised and controllable 
stages, where representations and images provide clues as to which locations to discard 
and which locations to investigate in depth. My argument is that places that do not feature 
prominently on investors' mental maps are likely to be discarded without even having 
been properly considered. In today's world-wide competition for investment it is vital 
that potential inward investment destinations attract attention and give themselves a 
visible presence. This claim is a central part of Ham's (200 l) idea of the brand state, 
which will be examined more closely in the following section ofthis chapter. 
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2.~.3. 'Spectacular accumulatimn' in an 'economy of appearances': macro-leveR 
processes 
There is evidence that investor behaviour has changed over the last decades in that it now 
is increasingly image-led. In his influential article "the rise of the brand state", Peter van 
Ham (200 1) looks at processes of framing and mental maps as discussed above, but on an 
aggregate scale. He points at the growing importance of nations to develop and manage a 
'brand' in order to be noticed on the international stage and to be economically 
successful: "Having a bad reputation or none at all is a serious handicap for a state 
seeking to remain competitive in the international arena. The unbranded state has a 
difficult time attracting economic and political attention" (p. l f.). To van Ham, brand and 
image are crucial in "today's world of information overflow" (p.l) where the qualities of 
most places are alike, and, in their attempt of product differentiation, "depend on trust 
and customer satisfaction" (p. 3). The following quote puts forward some of the basic 
functions of image: creating awareness, underpinning identity, attracting attention, and 
building trust: 
"Look at the covers of the brochures in any travel agency and you will see the 
various ways in which countries present themselves on the world's mental 
map. Singapore has a smiling, beautiful face offering us tasty appetizers on an 
airplane, whereas Ireland is a windy, green island full of freckled, red-haired 
children. But do these images depict real places, existing geographical sites 
one can visit? Or do the advertisements simply use cultural stereotypes to sell 
a product? 
Over the last two decades, straightforward advertising has given way to 
branding - giving products and services an emotional dimension with which 
people can identify. In this way, Singapore and Ireland are no longer merely 
countries one finds in an atlas. They have become "brand states," with 
geographical and political settings that seem trivial compared to their 
emotional resonance among an increasingly global audience of consumers. A 
brand is best described as a customer's idea about a product; the "brand state" 
comprises the outside world's ideas about a particular country. 
We all know that "America" and "Made in the U.S.A." stand for individual 
freedom and prosperity; Hermes scarves and Beaujolais Nouveau evoke the 
French art de vivre; BMWs and Mercedes-Benzes drive with German 
efficiency and reliability. In fact, brands and states often merge in the minds 
of the global consumer. For example, in many ways, Microsoft and 
McDonald's are among the most visible U .S. diplomats, just as Nokia is 
Finland's envoy to the world. In today's world of information overload, strong 
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brands are important in attracting foreign direct investment, recruiting the 
best and the brightest, and wielding political influence." 
(Ham 2001: 2, my emphasis) 
Van Ham points at several campaigns undertaken in the past to achieve an image change, 
or to get noticed on the mental map of the global public at all: the shift from "Rule 
Britannia" to "Cool Britannia", or Belgium's attempt "to rebuild the country's reputation 
after years of scandals involving government corruption, child pornography, and dioxin-
polluted chickens" (p.4). 
There is some evidence that certain investment decisions are based solely on the vague 
expectation of immense profits. This phenomenon is what Tsing (2000) termed 
'spectacular accumulation' in an 'economy of appearances'. She describes the "historical 
moments when capital seeks creativity rather than stable reproduction" (p. 118) and that 
"dramatic performance is the prerequisite of ( ... )economic performance" (ibid). In a case 
study of Canadian gold mining company Bre-X, Tsing (2000) gives a detailed account of 
how the company succeeded in persuading thousands of not only private but also 
corporate investors and banks to pour money into a venture that has never been 
profitable. In fact, the gold deposits that Bre-X convincingly claimed to have discovered 
never existed. Tsing ascribes this rush of 'spectacular accumulation' to the obligation for 
corporate investors to seek with increasing speed ever-new niches for the survival and 
success of their enterprises: "Investors are looking for the appearance of success. They 
cannot afford to find out if the product is solid; by then their chances for profit will be 
gone" (p. 141 ). As an example for this, Tsing (2000) quotes real estate development 
which "requires an assessment of desirability and growth, not demonstrated occupancy; it 
sells investors attractiveness. ( ... ) Economic performance is conjured dramatically" (p. 
142). 
2.4.4. Summary 
To conclude, there is evidence that investor behaviour is being increasingly image-led, 
both on an individual and an aggregate level. On the individual level, actor- and 
environment-related constraints are likely to influence an investment decision, 
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particularly in its initial stage, where the decision-makers are trying to reduce complexity 
and use 'rule of thumb' filters to select investment locations that are to be investigated in 
further depth. Less well-known locations are therefore likely to be not even considered, 
and locations that have an unfavourable image are likely to be examined more critically. 
On an aggregate level, the pressures of advanced capitalism to shorten turnover times of 
capital seem to lead to less systematic investment decisions that have to be made in ever-
shorter time, further reducing the chances of less obvious investment locations being 
considered. The media play a crucial role in forming and reinforcing images and 
stereotypes. 
Unfortunately, there seems to be very limited empirical evidence for the contention that 
investors are to a certain degree likely to be influenced by images and perceptions. Even 
an intensive literature search did not yield any studies specifically examining the 
influence of images and representations on investment decisions. The only empirical 
research in this field seems to be Gold and Holcomb's (1983) study that looked at how 
images were being constructed in an attempt to exploit the assumed link between 
perceptions and decision-making. 
Clearly, however, the view that investment decisions are made in a completely rational 
manner cannot be sustained. And even if it could be sustained, it is clear that soft 
locational factors, most prominently quality of life, have become more important in 
investment decisions, especially in industries that rely on the expertise of a well-paid and 
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2.§. Pnace promotimm as a process 
Despite the importance of communication and the role of the media for place marketing, 
research has largely failed to study place promotion as a communication process (Lever 2001: 
56-58). Most research to date has concentrated on the outcome of place imagery, that is the 
promotional material produced, while the process leading to this outcome has largely 
remained obscure. In response to this perceived gap Lever (2001) adapted Johnson's (1986) 
circuit of culture as the 'Image Cycle' (figure 2.6). Lever points out that the communication 
process is a cycle of inextricably linked stages, including a feedback loop from the 
consumption of image to its production, as the 'producers' of place images (public and private 
sector organisations or partnerships between them) will ideally seek to incorporate feedback 
obtained from the target groups. 
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For reasons of clarity and convenience of analysis, this model is a rather crude 
conceptualisation of the image communication process. The model does not reflect the fact 
that in reality there is no succession of clearly delimited stages. Lever (200 1) gave evidence 
for an overlap between the different stages, and that several stages can happen simultaneously. 
What is more, there could be a rather fluid collaboration in the image construction between 
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'constructors', intermediaries and 'consumers', which makes it difficult to draw clear and 
defined lines between the stages as in the model. For example, it could be argued that 
relocation consultants are at the same time constructors, intermediaries and consumers of 
place images. Relocation consultants consume images in the process of information collection 
regarding alternative location options. They construct an image in and through the bundle of 
selected, evaluated and interpreted information that they pass on to their client, usually in the 
form of a report. In doing so, relocation consultants are at the same time consumer as well as 
an intermediary - a medium serving the purpose of transmitting information and images from 
the region to their client. 
2.6. Applicability of marketing concepts 
Much of the literature on place marketing has been implicitly informed by the marketing 
theory of business management, but Ashworth and Voogd (1990) are widely considered to 
have been pioneers in putting forward a theoretical conceptualisation of place marketing. In 
adapting business marketing into planning, they regarded the place as a 'product' to be sold 
(the 'place product'), and the target groups of place marketing as 'consumers'. Accordingly, 
the instruments available for place marketers are 'product' improvement, pricing, and 
promotion (as shown in figure 2.1 ). Following the theory of consumer goods marketing, one 
of the crucial questions of image-management and place marketing is whether place 
promotion and advertising is simply trying to meet consumer demand (that is, to portray the 
image that investors find attractive) or whether place promotion can indeed create demand, 
that is, promote a product (place) through branding in such as way that consumers (investors) 
can be persuaded that the product (the place) has a value of its own. In consumer product 
advertising, creating demand usually requires a very cost- and time-intensive campaign with 
an enormous budget, but compared to the private sector place promotion budgets are very 
small. For example, Deutsche Telekom, Germany's biggest provider of telecommunication, 
spends around € 1 billion per year on promotion, whereas the KVR (the Ruhr Local 
Government Association), who is the main player of place promotion in the Ruhr, has over the 
last years had a communications budget of€ 5 to 7.5 million per year, no more than 7.5% of 
the Telekom budget (personal communication with Dr. Nellen, Director of Communication, 
KVR). 
There are, however, difficulties in adapting some of the existing marketing theories to a place 
promotion context. Due to its complexity and the multitude of stakeholders the 'place 
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product' (Ashworth and Voogd 1990) cannot be marketed like a consumer good. Most 
importantly, marketers are non-profit making, and the 'place product' is partly out of control 
of the marketer. The same goes for the images communicated and their perceptions, which are 
partly out of control of the marketer. First, because places are much more complex, and 
second, perceptions of place are derived from a far broader range of information sources and 
are likely to be more heterogeneous in nature than perceptions of consumer goods and 
services. What is more, places in their entirity are intangible (in contrast to consumer 
products). Thus, selling a place is more like selling an idea than selling a product. Ind (1990), 
who applied marketing theory to image-building efforts of companies (corporate image), 
reported similar conceptual difficulties. 
2.7. From 'old' to 'new' place marketing: the growing prominence of image 
building 
Place promotion has a long history. Ward ( 1998) traced it back to as long ago as the mid-191h 
century, when 'The West' of North America tried to attract settlers and capital (Zube and 
Kennedy 1990). Prominent examples for place promotion in the early 201h century were 
seaside resorts, for example Atlantic City in the US, and Brighton in the UK (Ward 1998, 
chapter 3) competing for tourists, and suburban residential developments around London 
trying to attract dwellers (Gold and Gold 1994). "Contemporary activity is qualitatively 
different to earlier efforts, as much of it involves the re-imaging of localities, rather than 
simply extolling the (existing, M.B.) virtues of a particular place" (Lever 2001: 19, see also 
Hubbard 1996, Waitt 1999). This technique has most prominently been applied to 're-invent' 
the rusty image of old-industrial towns and regions and to transfer it into a modern, 
progressive and high-tech image (Holcomb 1993, 1994; Barke and Harrop 1994). This has 
contributed to a shift from a traditional "try to make the customer buy what you have" to a 
modern "try to have what the customer wants" approach (Holcomb 1994: 116). More 
precisely, the 'new' method should be called "try to make the customer think that you have 
what (s)he wants" approach, as modern place-marketing largely rests on the re-invention of 
places, on the creation of a favourable image (Griffiths 1998). There is thus a strong case for 
focussing attention on the 'heart' of contemporary place marketing, the image-management 
process. 
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LAST APRIL, WE BROKE GROUND ON THE NEW NISSAN PLANT. 
BUT WE'VE ALREADY LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR MUCH MORE. 
When the state of Mississippi and Nissan joined forces it wasn't just to build a new plant, it was to build toward a bright future. Together. 
Our new, leading-edge facility in the city of Canton is where it all starts. I! will soon have the capacity to assemble' some 250,000 
Nissan full-size trucks, full-size SUVs and our next-generation minivan. All to meet the ever-increasing demand for Nissan products 
in North America. And to infuse the local economy with new jobs- potentially up to 4,000. And as if that weren't enough, this 
new plant will spur further growth in and around the state. All of which goes to show that this new facility will do more than produce 
incredible products, it'll produce an incredible amount of pride in all of us. For more information, visit mississippiandnissan.com. 
·u.S.·Buit-conMI of domnltcond globdy ll<lUI<ed parts. Nissan and lhe Nisoan Logo 11e Niaan t!Odemotb. 1:2001 NUan Nonh America, Inc. 
Fig. 2.7: A full-page advert in Business Week. The state of Mississippi and Nissan jointly promoted the 
fact that Nissan had established a sizable factory in the state. 
Source: Business Week 13/02/02. 
What has also changed are the institutional arrangements, both in terms of responsibilities on 
different levels of scale (from national to local government) and in the variety of actors 
involved. While place marketing used to be undertaken by public offices, there is now a web 
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of outsourcing and service providers around public agencies and public-private partnerships. 
Increasingly, private sector companies are not only used as part of the promotional message 
("Company X has located here because it found our place fantastic", see figure 2.7) but their 
involvement is also sought to benefit from private sector capital and expertise in designing 
and carrying out promotional strategies. Even if the responsibility for and control of place 
marketing still rests with public agencies, this change reflects the tendency towards 
privatisation and increasing efficiency encapsulated in the idea of urban entrepreneurialism. In 
many cases, financial budgets are now bigger than ever before. As Holcomb (1994: 120) 
observed, place marketing has now become "professionalized big business". 
Parallel to its rise in practice, social scientists have adopted a growmg interest m the 
promotion of place images, starting with Lynch's pioneering work in 1960, followed up by 
geographers Hudson and Pocock (1978) who acknowledged the connotative, behavioural and 
humanistic qualities of images, in a way that individuals have unique perceptions of and 
responses to their environment. The cultural turn in geography fostered a constructionist view 
of place experience to include perception and cognition. Places were no longer looked at (by 
researchers) as something fixed and abstract, but rather as a social construct that only gains 
meaning through the individuals' reception ('meaning lies in the eye of the beholder'). 
Individuals make sense of a place in many different ways. "Whilst all material may be 
potentially meaningful, it is only made meaningful through its relationship with existing 
cognitive structures" (Prince 1982: 3 quoted in Lever 2001: 20). Places are as much social 
constructs as they are 'real'. In researching the process of this construction, geographic 
research has, since the 1980s, expanded to include the media (Burgess and Gold 1985) as a 
main actor in the construction of place images (Zonn 1990). My thesis looks at how and by 
whom this construction is being undertaken. 
As demonstrated, present-day place marketing is different from that of former times not only 
in scale and intensity, but also in quality. This may be partly explained by the change of the 
environment in which place marketing operates. The early efforts of place promotion took 
place in an environment of economic expansion. Modern, post-industrial marketing, however, 
finds itself in an ever-increasingly competitive environment, as the post-industrial age is 
characterized by disinvestment in industrialised countries (see figure 2.8). In other words, the 
'investment cake' that is to he distributed among the industrialised world is erowing much 
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slower than previously, if not shrinking, which often leads to frantic promotion efforts. In the 
words of Ward (1998: 186), 
"Everywhere throughout the older industrialised countries, cities were 
experiencing major structural changes as their older industries declined with 
obvious replacements. ( ... ) As it dawned on the leaders of these cities that they 
were indeed peering into an economic abyss, with all the associated demographic, 
social and political implications, they began to seek new sources of wealth and 
new ways of stating their importance as places." 
agricultural 
c ~ 0 E 
-Q) tourist resort expansion a. 
~E ~ ·- 0 en o ro a> ~ 0 industrial o ro 
c- ~ - a. 
} disinvestment post-industrial 
Fig. 2.8: A time- and theme-scale of place promotion. Even though, typically, in post-industrial places 
marketing is employed to mitigate the effects caused by disinvestment in certain industry sectors, we 
can also find place marketing in thriving places like Baden-Wurttemberg. 
Source: Author's own work, based on Ward (1998) 
2.8. Summary 
This chapter has introduced the concept of image management - the object of analysis of this 
thesis - and has placed it in the wider context of place marketing, inward investment 
promotion and the new regionalism. It has demonstrated the tautology between image and 
reality, and the associated shift in place promotion away from the presentation of 'hard facts' 
to the promotion of particular lifestyles and cultures. The chapter has also identified four 
reasons for the adoption of image management by localities: dissatisfaction with traditional 
instruments of place marketing, changes in investor behaviour, increasing competition 
between places, and the associated normative discourse of competitiveness and 
entrepreneurialism. Overall, the chapter has demonstrated that image is regarded as an 
important factor of economic development, and that there is considerable scope for images 
and representations to influence an investment location decision. The evidence for this, 
however, is often anecdotal, which is partly due to methodological difficulties associated with 
empirical research on this topic. Some of these methodological choices and challenges will be 
outlined in the following chapter. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
One of the most difficult empirical problems faced in the analysis of public 
policies is determining specifically who the consequential actors might be in any 
policy domain. Although one might be able to begin to specifY these actors by 
utilizing a good understanding of formal institutions and of the persons occupying 
key positions, such a specification is almost inevitably bound to be incomplete. 
Policy-making is replete with informal relationships and the operation of subtle, 
somewhat opaque norms that empower certain actors in unexpected ways. 
(Coleman 2001: 11610) 
This chapter examines methodological challenges and choices. It describes the 
methodological approach and the process of data collection and evaluation. As previously 
mentioned, image and representations are complex and elusive concepts, and thus a variety of 
methods were used: analysis of secondary data such as statistics and existing academic 
studies, press articles and policy documents; semi-structured interviews; and an analysis of 
the promotional material produced. Multiple methods were used to yield a deeper and richer 
explanation. 
3.1. Research design 
On an epistemological level - due the complexity of the image management process - it 
seems advisable to adopt a case study approach. As examined in the previous chapter, image 
building is a multi-layered and multifaceted process. A detailed understanding of these 
processes is most likely to be achieved through an in-depth study concentrating on one or a 
few examples (Yin 2003). On a practical level, the limited time and monetary budget 
available mean that an in-depth study can only be undertaken of a limited number of cases. 
Research has hitherto shown a clear preference in terms of size and location of case study 
areas: the vast majority of studies have concentrated on cities in general and large cities in 
particular, and on North American, and more generally, English-speaking countries of the 
'developed' world. The regional level of analysis as well as non-English speaking and 
international contexts have received little attention, despite the merit of an international 
comparative study of regions. Firstly, it is widely acknowledged that areas of coherent 
economic activity extend well beyond city boundaries and into the region, and place 
promotion is often conducted on a regional level (for example, Regional Development 
Agencies in Britain or the Uinder governments in Germany). At the same time, it is still the 
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nation state that is the most important scale of regulation, setting most of the 'rules of the 
game' for regional economic development and place promotion. At the supranational level of 
regulation, the EU has been gaining influence through the operation of a single market and the 
Regional Development Fund, both of which changed the conditions of competition between 
the European regions and affected the regional responses to this competition, including place 
marketing. In a "Europe of the Regions" the EU sees itself distributing, through its structural 
and cohesion funds, money directly to regions rather than the nation state. This constitutes a 
strong practical and political imperative for regions to demonstrate their political ability to 
act. Yet there are tensions between regions, nation state, and EU as to in how far national 
governments in practice adhere to the principle of 'additionality', or whether they use EU 
funds to substitute their national regional development assistance. 
Since I want to concentrate on the interplay between processes of governance, place 
promotion and the use of images, I find it advisable to select case study areas that are in a 
similar socio-economic situation but are set in the context of different political systems and 
traditions of governance. A focus of my research will be how different national and regional 
institutional settings influence the regional image building process, and how EU and nation 
state frameworks are being reinterpreted at the regional level. 
Evidence suggests that the operation and effectiveness of image communication in place 
promotion is to a great extent influenced by governance and policy-making processes. 
Regulation and governance are undoubtedly bound up with questions of scale and the 
delimitation of territory, for processes of governance do not take place on a single, level and 
nation-wide playing field. Even in a (still) centralist country like the UK, in which England 
does not have any tier of government between the nation state and local government, there is a 
much greater number of agents of governance on various scales, even if the number, nature 
and the exact territorial delimitation of these agents of governance can be difficult to 
establish. As Alien et al. (1998) have demonstrated in the case of the South-East of England, 
regions are not 'out there' waiting to be discovered. They are constructed and constantly 
modified through human activity. Thus, a region is a product of social and cultural relations. 
Therefore, an examination of processes of governance of place marketing has to be preceded 
by an attempt to delineate the region(s) in question. This will be done in the following chapter 
(Regional Case Studies). 
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In examining the image cycle, my starting point will be the influence of institutional 
arrangements and their collaboration on different scales. I would argue that in EU member 
countries these arrangements are mainly determined by the nation state, even though the EU is 
gaining importance as a regulatory body. This is a case for the selection of countries as a first 
step, followed by the identification of appropriate regions. 
The main reason for the focus of this thesis on regions rather than local authorities or the 
nation state is twofold: On a theoretical level, there are strong claims that regions have, for 
some time, been the most important economic units. Storper (1995 and 1997) sees the region 
as the nexus of untraded interdependencies, and his basic argument is that the region is best 
able to capitalise on those interdependencies, as the local scale is too small to allow for 
meaningful exchange and synergies, and the national scale too big to enable the functioning of 
institutions (in the wider sense) that require spatial proximity. 
Secondly, the region is the focus of intense political debate in both Britain and Germany. In 
Britain, the process of devolution is currently asymmetric with Scotland and, to a certain 
extent, Wales and Northern Ireland being equipped with considerable powers of self-rule. The 
proposed introduction of regional governments in England is a matter of heated debate, and 
while most of the public discussion runs along political and cultural lines, one of the crucial 
questions is whether or not the region is an appropriate scale of economic governance. One of 
the central aims of the British government in encouraging devolution is the hope that 
economic performance of the English regions will improve (the link between regional 
governance and economic performance has been examined in more detail in chapter 2.3). In 
Germany, national-regional government relations are fairly stable, but there is considerable 
tug-of-war between the federal and Uinder governments about competencies of economic 
policy, with the two sides accusing each other of interfering with and undermining the 
sovereignty of the other side and transgressing the boundaries of self-rule guaranteed by the 
Basic Law. 
While this has been a very short discussion (for a deeper and systematic analysis of the 
resurgence of the interest in regions, see Wood 2001 and Storper 1995), it has provided 
justification for my focus on the region as the object of analysis. As demonstrated above, 
there is also a strone; empirical justification for this focus. Jn hoth in Germany and Britain 
regions were the scale on which the most costly and visible image management efforts have 
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occurred to date. Examples include Scotland, Wales, North East England and North West 
England in Britain, and Baden-Wtirttemberg, Saxony and the Ruhr in Germany. There is also 
widespread recognition among planners and economic development practitioners that the 
region has become an area of increasingly dense economic relationships. In Germany, one of 
the most prominent current debates in urban and regional planning is centred around 'city 
regions' (Blotevogel 2000), prompted by an understanding that exchange relationships are 
intensifying regionally, such as widening commuter catchment areas and regional sales and 
supply relationships. 
Selection of case study areas 
Overall, I tried to select 'typical' cases (Stake 1995). The case study areas selected exemplify 
the phenomena of de-industrialisation and socio-economic tensions that I want to explore. I 
have therefore selected countries 'typical' for a certain political system of regional-national 
power relations, and regions 'typical' for their dependence on a declining industrial base and 
their image problems. I would argue that a number of case study area of two leaves enough 
time to understand the complexity of each case and the commonalities and differences 
between them, while at the same time not putting excessive demands on resources. 
Countries 
Within the EU, the range of political systems and power-sharing in nation states between the 
local, the regional and the national scale range from centralist to federal. On the other hand, 
the political power-sharing is not set in stone, and one important factor of influence is the 
constant re-negotiation of the status quo through everyday political practice, as well as 
through more formal negotiation, informed by popular demand of people living in the regions 
as well as private sector companies and their interest groups. Within individual countries the 
regional level of government - if it exists - enjoys various degrees of constitutional 
recognition and resulting bargaining power that draws on various bases of power, ranging 
from constitutionally enshrined rights to everyday political practice. One of my key research 
hypotheses is that attempts of image management on the regional level are contingent on 
differences in state traditions (as set out below) because of the variations in cohesion and 
policy-making powers held by regions. 
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The United Kingdom and Germany provide an interesting comparison, since they represent 
two different traditions of political systems and approaches to regional-national distribution of 
power, including regional policy: 
The United Kingdom consists of four nations and is governed rather centrally. Only recently 
has devolution within England begun, in recognition of the current asymmetry of Scotland 
and Wales having their own parliament or assembly while there is no layer of government in 
England between the national and the local scale. Some commentators and regional politicians 
see the hitherto purely economic Regional Development Agencies as a first step towards a 
regional government. In the policy field of place marketing, the North East has repeatedly 
demanded from central government to create a more level playing field, as there are fears in 
the North East that the massive inward investment promotion budgets of Scottish Enterprise 
and the Welsh Development Agency could jeopardise the North East's share of inward 
investment inflows (Pike 2002). Economic development policy, however, is just one element 
in central government's political drive to establish regional government in the English 
regions. In this process, North East England will be the first region to hold a referendum on 4 
November 2004 on whether or not it wants a regional government with extended powers not 
only in economic development but also transport, housing and cultural policy. 
Germany represents the opposite end of the spectrum, with a strong federal tradition that has 
two to three (this depends on the individual Land) layers of elected government between local 
and federal government. Germany as a nation state was formed relatively late, when 26 
independent or semi -autonomous states united in 1871 to form the Deutsches Reich (Schubert 
and Klein 2001 ). After World War 11, the Uinder were reorganised so that with the exception 
of Bavaria and the city states of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, all Uinder are now parts of or 
amalgamations of former states. North Rhine Westphalia, for example, was created from three 
Prussian provinces; North Rhine, Westphalia, and Lippe-Detmold (Andersen and Woyke 
2000). Despite these divisions and amalgamations, regional identity is generally strong and 
reflected in a high degree of autonomy for each of the 16 Liinder which have their own tax-
raising powers and responsibility for essential matters such as education, policing, and 
regional planning (Federal Government Information Service 2001). Chapter 4 (Regional Case 
Studies) contains a more detailed outline of national-regional power relations in Germany and 
the UK. 
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Following Loughlin and Peters' analysis (1997), the United Kingdom and Germany 
exemplify two fundamentally different state traditions. They argue that any political reform or 
policy innovation, be they gradual or revolutionary, can only be understood in the context of 
the long-standing political traditions and attitudes (StaatsversHindnis) of the state in which 
they occur. Loughlin and Peters (1997) also acknowledge the "very long-term and pervasive 
effects of institutional choices" (p. 43, my emphasis) and the mutual dependency between 
state traditions and these choices. State traditions can therefore be seen as "sets of institutions 
and cultural practices that constitute a set of expectations about behaviour" (Loughlin and 
Peters 1997: 47). These observations are in line with Brenner's (2004: 107) argument ofpath-
dependent state development that is "best conceived as a layering process in which newly 
emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies (i.e. institutional frameworks and 
specific policies, M.B.) are superimposed upon entrenched morphologies of state spatial 
organization." Maintaining Brenner's analogy of geological layering state traditions would be 
the bedrock on which all other layers are based but which can still be subject to change, albeit 
incremental more often than revolutionary. This is because the compatibility of political 
projects is measured against long-standing state traditions, but on the other hand everyday 
political practice often gradually changes attitudes towards existing state traditions and 
eventually might effect a change of traditions. 
One of the main differences between Anglo-Saxon state traditions as manifest in Britain on 
the one hand and Germanic state traditions on the other lies in the fact that the former largely 
lacks a legal basis for the state. In addition, in the Germanic tradition there are "a number of 
governments at several levels each expressing the authority of the state" (Loughlin and Peters 
1997: 48), whereas in Britain there traditionally has been little room for any expression of 
state power other than through central government, and this is reflected in the fact that in the 
UK all power currently held at levels below the nation state is completely at the discretion of 
central government. The existing degree of devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, as well as the English RDAs (which are often interpreted as a first step towards a 
regional government) could be revoked at any time simply through an act of the Westminster 
Parliament. Indeed, the UK used to have rather powerful local governments, but many of 
these powers have been taken away during several waves of policy centralisation, especially 
during Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, and to a lesser extent since Labour came to 
power. Any state power expressed at the local level has been and still is determined centrally. 
In Germany, the simultaneous representation of state power by governments on several scales 
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leads to a high degree of Politikverflechtung (interlocking federalism). This results in a high 
degree of consensual politics and bargaining as both federal and Uinder governments are able 
to effectively block each other's proposed legislation in many policy areas (These struggles 
are outlined in more detail in chapters 4.3 and 4.4). 
The two different state traditions have also given rise to differing interpretations of the merits 
of regionalisation, be it in the administrative or political sense (elsewhere I have made the 
distinction between regionalisation [administrative, executive] and devolution [political, 
legislative]). Following Loughlin and Peters' ( 1997) line of argument the project of political 
regionalisation is more compatible with Germanic than with Anglo-Saxon state traditions: 
"regional governments, as emanations of the central government ( ... ), are foreign to the 
[ Anglo-Saxon state] tradition" (Loughlin and Peters 1997: 51). On the face of it, in the semi-
unitary state of the United Kingdom there seems to be a contradiction between unitarianism 
and regionalisation. However, as Loughlin and Peters (1997: 47) argue at the example of the 
French state, there can be a compatibility between the unitary logic "and the regionalist logic 
providing the latter is not an expression of federalism." Therefore, not only administrative 
decentralisation but even political regionalisation can be seen as a strengthening of the unitary 
state, improving the effectiveness and cohesion of the unitary state through increasing 
administrative efficiency and softening separatist movements. 
In the context of image management and institutions it is important to look at each national 
regionan policy. The core of many regional development policies has been to foster the 
development of institutional arrangements that encourage economic growth. Crucial to growth 
is a positive business climate, part of this in turn is a good image. Despite all claims of the 
hollowing out of the nation state it is still the central government that "determines the 'rules 
of the game' for local actors, albeit that these may in turn be reinterpreted in different local 
contexts." (Gibbs et al. 2001: 1 06). This suggests that despite the same national context there 
is scope for different developments and institutional set-ups in different regions of the same 
nation-state. In its regional policy, the UK has traditionally employed a top-down approach, 
with the process of regional development being centrally governed. Only over the last decade 
or so has central government handed down competencies to regions and localities, largely as 
part of a more entrepreneurial approach to regional development (Hall and Hubbard 1998), 
involving greater financial self-reliance of localities. (West) German regional policy has been 
a mixture of federal and Uinder-driven approaches. While local governments are dependent 
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on state and federal subsidies and thus lack complete financial autonomy, they enjoy almost 
unrestricted sovereignty in spatial planning. 
Regions 
There are a number of rationales for the choice of regions. Firstly, since the regional image 
and attempts to modify these representations are my object of analysis, appropriate regions 
must have an image problem. The underlying assumption is that image management largely is 
a reaction to problems in attracting investment as a result of an unfavourable image. In other 
words, 'you don't care about your image unless you perceive it as an obstacle'. It is regions in 
crisis that are likely to suffer from an image problem, but at the same time are in particular 
need of inward investment as part of a regeneration strategy. This makes a case for selecting 
old-industrial regions that are trying to break out of the vicious circle of image problems and 
under-investment. This ties in with arguments about the interdependence between a lack of 
institutional capacity and poor regional economic performance (Gibbs et al. 2001 ). 
The focus on old-industrial areas would still leave several regions to choose from in Germany, 
especially in the Eastern Uinder. However, I decided against selecting an East German region 
as this would distort the comparison. First, because the challenges of economic transition in 
the five new Uinder are much more fundamental than in the West, namely from a socialist 
planned to a capitalist, social market economy. There is no region in the UK facing a 
challenge of an equivalent scale, and therefore a meaningful comparison would hardly be 
viable. Second, and partly as a consequence of the first point, federal government intervention 
in East Germany since re-unification has been (and still is) much greater than in the Western 
Uinder (Sturm 1997: 276), mainly because of the radical restructuring of the Eastern Uinder 
that had to be achieved in a short amount of time. It can be assumed that this high degree of 
direct federal government intervention will apply only until the transition is largely 
accomplished and is a temporary, atypical state. Therefore, an East German region at this 
point in time would represent a rather atypical example for Germany and for the Germanic 
state tradition as a whole. 
I argue that old-industrial regions have a specific set of image problems, different from those 
of other types of European 'problem regions' such as the south-west of Ireland or the Greek 
Islands (which arguably have less of an image problem). A theme that appeared in most ofthe 
interviews undertaken for this thesis was that old-industrial areas are often perceived as run-
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down, ugly, boring, polluted, haunted by unemployment, poverty and social unrest, as a 
region whose best times are over. Note that some of these descriptors are rather emotional, 
such as "ugly" and "boring". Many of these places have come to realise their image problem 
and are attempting to re-invent themselves (Holcomb 1993, 1994), and there are 'discursive 
battles' (McGuirk and Rowe 2001) over a new, 'appropriate' image. The KVR, the Ruhr's 
Local Government Association, commissioned an image study before the start of its first 
campaign in 1985. A survey of 2,000 German households showed that the overall interest in 
the Ruhr from outside was low. The images most frequently associated with the region were: 
grey and unattractice industrial region, one-sided economy with no future, low quality of life, 
environmental pollution, and low educational attainment (Dahlhoff 1989, Kerkemeyer and 
Thies 1993, KVR 1995). 
Secondly, to isolate the influence of institutional structures, learning strategies and leadership 
on the image management process, the regions ideally have comparable characteristics such 
as comparable size and socio-economic conditions. 
North East England Ruhr 
Country United Kingdom Germany 
Name of region North East Nordrhein-Westfalen (EU NUTS1) 
EU Regional 
Objective 2 (parts of the Development Fund Objective 2 (most of the region) 
classification region) 
Area (km2 ) 34,000 8,600 
Population (million) 2.6 5.1 
Manufacturing sector 22.5% 32.0% 
employment 
Unemployment 6.7% 11.9% 
Per capita GDP (national 76 98 
average = 1 00%) 
Special case: four nations 
within one nation state. Federal 
Political system of nation Centralist, unitary; partial and Regional government structure 
state asymmetrical devolution virtually unchanged since 
Frequent change in regional 1949. 
government structure 
Political power of region Low but growing High but decreasing 
Main economic National government and Land government and Ruhr development and place 
promotion stakeholder regional development agency Local Government Association 
organisations (KVR) 
Fig. 3.1: Some political and socio-economic characteristics of the case study areas 
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On the basis of these considerations I selected two case study areas that share similar socio-
economic characteristics, that are old-industrial, are considered 'peripheral', and that have an 
image problem, set in two different political contexts of nation states: the North East of 
England and the Ruhr in Germany. The North East has a political boundary in the form of it 
being a region as defined by central government, whereas the Ruhr is part of the Land of 
North-Rhine Westphalia (NR W). 
Figure 3.1 shows a profile of the two case study regions and specifies how they meet the 
criteria set out above: 
Old-industrial: both regions have a large stock of 'old' industries that are in decline. Both 
have reduced their dependence on manufacturing as the main source of employment, but 
they are still considered 'problem regions' by the EU and therefore eligible for Objective 
2 ('structural problems') ERDF funding. In a wider sense, old-industrial does not 
necessarily have to refer to concentrations of heavy manufacturing and engineering but 
simply to industry that is considered not be a significant source of revenue and 
employment in the future. 
Image problem: Both areas are trying to 're-invent' themselves and build a better image. 
Both regions have to a certain degree succeeded in attracting 'future-proof industries and 
in diversifying their source of employment. 
Peripheral: North East England is peripheral even just considering its physical location. 
Using a broad definition of periphery as opposed to 'core' introduces the concept of 
marginality (Bailly and Weiss-Altaner 1995). Economically and socially both regions can 
be considered 'marginal', as they are not exactly the 'hot spots' oftheir national economy. 
Both regions are also 'marginal' in a political sense as they are largely excluded from 
policy-making: the powers ofthe Ruhr's regional body, the KVR, are limited to very few 
policy areas, and North East England has no regional government at all. 
3.2. Data sources and methods of analysis 
As outlined previously, the concept of image is elusive, and political arrangements are 
complex. This, coupled with an interest in examining processes, suggests that qualitative 
methods are appropriate as the main data source. 
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3.2.1. §ecmullary sou:nrces 
Both regions have been selected (a) because they are old-industrial and economic 
development professionals perceive this old-industrial image as a disadvantage and (b) upon 
economic and social indicators showing that both are among the most disadvantaged regions 
of their country. Additionally, existing academic literature as well as ERDF publications (EU 
Commission 1999) identified both regions as having structural problems (Vanhove 1999). 
The relevant investment promotion agencies have been identified through the World Bank's 
Investment Promotion Agency Directory (http://www.ipanet.net). On a national level, the 
relevant agencies are: UK Trade & Investment (Formerly InvestUK and Invest in Britain 
Bureau), and the Office of the Commissioner for Foreign Investment. Both agencies and my 
own fieldwork have helped identifYing the relevant economic development/inward investment 
promotion agencies on the regional and local level. 
3.2.2. Primary data 
Since most of the required information is more specific than that available from secondary 
sources, I had to undertake a significant amount of fieldwork. The methods used were semi-
structured interviews and, to a lesser extent, document analysis of the promotional material 
produced and of public and internal publications on the image management process. The 
construction, communication and consumption of images cannot be directly observed, 
because they (a) take or took place at a time different to my fieldwork (i.e. in the past, or take 
too long to be observed in a two-year fieldwork period), and (b) because the construction and 
exploitation of representations are often mental processes and/or based on informal contacts, 
for both of which no external records exist. Therefore, I largely had to rely on promotional 
material as one the few tangible products of image building, and on what the actors involved 
were willing and able to tell me about the processes behind the image-building activities. 
As a first step I needed to find out what organisations and individuals were involved. The 
source for this information could be (a) internal notes and documents of organisations 
involved, (b) interviews with key persons in these organisations. It turned out during the 
research that (a) hardly existed or, where it did, was in most cases not made available to me, 
which meant that I had to rely on (b) as the most appropriate and feasible way of date 
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collection. A total of 59 interviews were conducted with senior members of organisations and 
institutions involved in image building: 
e Government of various scales: (EU, national, regional) and public sector organisations 
(mostly economic development agencies). In both case study areas local government 
departments or economic development agencies were interviewed. In the example ofNorth 
East England, the former group comprised national and local government - as there is no 
regional layer of government. The latter group comprises UK Trade & Investment, ONE 
North East, and economic development organisations of local government (e.g. the County 
Durham Development Company) 
e Private sector companies and their interest groups (e.g. chambers of commerce). These can 
be divided into those companies who have a vested interest in a positive image of the 
region they are rooted in, and those who provide professional services to place marketing 
and image building efforts (e.g. graphic design, advertising or media companies), but who 
otherwise have no particular attachment to the region. 
e Citizens' and community groups (e.g. local initiatives, trade unions) 
• Informal partnerships and official coalitions. These are usually public-private partnerships 
between the state and private companies, for example, local regeneration schemes, but can 
also involve wider participation, such as the Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative. Partnerships 
in the Ruhr were mostly formal whereas the North East contains many fluid or short-lived 
and less formal partnership arrangements, which makes their identification more difficult. 
To reflect the heterogeneity of both case study areas in the sampling process I made sure that 
typical cases in both regions were included: for example, in North East England interviews 
with economic development agencies included the region's administrative and financial 
centre of Newcastle, the old-industrial shipbuilding and steelmaking areas of Wearside and 
Teesside, and rural Wear Valley with an economy that is based on agriculture, tourism, and 
significant commuting to the region's conurbations. The same idea was followed in the Ruhr, 
where economic development agencies interviewed included the northern part of the Ruhr 
where mining and chemical industries are still active, Bochum as a city attempting re-
industrialisation, Duisburg as a growing location of call centres, Essen as the 'city centre' of 
the Ruhr and headquarter location of most of the Ruhr's largest firms, and Dortmund as a city 
that has successfully attracted high-technology companies. 
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As far as the order of case study areas is concerned, I began with the North-East of England as 
a first investigative study. This allowed me to refine my research questions and methods in a 
place where support from supervisors and University facilities were readily available. The 
fieldwork was spread out over a total of 3 years. The pre-test interviewing took place in June 
and July 2001 across both regions. The bulk of interviews in the North-East were conducted 
from August to November 2001, and in the Ruhr during my time as a visitor to the 
Department of Geography at Mercator University, Duisburg, between January and April 2002 
and again in September 2002. The interviews were rounded off by a visit to the EU 
Commission for Regional Development in January 2003. 
Quantitative versus qualitative methods 
Quantitative methods are usually chosen "when the goal of the study is to represent some 
phenomenon numerically" (Cocking and Cuba 1994: 92) whereas "qualitative methods are 
best suited to answering questions about social organisation and processes ( ... ) and to 
illustrate the richness and expressiveness of social interaction as it occurs in specific contexts" 
(ibid). The elusive nature of the concept of "image" coupled with an interest to examine 
processes suggests that qualitative methods are appropriate. 
More concretely, the method of semi-structured interviews with key actors was chosen for 
three reasons (Lamnek 1989). Firstly, semi-structured interviews offer enough freedom to be 
flexible when moving into a comparatively unchartered research territory. They give the 
interviewee the chance to express their opinions in their own words, without having to make 
their comments 'fit' the predetermined answer categories of a questionnaire survey. On the 
other hand, the systematically structured catalogue of questions achieves a certain 
comparability of answers and ideally prevents interviewees from 'drifting off to irrelevant 
issues. Secondly, in the ideal world the interviewer and the interviewee establish an 
atmosphere of trust during the interview. In this way interviewees are more likely to answer 
sensitive questions and give franker replies. This is especially relevant in the case of 
interviews with private sector companies who are afraid of leaking sensitive business data and 
strategies, and to a certain degree also with public sector organisations that have to be careful 
to appear neutral, or not to offend their political supporters. Thirdly, interview schedules can 
be adapted to the progression of knowledee over time about the object of investigation and 
enable a gradual focussing on the most relevant aspects. 
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Carrying out the interviews 
The interview schedule was designed for a length of one hour, representing a compromise 
between my desire to cover a comprehensive list of questions and the interviewees' limited 
time. Most interviews lasted for about one hour, with considerable variations due to a lack of 
time or a particular 'talkativeness' of interviewees. The shortest interview was just 10 
minutes, and the longest one was two hours and twenty-five minutes. Most interviews were 
conducted face-to-face in the interviewee's office. A small number were conducted in public 
places such as cafes or parks, and one in my Durham office. A limited number of interviews 
were conducted over the telephone, at the interviewee's request. Those were on average 
considerably shorter than the average face-to-face interview. A total of 59 interviews have 
been undertaken in the two case study areas (fig. 3.2). Because of the wish of several 
interviewees to remain anonymous some individuals are not named. 
In both case study areas, the selection of interviewees was aimed at drawing in the views of as 
many groups of stakeholders as possible. The first group of interviews was conducted with 
staff of economic development agencies and aimed at clarifying their involvement in image 
building. The second round of interviews was conducted with place promotion stakeholders 
from the public and private sector and from civil society. In the North East this consisted 
mainly of the organisations that were involved in the 'Image Strategy Steering Committee' 
that served as a consultative forum for the development of the Regional Image Strategy, led 
by One North East. In the Ruhr, this group consisted of stakeholders that were directly 
involved in the Ruhr's image building activities through their representation at the KVR, or 
pursued image building activities independently of the regional body KVR. The third group of 
interviewees in both case study areas were specialised service providers involved in the image 
campaigns, such as advertising agencies, media production and PR companies. The last group 
of interviews was carried out with companies that had recently located in or relocated to the 
region from elsewhere. 
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Person Title Organisation Date "'C "'C 






NORTH EAST ENGLAND 
NI Peter Eltis Assistant Director of Department of Economy & 27/06/01 p N 
Economic Development Environment, Redcar and 
Cleveland Council 
N2 Alan Bell Marketing Manager Tees Valley Development 23/07/01 p T 
Company 
N3 Phil Eadon Head of Inward Investment County Durham Development 30/07/01 p T 
Company 
N4 Ruth Laing Head of Public Relations One North East (ONE) 08/08/01 p T 
and Marketing 
Kay Wilson Head of Communications North East Assembly 
N5 Myles Handy Director of Economic Wear Valley District Council 23/08/01 p T 
Development 
N6 Geoff Head of Economic Development and Enterprise Group 31/08/01 p T 
Turn bull Development Service Gateshead Council 
N7 Rick O'Farrell Head of Inward Investment Government Office for the NE 19/09/01 p T 
N8 Paul Dobbie Owner-Director Persuasion Ltd. (then Gentle 18110/01 p T 
Persuasion Ltd.) 17/05/02 p N 
N9 Clare Copsey Inward Investment Officer Tyne and Wear Development 22/10/01 p T 
Company 
NIO Ross Forbes Head of Communications Atmel UK at Newcastle 30110/01 p T 
and Human Resources 
Nll Bill Director of Libraries, Arts Learning and Culture Group 16111102 p T 
Mac Naught and Lifelong Learning Gateshead Council 
Nil John Ashby Assistant Director of Durham County Council 19111/01 p T 
Economic Development 
NI3 Or Peter Slee Head of Corporate University of Durham 20/11/01 p T 
Communications 
NI4 Andrew Dixon Chief Executive Northern Arts 21111101 p T 
NlS Neil Rami Director Newcastle Gateshead Initiative 23/11/01 p T 
Nl6 Bill Midgley Director British Chamber of Commerce 27111/01 p T 
Member of the Executive North East Assembly 
Director County Durham Cricket Club 
Chairman Century Radio 
Member of the Council University of Newcastle 
Past President North East Cham of Commerce 
N17 Gary Director of Pub I ic Relations Procter&Gamble, Newcastle 24/05/01 p N 
Cunningham 
N18 John Tomaney Professor Centre for Urban and Regional 27/05/02 p T 
Development Studies 
University of Newcastle 
Nl9 Or Fred Lecturer of Sociology Department of Sociology 17/07/02 p T 
Robinson University of Durham 
N20 Juan Arregui European Liaison Officer North of England Brussels Office 20/01/03 p T 
McGullion 
N21 Kate Head, Public Relations One North East 03/12/03 p T 
Mac Naught 
N22 Michael Bishop of Durham (retired) Church of England 06/02/04 T T 
Turn bull 
N23 Lesley Information Manager, One North East 29/07/04 p N 
Broughton -Investor Development 
N24 David Then: Director of Marketing Northern Development Company 03/08/04 p T 




Rl Klaus Kipper- Head of Marketing and Essener WirtschaftstOrderungs- 20/06/01 p N 
Doktor International Relations gesellschaft mbH 
R2 Heinz-JUrgen Head of Industry, IHK Essen, MUiheim, Oberhausen 20/06/01 p N 
Hacks Technology, Environment (Chamber of Commerce) 
R3 Udo Thies Head of Design, Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 20/06/01 p N 
Department of Public (KVR) 
Relations 
R4 Dr. Uwe Managing Director lnitiativkreis Ruhrgebiet 21/06/01 p N 
Stocklossa 
R5 Dr. Rainer Executive Director Gesellschaft flir Wirtschaftsfdrderung 21/06/0 I p N 
1-Iornig Nordrhein-Westfalen GmbH 
R6 Dr. Roland Managing Director Pro Ruhrgebiet e. V. 26/06/01 T N 
Kirchhof 
R7 Jens Geier Director, External Projekt Ruhr GmbH I 0/01/02 p T 
Relations 
R8 Udo Mager Director Dortmund Project (PPP between City 17/01/02 p T 
Patrick Dufour Project Manager of Do and private sector) 
R9 Patrick Dufour Project Manager Dortmund Project 22/01/02 p T 
RIO Gerd Frohlich Managing Director Emscher-Lippe-Agentur 25/01/02 p T 
Rll Uwe KnUpfer Editor Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 06/02/03 p T 
R12 Heinz Economic Development Bezirksregierung DUsseldorf 06/02/02 p T 
Weselsky + Commissioner (DUsseldorf District government) 
Wemer 
Fin ken 
Rl3 Jorg Head of Regional Policy Niederrheinische IHK (Lower Rhine 13/02/02 p T 
W inkelstriiter Chamber of Commerce) 
R14 Martin Breuer Creative Director Euro RSCG (advertising agency) 13/02/02 p T 
R15 K. Volkenand Managing Partner FGK Die Zweite (advertising agency) 20/03/02 p N 
Ralf Kahmann Managing Partner 
F. Dornieden Creative Director 
R16 Dr. Ralf Head, Technology and DGB Bezirk NRW (NRW trade 26/03/02 p T 
Bartels + Regional Policy union council) 
Carmen Union Rep. at KVR 
Tietjen 
R17 Ralf J. Meurer Managing Director Gesellschaft fiir Wirtschaftsforderung 26103102 p T 
Melanie Head of External Relations Duisburg mbH (Ec.Dev. Corporation) 
Bodeck 
Rl8 Gerd E.Kolbe Germany Correspondent Neue ZUricher Zeitung 27/03/02 p T 
R19 Dr. Wolfgang Chairman Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir 09/04/02 p T 
Ebert lndustriekultur 
R20 Dr. Baldur Head of Department of Diocese of Essen 18/04/02 p T 
Hermans Social Affairs 
R21 Christoph Head of Communications IG BCE (Mining, Chemicals and 06/09/03 p T 
Meer Energy Union) 
R22 H.-M. Dirks Head Department of Economic 12/09/02 p T 
Ulrich Storch Locational Consulting Development, City of Bochum 
R23 Reiner Seeker Branch Director Salomon Automation GmbH, 17/09/02 p T 
Dortmund 
R24 Alexander T. Chair of the Board Acardo Technologies AG, Bochum 18/09/03 p N 
SchUie 
R25 Antje Moller Head of Communications Six Flags AG, Essen (runs Movie 19/09/02 T T 
World for Warner Bros.) 
R26 Dr. Dieter Head of Public Relations Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 20/09/02 p N 
Ne lien 
R27 Dr. Wilfried Head, Economic Analysis Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 20/09/02 p N 
Dege 
R28 Dr. Hans-Peter Head, Political Affairs RWE AG, Essen 26/09/02 p N 
Meurer 
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R29 Axel Schappei Head of Communications RAG, Essen 26/09/02 p 
R30. Klaus Head of Corporate ThyssenKrupp AG, DUsseldorf 26/09/02 T 
Pepperhoff Communications 
R31 Anonymous Senior manager Dresdner Direktservice GmbH (Call 27/09/02 T 
centre operator) 
R32 Seppo Head of Corporate Nokia Deutschland GmbH 27/09/02 T 
Lehtinen Communications 
R33 Anonymous Senior manager Representation ofthe State ofNRW 16/01/03 p 
to the EU 
EU COMMISSION 
El Manfred Director, Cl EU Commission for Regional 16/01/03 p 
Beschel Development 
E2. Anonymous "A senior source in the EU EU Commission for Regional 11/06/03 p 
Commission" Development 
Fig. 3.2: List of interviews undertaken 
(P = interview in person, T = over the phone, T = transcript, N = notes) 
c:: 
.e Type of organisation Interview Total 01 
numbers number Q) a:: 
Economic development Regional 4, 20,21,23,24 5 Sub-regional 2, 3, 9, 12, 4 
agencies or departments Local 1, 5, 6, 11, 15 5 
- Government National 7 1 z Regional (to be) 4, 16 2 
-... PR service providers 8 1 m 
ns 
w Public bodies (education, 13, 14, 16 3 
.c culture, sport) t:: 
0 
Other stakeholders Private sector companies 10, 16, 17 3 z 
or their associations 
Civil society (trade unions, 22 1 
churches) 
Academic experts 18, 19 2 
Land 5, 7, 33 3 
Economic development Regional n/a (does not 0 
exist) 
agencies or departments Sub-regional 10, 12, 2 
Local 1, 8, 9, 17,22 5 
~ Government Land None 0 
- Regional 3, 26, 27 3 ... 
.c PR service providers and press 11, 14, 15,18 4 :I 
a:: Public bodies None 0 
Private sector companies 2, 4, 6, 13, 28, 29, 7 
Other stakeholders and their associations 30 
Civil society (trade unions, 16, 19, 20, 21 4 
churches, associations) 
Recent inward investors 23,24,25, 31,32 5 





Fig. 3:3: Backgrounds of the organisations interviewed 










Alllalysfis and! interpretation oJf iuntelf'Views 
All interview recordings were fully transcribed, apart from obvious digressions such as an 
interviewee's ten-minute monologue about his favourite football club. About 15 interviews 
were conducted either over the telephone or, at the request of the interviewee, without 
recording equipment switched on, and for those interviews only notes exist. The notes and 
transcripts were then subjected to a process of comparative systematization (cf. Meuser and 
Nagel 1991: 451 ff.; Dunn 2000; Bickl 2000: 31 ff.). 
time 
Group thematically Produce matrix of 
Summarise Assign headings matching sections main statements 
indil.idual ~ that are true ~ into blocks of ~ so that sections of to the text themes according comparison by 
transcript to each section to inten.iew themes 
schedule becomes possible 
increasing abstraction: from text-orientated to theme-oriented 
Fig. 3.4: Steps of analysis of the interview transcripts and notes 




In a first step I summarised, in chronological order, the content of the individual sections of a 
transcript, so that at the end of this step the transcript still exists in its original chronological 
order but has been shortened to about one fifth of its original length. This produces an overall 
view of the interview, and its structure and line of communication become apparent. In a 
second step, a heading can be assigned to each individual section, and thematically matching 
sections can be grouped together according to the interview schedule. This is necessary 
because due to the flexibility of a semi-structured interview interviewees often 'scatter' 
statements on one topic all over the interview. Thus, in this step the order of statements is no 
longer chronological, but now keeps to the themes and questions of the interview schedules. 
However, themes not initially contained in the schedule were also included in the analysis, to 
take advantage of the flexibility that semi-structured interviews offer. In almost every 
interview statements occurred that did not fit into any category of the schedule. This process 
of analysis results in a matrix of core statements about every theme (if covered in the 
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interview). The statements contained in this matrix are being 'cross-examined' and their 
validity and credibility is assessed. Next, the statements are being examined with regard to 
commonalities, differences and contradictions. The final step is the conceptualisation and 
generalisation of the statements received. On this level of abstraction, statements about the 
structure of expert knowledge become possible: what tendencies are there, what is the overall 
picture? 
3.2.3. ReflectioDlls on the research process 
This section describes some of the challenges and problems of data collection and analysis. 
The data available on some earlier image building efforts is limited, and there have been 
problems with access to certain kinds of organisations and individuals. Furthermore, some 
interviewees gave the impression that they were reluctant to give out information and 
occasionally refused altogether to provide more detailed information on particular subjects. 
Limitations of data 
The data collected for this study might have some limitations, partly because some of the 
earlier image efforts were carried out as long as 20 years ago, and in many cases no 
systematic records have been kept. Furthermore, some of the organisations involved in image 
building - past or present - were reluctant to give out information. As a consequence, image 
building efforts in the North East at the time of the "Great North" campaign largely remain 
obscure. There are few official records, and the newspaper clippings of the time contain very 
limited relevant information. They mainly revolve around the disputes that arose from the 
campaign but contain almost no references to the process of developing the campaign. 
Additionally, the Northern Development Company (NDC), the lead organisation of the 
campaign, no longer exists. After considerable 'detective work' I was able to find two persons 
who occupied key positions in the NDC at the time of the "Great North" campaign, and my 
evaluation is mainly based on the information obtained from them. Accordingly, the North 
East England case study largely concentrates on the events after the creation of elements of an 
emerging regional government in 1997. 
In contrast, the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (KVR) - who has been at the centre of 
regional image building in the Ruhr for 20 years - has an excellent, publicly accessible 
archive and library, and image campaigns and other image-related efforts, some dating back 
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to the early 1980s, are well documented. Moreover, many of the staff responsible for the first 
systematic image campaign (1985-1995) still work at the KVR. These differences in 
organisational stability are not only a methodological point but also an analytical issue in their 
own right, and will be taken up in chapters 6 to 8. 
Access 
The first challenge was the identification of organisations that have or might have an interest 
in the region's image. Once I had gained an understanding of the governance framework 
operating in the two countries and regions, I was able to draw up a list of government 
agencies and agencies with a government mandate in the two regions, from local government 
economic development departments to regional bodies. A second list was compiled for the 
private sector and its associations, and a third one for organisations of civil society. 
Additionally, interviewees pointed out other agencies they thought were worth interviewing. 
Access to economic development agency interviewees was, generally, easily obtained. Most 
intermediaries, mainly advertising agencies, were also very willing to speak to me. They were 
identified in the interviews with their clients, the economic development agencies. 
Recent inward investors was the most difficult group of interviewees both to identify and 
access. There are no publicly available directories of recent inward investors in both case 
study regions. My initial strategy was to obtain names and addresses from economic 
development agencies. However, their reaction to my request was mostly reluctant to hostile. 
Several economic development practitioners told me that they wanted to protect 'their' 
companies from researchers approaching them. Even my offer of preparing letters that would 
then be sent out by the agency was rejected. Consequently, I had to rely on occasional and 
mostly unofficial 'tip-offs', and investor interviewees were usually kind enough to refer me to 
one or several of their colleagues in other companies. The second step, getting access to 
investors, was also very difficult. Most potential interviewees seemed too busy to make time 
for an interview or/and were afraid of giving out confidential business details. This hesitation 
was much lower in those cases in which I was personally referred by a colleague of the 
potential interviewee. Consequently, I tried to follow this strategy whenever possible. The 
most striking example was: I had tried to get an interview with a company CEO for weeks. I 
had written letters, sent e-mails to him and made telephone calls, but was still unable to get in 
contact with him personally. His secretary firmly denied any interview requests. Eventually, I 
gave up. Some time later I happened to interview someone who went to school with him, and 
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this person promised to contact his 'hard-to-get' colleague. Two hours later the CEO which I 
had been chasing for weeks called me and offered me an interview for the next day. 
Reluctance and refusal 
In the interviews, most persons seemed to speak frankly. On some occasions, however, I had 
the impression that an individual spoke extremely carefully. In general, interviewees tended to 
be more outspoken when the recording equipment was switched off. I always asked for 
permission to record at the start of the interview, and some persons preferred not to be taped. 
Most persons had no objections to being named but a few wanted to remain anonymous. For 
example, an interviewee at the EU Commission wanted to be identified only as "a source in 
the EU Commission for Regional Development". He informed me at the start of the interview 
that if the interview was to be recorded he would have to ask permission to answer each 
question from his line manager, which in practice would have meant an end to the interview 
before it had even started. In line with my expectations I was able to build a sense of 'trust' 
with most interviewees. As the interview progressed they became gradually more talkative, 
even about seemingly sensitive issues. 
Secondly, I encountered a degree of secretiveness on some occasions. This was most marked 
when researching information about the North East's current image strategy. Work on the 
current strategy had started in mid-2000 (ONE 2000), when the first stakeholder consultations 
were held, but apart from a short-lived advertising campaign called "Here. Now." in March 
2002 the strategy still has not been finalised let alone implemented. The two organisations 
who initially led the image strategy, One North East and the Regional Assembly, were at first 
very welcoming to my research but later on their attitude changed. As the Assembly ceased to 
be an official project partner in mid-2002 - something I was not aware of at that time - my 
queries to this body were redirected to One North East, and One North East for some time 
ignored my attempts of contacting them. After two months I had finally received a reply from 
One North East and the Head of Communications was willing to be interviewed by me. 
However, in the interview the person was very cautious and refused to give out rather trivial 
internal documents such as the media schedule for the "Here. Now." campaign. Previously, 
One North East had been happy to supply similar documents. 
Eventually, the only co-operative source of information was the PR agency that until 2002 
had been commissioned by One North East to develop the advertising component of the 
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image strategy, but due to reasons of confidentiality the PR agency could only give out a 
limited amount of information. Although there is no firm evidence it seems that One North 
East's reluctance stemmed from a desire to cover up the failure of its recent attempts to 
implement a regional image strategy. Targets for the strategy to be fully operational have been 
missed by more than two years. As it will be examined in greater detail in chapter 5 
(Changing Images), a large part of the image building process between early 2002 and mid-
2003 remains obscure. It seems to be clear, however, that there was an obvious break in 2002, 
when the fully developed "Here.Now." campaign was rolled out with great fanfare but came 
to an abrupt halt only a month after its launch. Only the first of a series of adverts did run in 
March 2002 in the regional press, on television, billboards, and buses and taxis. Additionally, 
a few news releases were issued - mainly on organisations backing the campaign (pers. 
comm. with Paul Dobbie, manager-owner of Persuasion PR, 27.4.04). He made me aware that 
a combination of several unfortunate circumstances had triggered this setback. "The initiative 
simply petered out after the lead person at the North East Assembly left and the lead person at 
One North East took ill. I'm afraid to say that [the campaign] simply didn't go anywhere" 
(pers. comm with Paul Dobbie, manager-owner of Persuasion PR, 23.05.03). To add to the 
troubles of the lead organisations, "the company which put together the visuals and drew up 
the ad schedule - Yellow M- went bankrupt" (ibid). It has proven impossible to obtain copies 
of any visuals or ad schedules as One North East, the client and only organisation that, 
besides Yellow M, does have copies of these documents, is unwilling to give them out. One 
North East, now the sole lead agency, have been trying to make a fresh start since, with the 
publication of another consultation document (ONE 2003a) that signals a significant change 
in some of the key areas of image management. 
In contrast, KVR, the organisation in charge for the Ruhr's regional image efforts, has been 
very open and supportive. They made several key persons available to me for interviews, and 
allowed me access to their comprehensive and well-kept archives. KVR also introduced me to 
the agencies to which they had commissioned two advertising campaigns. 
3.3. Summary 
_This chapter gave an overview of the research design and data collection methods used. The 
old-industrial case study areas North East England and the Ruhr were chosen to allow a 
comparative study that covers two different political environments, a centralist state with only 
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emerging elements of regional government, and a federal state with relatively stable 
institutional arrangements of national-regional power-sharing. However, both regions 
experience a re-scaling of economic governance. In England, there is a strong tendency 
towards decentralisation and devolution, whereas Germany has recently seen an increasing 
centralisation of economic development policies and initiatives. Some of these issues will be 
explored in more depth in the following chapter. 
The two mam methods of data collection employed are semi-structured interviews with 
economic development stakeholders and an analysis of internal consultation documents and of 
the promotional material produced. The main tool of analysis used was the process of 
comparative systematisation. I have encountered problems in the process of data collection, 
especially in the North East, due to rapid and frequent changes in the organisational 
landscape. Some organisations involved in image building no longer existed, or key staff had 
left. I also encountered a degree of secretiveness from One North East, which I attribute to 
their desire to cover up a significant setback of the Regional Image Strategy. In the Ruhr, 
obtaining the required data was relatively easy, and as a consequence, empirical data are more 
complete, even for early image building efforts dating back to the early 1980s. 
66 
4. REGIONAL CASE STUDIES 
The two case study areas chosen are the North East of England and the Ruhr in Germany. 
While they differ in size and population I would argue that they provide an interesting 
comparison: the two areas had a similar industrial past- mainly characterised by coal mining, 
steel and metal production, shipbuilding and, more generally, heavy manufacturing. The areas 
were hit at roughly the same time by the same market forces, resulting in loss of 
competitiveness and industrial decline. However, the two areas have had different kinds and 
degrees of government intervention and spatial impacts of government policies, which are two 
other crucial determining factors of their economic history. 
Fig. 4.1: Location of the case study areas 
Frankfurt 
• 
oth reas have since suffi r d from n gntive ster otyping typical for old-industrial regions 
(Holcomb 1993 and 1994, as set out in chapter 2). The aim of this thesis is to fmd out whether 
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and why (or why not) the two regions responded in similar or different ways to this problem. 
To place their image-building efforts into a wider context, this chapter introduces the most 
important characteristics of the two regions and provides an introduction to their economic 
histories and present-day structures. It also looks at government on various scales and the 
interdependencies between them. 
The following section provides statistical data to demonstrate that both regions are 'problem 
cases' in their national context, with a loss of population, loss of employment resulting in 
considerably above-national-average unemployment rates, and greater poverty and social 
deprivation than the national average. Secondly, this chapter places image-building efforts in 
the context of other regional policy initiatives, many of which are considered to have failed. 
The ease or difficulty with which statistical data of the two areas could be accessed reflects 
the standing of the two regions in relation to their political weight and autonomy. The Ruhr 
has had its own body since 1920, the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (KVR), and this is 
reflected in the fact that certain statistical data is readily available for the aggregation unit of 
the Ruhr. Statistics on the North East of England, in contrast, are much more difficult to 
compile, especially with regard to historical records. The regional boundaries have changed in 
1994 when the North East Region superseded the Northern Region and no longer included 
Cumbria. It was only from 1994 that statistics for the North East became available on the 
scale of the current North East region. However, many of the statistics had to be laboriously 
extracted from national statistics because the two main regional bodies, One North East and 
the North East Regional Assembly, only provide very basic data. The KVR, in contrast, 
provides a wide range of data and keeps a long-ranging archive, both of which are easily 
accessible. However, those types of data that are not provided by the KVR necessitate own 
calculations, as neither the EU nor the state ofNRW provides data on the aggregation level of 
the Ruhr. This is because the Ruhr is divided between three districts (all of whom extend well 
beyond the Ruhr), and the Land of NR W usually provides data only for the district or local 
government aggregation level. Similarly, Eurostat, the European statistics office, and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) make their statistics available for NUTS 1 and 
NUTS 2 levels only, the latter of which are congruent with the three districts, the boundaries 
of which cut through the territory of the Ruhr. Consequently, some of the required data for the 
Ruhr had to be laboriously assembled from local authority statistics. 
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4.L lLocatimm, size and! popuDation 
North East England is bordered by Scotland to the North, Cumbria to the West and North 
Yorkshire to the South. The Ruhr lies within the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-
Westfalen in German, NRW in short) in the central West of Germany (fig. 4.1). At 8,592 km2 
North East England is almost twice the size of the Ruhr ( 4,434 km2) but contains less than 
halfofthe population (2.51 vs. 5.33 million, fig. 4.2) 
North-East England 
Population (million) 2.51 (e) 
Area (km2 ) 8,592 
GDP per capita (in USD) 22,112 
GDP % of national average 76.1% 
Regional annual GDP growth 1.7% 
National annual GDP growth 2.1% 
Unemployment rate 6.7% (1) 
National unemployment rate 4.9% (1) 
Regional economic activity 73 % (1) 
National economic activity 79% (1) 
Fig. 4.2: Basic socio-economic indicators of the case study regions 





98.2 % (Germany) 







Both regions have experienced population decline during the last four decades. The 
population of the Ruhr peaked at 5.57 million in 1961. At the end of 2001, this number had 
fallen to 5.35 million (KVR 2002a: 9, fig. 4.4). The main reason for this is the migration away 
from the Ruhr. In every year since 1961 (except 1987 to 1995) more residents left the Ruhr 
than arrived. Especially the 18 to 30 year-olds have been leaving (KVR 2002a: 12). Faced 
with outmigration of a similar scale, the population of North East England shrank from 2.67 
million in 1971 to 2.51 million in 2001 (National Statistics 2001:40, fig. 4.3). This reduction 
of 6% is against the national trend, with the United Kingdom's population increasing by 6% 
over the same period. Along with the North West, North East England was one of only two 
English regions to experience a population decline in this period. For each of the last 40 years 
the North East has had a negative migration balance (National Statistics 2003a). Like in the 
Ruhr, almost half of the outmigrants in 2002 were in the age group of 15 to 29 (ibid). 
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Fig. 4.3: Development of North East England's population 
Source: Based on National Statistics (2003a), House of Commons (1999) 
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Fig. 4.4: Development of the Ruhr's population 





4.2. Wealth, structural change and unemployment 
95 00 
This section gives an overview of the most widely used economic indicators: GDP per capita, 
unemployment, and the sectoral composition of employment. 
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4.2.1. Wealth 
Per capita GDP is below the national average in both regions. In the North East it is just 76% 
of the UK average, and the lowest of all UK regions (National Statistics 2002a). Not only is 
the North East's per capita GDP lower than the national average, but it also grows more 
slowly (2.3 vs. 3.8 % growth in 2001, ibid). Thus, despite considerable growth rates of the 
North East's GDP, the aim of catching up with UK average has not been achieved. Indeed, 
GDP per head has steadily fallen from 86 % of national GDP in 1987 to 76 % in 2002 
(Hetherington 2002). The Ruhr shares the problem of growth rates below the national average 
(+ 11.2 vs +28.2%, from 1991 to 2001, KVR 2002c). However, the Ruhr is less of a 'problem 
case' in its national context than North East England, as its GDP per capita is, owing not least 
to the accession of the five new Uinder in 1990, only slightly below national average. 
Compared to its surrounding regions and in the West German context, however, the Ruhr's 
GDP is almost 10 per cent below average. 
There are also notable intra-regional disparities in both areas. In the North East, Darlington 
achieved 90 % but County Durham only 66 % of the national average (fig. 4.5). In the Ruhr, 
discrepancies of wealth are even wider, with Essen's per capita GDP at 116 % being well 
above the national average, whereas for Bottrop this figure stands at only 75 %. 
North East England Ruhr 
Sub-region GDP p.h. City/Kreis GDP p.h. 
Darlington 90 Essen 116 
Tyneside 83 MOiheim 112 
South Teesside 82 Bochum 109 
Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees 77 Duisburg 104 
Sunderland 73 Gelsenkirchen 103 
Northumberland 70 Dortmund 102 
County Durham 66 Hagen 98 
Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis 95 
Kreis Unna 94 
Herne 92 
Oberhausen 91 
Ham m 88 
Kreis Wesel 88 
Kreis Recklinghausen 86 
Bottrop 75 
North East 76 Ruhr 98 
-~-----~- ~.; -· ------·~-
Fig. 4.5: GDP per head in North East England and the Ruhr as percentage of national average (2001) 
Source: National Statistics (2000), various National Statistics Regional Accounts, KVR (2003b) 
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4.2.2. §tructume of tillle economy 
Both North East England and the Ruhr have seen a dramatic change in their industrial 
structure. Over the last 40 years, the traditional industries of heavy manufacturing, 
shipbuilding, and mining have been in decline. "During the post-war era, the North East's 
fortunes have been mixed, but undoubtedly the long-term economic trend has been 
downwards" (O'Toole 1996: 185). While the crisis had been looming since the mid 1950s, "it 
was in the seventies that the North East encountered serious economic trouble. There was a 
mass exodus of the multi-national companies and, together with the restructuring and decline 
in many of the region's indigenous industries, this caused the shedding of labour at an 
exceptional rate. Between 1978 and 1983 43,000 jobs were lost in engineering. In 1981 there 
were 40,000 redundancies alone in manufacturing" (O'Toole 1996: 185). 
The decline of traditional industries is reflected in the changing sectoral composition of 
employment (fig. 4.6): In the Ruhr almost two thirds of jobs are now in service industries, and 
manufacturing employment (produzierendes Gewerbe) has since 1980 fallen by 30 points to 
32%, with mining and engineering now at 24.5 % (KVR 2002a: 22ff.). In 2000, only ten per 
cent of all employees worked in the industries that once were decisive for the Ruhr, mining, 
coking, metal production and processing, and the production of metal goods, with the share of 
mining in total employment now below 2 % (KVR 2002b: 26). Interestingly, a recent KVR 
survey, to which I will return to in chapter 5, revealed significant misperceptions: 60 % of 
adult Germans thought that more than one fifth of the Ruhr's working population work 
underground. From 1980 to 2000 the Ruhr lost 44 % of its manufacturing jobs (KVR 2002b: 
27), with an extreme loss of 61 % in the City of Gelsenkirchen (KVR 2002b: 28). Within the 
Ruhr there are considerable differences in the sectoral composition of employment, with 
employment in manufacturing varying from nearly 50% in the Ennepe-Ruhr Kreis to just over 
25 % in the city of Essen (KVR 2002a: 29). The situation is similar in the North East, where 
in some Teesside local authorities the share of manufacturing employment is six times as high 
as in the rural local authorities of north Northumberland. 
These enormous intra-regional disparities are likely to be an impediment to the development 
and projection of a joint and coherent image for each case study region, with different sub-
regions targeting different industries in their inward investment promotion and thus sending 
out different messages to potential investors. This could result in conflicting messages 
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emerging from the sub-regions and make region-wide image management more difficult. This 
point will be examined in more detail in the following chapters. 
North East United Kingdom Ruhr 
Agriculture 0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 
Mining, manufacturing, construction 22.5% 18.6% 32.0% 
Services 77.1% 80.5% 67.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Fig. 4.6: Sectoral composition of employment in North East England and the Ruhr (2002) 
Source: National Statistics (2004), KVR (2002a, 2003b) 






Compared to the national averages, employment rates are relatively low in both regions (fig. 
4. 7). These figures conceal wide intra-regional variations of almost 20 points in the North 
East and 15 points in the Ruhr. Low employment is generally associated with low economic 
activity, which is in turn a major contributor to low average incomes and high socio-economic 
disparities. 
North East United Kingdom Ruhr Germany 
Employment rate 68.4% 74.3% 65.6% 70.1% 
Minimum - maximum 60.1-80.8% 58.2-73.5% 
Fig. 4.7: Employment rates in North East England and the Ruhr (2002). Intra-regional variations by 
county/unitary authority (North East) and cities/Kreise (Ruhr) 
Source: National Statistics (2004), KVR (2003b) 
Both regions have a history of high unemployment compared to the national average. In mid-
2002, unemployment in the Ruhr was at 12.5 %, compared to the national German average of 
10.7 % (KVR 2002b). Since the 1960s, unemployment has always been above national 
average, with the late 1980s being the time of greatest difference (fig. 4.9). Also North East 
England's unemployment is higher than the national average. Even though unemployment in 
the region has come down from a record 18 % in 1986 to 7.3 % in 2002 it has always been 
well above the national average of 5.0% in 2002 (fig. 4.8). 
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Fig. 4.8: A comparison of unemployment rates of North East England and the national average 
Source: Various National Statistics Accounts 
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Fig. 4.9: A comparison of unemployment rates of the Ruhr and the national average 
Germany: Until1994 West Germany, from 1995 the whole of Germany 
Source: Own calculations based on KVR (2002c) 
Both within North East England and the Ruhr there are stark intra-regional differences (fig. 
4.1 0), with unemployment rates in Northumberland being 1.25 times the national average, 
while Tees Valley has a rate more than twice the national average (May 2002 [GO-NE 
2002]). Intra-regional differences in the Ruhr are even higher, with an unemployment rate of 
18.1 % in Gelsenkirchen and 7.0 % in Dinslaken (KVR 2002b ). In both regions the scale of 
the differences can be at least partly explained by the fact that both the Ruhr and the North 
East comprise densely populated areas that have experienced rapid and profound de-
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industrialisation, as well as rural areas that have been much less affected by structural change 
because they never contained significant amounts of traditional industries. In both areas, 
minimum and maximum can be found in these opposed categories. 
Ruhr 
/ t t 
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unemployment in % 
Fig. 4.10: Unemployment rates (ILO) 2001 with minimum, average and maximum (smallest unit: 
County/unitary authority in the UK, city/Kreis in Germany) 
Source: Own calculations based on KVR (2002c) and GO-NE (2002) 
Not only is unemployment in the two regions higher than in the rest of the countries in which 
they are located, but it is also qualitatively different. Long-term unemployment of more than 
two years is much more pronounced in the Ruhr (28% of all unemployed persons) than in the 
rest of Germany (19 %, fig. 4.11). Similarly, in the North East 9.5 %of all unemployed have 
been out of work for more than two years, compared to a national average of 7.2 %. 
North East UK Ruhr 
< 3 months 44.2% 46. 1 % 26.2% 
3 months < 1 year 36.3% 36.0% 29.8% 
1 year < 2 years 10.0% 10.7% 16.2% 
2 years and over 9.5% 7.2% 27.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Fig. 4.11 : Unemployed persons by duration of unemployment, 2002 







Overall, high unemployment rates and the comparatively high percentage of long-term 
unemployment demonstrate the difficulties both regions have faced (and are still facing) in 
long-term economic restructuring. As business start-up rates are significantly lower than the 
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national averages and the encouragement of self-employment will take time, the need for 
inward investment is still great. High unemployment is, in this respect, a double-edged sword: 
on the one hand it signals to potential investors that labour is readily available (provided that 
the skills of potential employees match the skills required by investors), but on the other hand 
it could be seen by potential investors and the wider public as yet another sign that the best 
days of the region are over, thus reducing the their attractiveness as an investment location. 
41.2.4. Owi!Dersllnnp amdl state frlrntenrei!Dtioi!D 
One important difference in the economic structure of the two regions is that the North East 
by the 1960s had developed into branch-plant economy, much of it under state ownership 
(Hudson 1989, Benneworth and Charles 2001). Ownership by far-away headquarters has 
since decreased and state-ownership of production is now marginal in Britain, but business 
start-up rates below average coupled with significant influx of foreign direct investment mean 
that dependency on decisions taken in headquarters outside the region is still high. In contrast, 
the Ruhr had a more indigenous history of late 19th and early 20th century industrialisation, 
and until now most of the Ruhr's large corporations are headquartered in (or just outside) the 
region. While many of the Ruhr's traditional industries such as coal mining and steel-making 
were considered 'strategic' by the German government, they were never nationalised, albeit 
often put under tight government regulation and, in many cases, heavily subsidised. 
The dominance in the two regions of large companies - be they state- or privately owned -
and their combines had two main effects on the economic restructuring of the regions. Firstly, 
entrepreneurialism has generally been low. This is often attributed to the workforce having 
adopted a 'cradle-to-grave' mentality, assuming (and in most cases experiencing in reality) 
that 'their' company would provide not only a secure and life-long job for them but would 
also take care of them in a fatherly manner, providing housing, leisure centres, and facilities 
like child creches or retirement homes. Secondly, both regions have a record of 'protectionist 
alliances' that have in the past tried to hinder structural change by blocking out potential 
inward investors that would have aided economic restructuring in the area. A well-
documented case in the Ruhr is when an alliance of companies of traditional industries (that 
owned the bulk of the Ruhr's industrial land) and trade unions thwarted attempts by the Ford 
Mo~or Compa~y to set up a plant in the Ruhr city of Heme in _t_he mid-1960s (Nonn 2001 ). 
The North East has had similar experiences of institutional lock-in, albeit less extreme. 
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4.3. Relatimms betweeJm scaRes of goverllllmeJmt 
The United Kingdom has been a highly centralised and centralist state whereas post-war 
Germany has very much been a federal state. Despite recent tendencies in the UK to 
decentralise powers, it is the central government alone that has the powers to make laws in 
England. This includes the right to create and abolish local governments. In England, "local 
government is wholly subordinate in law to the national government and parliament in 
London. In so far as local authorities have any decentralised authority at all, they have it 
because parliament has allocated it to them" (Painter 2000b: 301 ). In was not until the Local 
Government Act 2000 that local authorities "for the first time ever had a statutory power of 
leadership: the power 'to promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their 
area"' (Game and Wilson 2002: 4f.). Still, the autonomy of local governments in Britain is 
severely limited. Local government has no tax-raising powers and is therefore completely 
dependent on central government funding, which in most cases comes with strings attached. 
The UK's regions are in a similar situation. Scotland now has a parliament and Wales an 
assembly, but the English regions do not possess any elected government. The process of 
devolution, the handing down of power from Whitehall to the regions, is still very diffuse. 
This stems, in part, from the superiority of parliamentary sovereignty (Htibner and MUnch 
1998: 33), which makes it difficult for the English regions to demand more rights in order to 
make the change from administrative into political units with their own, albeit limited, 
legislation. 
In contrast to this fluidity, Germany has a formal and written constitution (Grundgesetz, 
'Basic Law') which underlies the federal nature of the state. Both Uinder (states) and 
Gemeinden (local governments) have constitutional rights over their own affairs, which 
means that these rights cannot be taken away by central government, unless the constitution is 
amended with a 2/3 majority of both the Bundestag (federal parliament) and the Bundesrat 
(upper house, made up of representatives of the 16 states, Art. 79(2) of the Basic Law). 
Germany's territorial units of Uinder (states), Kreise (::::: counties) and Gemeinden (local 
governments) are not merely administrative units, but must enjoy, according to the 
constitution, a high degree of self governance. In each of them, "the people has to be 
represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections" (Art 28(1 )). 
According to Art. 28(2) "local governments must be guaranteed the right to regulate, on their 
own responsibility, all the affairs of the local community within the limits set by statute." This 
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includes the right to taxation. The constitution devotes about one fourth of its length to a 
detailed list of the division of legislative and executive powers between central government 
and the individual states (Art. 70-91). In the field of economic policy, all Uinder have been 
engaged in their own inward investment promotion. Most of them have by now created 
separate inward investment promotion agencies, set up along private-sector principles, yet 
under state control. 
However, there is evidence that in their political systems both countries are converging to 
some extent. With the establishment of Scottish (1997) and Welsh (1999) executives British 
central government has handed over powers over certain matters to the two nations, and the 
setting up in England of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and Regional 
Chambers/ Assemblies in 1998/99 partly was a response to surging regionalism in parts of 
England, but also to demands of greater economic self-rule. Especially North East England 
demanded rights similar to those of neighbouring Scotland with its strong inward investment 
promotion agency. Germany, on the other hand, has had an institutionally stable federal 
structure since 1949. However, the scaling of government has not been uncontested. There 
have been, especially over the last five years, signs of central government restricting the 
freedom of action of lower-level political units. This did not happen through openly centralist 
legislation but through changes in sectoral policies. Notably, the Uinder and local 
governments saw their finances put under strain and their economic freedom squeezed 
through continuing shifts of social responsibilities and financial commitments from central 
government downwards, especially to local governments. For example, cuts in many welfare 
programmes paid for and delivered by national government have contributed to an increasing 
financial burden on local government, which is legally obliged to provide income support to 
its residents. 
Devolution has made considerable progress in Britain, with the establishment of a plethora of 
regional institutions. However, this has involved problems. Especially the "fragmented 
structure of bodies at the regional level contributes to a failure of governance" (Tomaney 
2002a: 226). Tomaney (2002b: 728) quotes a study commissioned by the North East Regional 
Assembly which found that "over 20 'regional' organisations were involved in the preparation 
of at least 12 regional strategies." 
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Being recipients of significant amounts of European Union structural funds, both regions are 
increasingly influenced by the EU Commission. Many economic development projects are 
(part-)funded by the EU, with strings invariably attached to all monies received from the 
ERDF. 
4.4. Governance of the economy 
Until the early 1980s, regulatory frameworks of British and German national economies were 
rather different, with Britain pursuing public ownership of key industries like steel, coal and 
railways, whereas in Germany these industries remained privately owned, albeit many of 
them under tight government regulation and receiving substantial amounts of public subsidies. 
As Hudson (2000: 65) notes, "in the immediate post-war period there was a significant, 
though selective, extension of the scope of state involvement in economy and society in the 
UK as a central element in the Post-War Settlement (PWS)". The presence of state-owned 
corporations was particularly pervasive in North East England, where the nationalised 
industries during the 1950s and 1960s accounted for a significant percentage of all 
employment. "Consequently, the northeast became characterized as a state-managed region, 
with a particular regional form of institutional arrangements and Labourist political culture" 
(Hudson 2000: 65). The Thatcher and consecutive Conservative governments from 1979 to 
1997 significantly reduced the role of the direct involvement of the state in the running of the 
UK economy through sweeping privatisation. This had a devastating effect on the North East, 
as it contained a disproportionately high share of jobs in state-owned businesses. The region 
was made very aware that "the economic power of public corporations can also be the power 
to destroy whole communities by curtailing job opportunities" (Castles 1972: 144 ), even 
though many of the jobs lost have been replaced by service sector employment. 
Even after privatisation, the present-day North East is still far more dependent on the state 
than other, economically more successful UK regions, as its current welfare is underwritten 
by redistributionist policies of the UK government and the EU. In addition, local government 
and the elements of an emerging regional government are still subject to tight central 
government control, both in terms of legislation and funding. Furthermore, many services 
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provided by local or regional authorities were transferred to non-elected "quangos" (quasi-
autonomous non-elected governmental organisations, for details see Hudson 2000: 67)7. 
In essence, the North East is still under heavy control from Whitehall. Nonetheless, the 
English regions have become a more important scale of governance. In 1994 the UK 
government set up ten Government Offices for the Regions (GO), superseding the formerly 
eight (now nine) standard regions, the boundaries of which "have their origins in 
administrative convenience rather than in historically and socially united communities" 
(Pattie 2000: 330). Still, to most observers the GOs are a top-down instrument to more 
efficiently and co-ordinatedly administrate central government programs and initiatives in the 
regions. It can be argued that with the introduction of the GOs the government 'had its ear 
more closely on the ground', but did not devolve powers. In other words, this was a 
decentralisation only of administrative, but not of political authority. A marked shift in 
regional policy was the introduction of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) across 
England in 1998. One North East, the North East's RDA, took over the responsibilities of the 
Northern Development Company (NDC, essentially an inward investment promotion agency), 
the Rural Development Commission, and some functions of English Partnerships (Robinson 
et al. 2000). ONE North East is primarily funded by central government, through the 
Government Office for the North East (GO-NE). 
Much like the UK, during the post-war period Germany also adopted a Keynsian economic 
policy, while virtually all industries remained in private hands, except those that had already 
been nationalised in previous decades, such as the railways. As already mentioned, Germany 
is a federal state, allowing a high degree of autonomy for its regions (Uinder). However, the 
power-sharing between central and regional governments is not static. Especially the 
governance of economic affairs is contested, both in the interpretation of the basic law and 
political practice. This is largely due to the fact that the regulation of the economy falls in the 
category of concurrent law, where central government and the states have 'competing' powers 
of legislation. Art. 72 ( 1) of the German constitution states that "in the field of concurrent 
legislative power, the States [Uinder] have power to legislate as long as and to the extent that 
7 Game and Wilson (2002: 18) speak of a 'quango explosion': "The scale of non-elected government ( ... ) 
increased enormously during the 1980s and 1990s, frequently at the direct expense of elected local councils. 
Under national governments of both major parties (Conservatives and Labour, M.B.), service responsibilities 
were removed from local authorities and given to-mainly-singlcupurposc GovcrnmcnH!ppointcd agencies: Urban 
Development Corporations (UDCs) for inner city development, Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), and 
Housing Action Trusts (HATs)" (my emphasis). Therefore, no analysis of economic development policy and 
inward investment promotion strategies can be conducted without considering the re-scaling of governance. 
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the Federation does not exercise its right to legislate by statute." According to Art. 74(1) "the 
law relating to economic matters (mining, industry, supply of power, crafts, trades, 
commerce, banking, stock exchanges and private insurance) is concurrent law", which means 
that theses matters are the legislative responsibility of both scales of government; state and 
federal. In practice this provision has lead to constant re-negotiation of powers of economic 
development between federal and regional government in Germany. The post-1960 economic 
development policies of the Ruhr exemplify this situation. From the 1960s the state of NR W 
has been the dominant actor in the Ruhr's economic development (Petzina 1998), but times of 
acute crisis in the mid- and late 1970s8 and from the late 1990s onwards provided justification 
for the federal government to intervene more directly through the introduction of 'special 
programmes' for the Ruhr. 
Central govemm~ ~ Central government 
Land NRW 
1 Elements of emerging regional government 
(North East) 
Ruhr 
Local government Local government 
IRUHRI I NORTH EAST I 
Fig 4.12: Governance of the economy in the Ruhr and the North East 
Figure 4.12 shows the current economic governance of both regiOns. The two mam 
differences are the greater number of levels of government in Germany, and the heavily top-
down policy-making process in England. In Germany, the Uinder have a direct impact on 
government policies as they are able to block or amend central government legislation in the 
Bundesrat, the upper house. In England, this regional level of government is currently absent. 
There are elements of an emerging regional governmentsuch as the RDA and the North East 
8 The 'oil shock' of the mid-1970s hit the Ruhr especially hard. Its large concentrations of heavy engineering and 
manufacturing companies were dependent on the cheap supply of fossil fuels, especially oil. 
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Assembly, but the former is legally and financially dependent on central government. The 
latter represents local government of the North East, but has few competencies and plays a 
mainly consultative role. Compared to the RDA the Assembly ' s influence on economic policy 
on the regional level is rather limited (hence in the diagram the line of influence from local 
government to regional government is broken). The direct line from central to local 
government demonstrates the practice of the former to directly intervene in local government 
affairs, be it through legislation, special programmes or the setting up of quangos like UDCs. 
4.5. Governance of inward investment promotion 
"Pressure for a degree of devolution to the English regions comes in part ( .. . ) from concerns 
about the knock-on effects of Scottish and Welsh devolution, and a desire not to be left out." 
(Pattie 2000: 331). Since devolution came onto the political agenda in the 1970s, the North 
East has been especially jealous of increased powers for Scotland over its economic affairs 
and regional development, fearing to lose competitiveness in attracting much-needed 
investment from foreign private companies and the EU (Pattie 2000: 331 ). This fear came up 
in the interviews undertaken for this thesis, with many local and regional economic 
development practitioners saying that in inward investment promotion "we just can' t keep up 
with the huge money the WDA (Welsh Development Agency) and SDA throw into 
advertising" (Interview with Clare Copsey, Tyne & Wear Development Company). For 
example, the WDA, established as early as 1976, has a budget four times higher than that of 
One North East, covering an area with a population that is only slightly higher (3.0 million) 
than that of the Notth East (2.5 million). Equally powerful is Scottish Development 
International, into which Scottish Trade International and Locate in Scotland recently merged. 
It is a joint venture between the Scottish Executive and Scottish Enterprise. 
The present-day inward investment promotion framework in England consists of three levels: 
national (UK Trade & Investment, formerly lnvestUK and Invest in Britain Bureau), regional 
(Regional Development Agencies), and local government, consisting of local authorities, 
districts and counties (where they exist). Part of the difficulty in co-ordination between the 
bodies on different scales seems to stem from the fact that some economic development 
bodies are not controlled by matching political power on the same scale. Thus, while in 
economic development the establishment of RDAs has introduced an intermediary scale 
between central and local government, on a political level there is still a gap. The RDAs are 
still largely controlled by central government as the funding body. 
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4.5.1. Organisations of inward investment promotion in the North East 
UK Trade & Investment, formerly Invest UK and founded as Invest in Britain Bureau in 1977, 
is the United Kingdom's inward investment promotion agency. It advertises and markets 
















Key to acronyms: 
NEDB North East Development Board 
NIG Northern Industrial Group 
NEDA North East Development Association 
NEIDA North East Industrial and Development Association 
NEDC North of England Development Council 
NEPC Northern Economic Planning Council 
NEPB Northern Economic Planning Board 
NDC Northern Development Company 
ONE One North East 
ONE 
Fig 4.13: The regional economic development bodies of the North of England (1996 to 1997: North 
East plus Cumbria, from April 1998: North East England) 
Source: Based on Cousins et al. (1974: 136), Wood (1996: 231), updated 
Like all other English RDAs, One North East was established by an Act of Parliament in 
1998, and started work on 1 April 1999. Figure 4.13 shows the historical line of development 
of "organisations that elites of employers, unions and politicians have brought about within 
the last 60 years:' (-Wood 1996: 231). All of these aeencies "have vigorously pursued an 
inward investment strategy in an attempt to diversify the region's industrial base and 
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economic structure, promote growth in research and development facilities, and thus secure 
an upward spiral of indigenous advanced manufacturing capacity. However, despite this and 
the North's success in attracting new investment, the region's GDP per head remained below 
all other UK regions except Wales and Northern Ireland in 1989" (O'Toole 1996: 186). The 
dynamics have not changed since then. According to the progress report on the North East's 
regional economic strategy, "the region has not experienced any substantial catching up with 
national performance. ( ... ) On some indicators, the gap with better performing UK regions 
appears to have widened up to the year 1999: the latest for which data is available." (ONE 
2002b: 4). One North East is therefore under intense pressure to turn around the trend, 
something which can - in the short term - only be achieved through attracting inward 
investment, especially in high-value-added industries. 
Even though the establishment of a Regional Development Agency (RDA) brought greater 
regional management of the regional economy, many observers point at the fact that RDAs 
report to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and merely consult with Regional 
Assemblies. "They should have regard for the chamber's view in preparing their economic 
strategy: consult with the chamber on its corporate plan: be open to scrutiny by the chamber, 
but not actually accountable to it" (Game and Wilson 2002: 89, original emphasis). 
Compounding the regional accountability deficit is the fact that the chamber itself consists of 
"councillors, business people, trade unionists and religious leaders that were entirely 
nominated, rather than directly elected" (Game and Wilson 2002: 17, my emphasis). 
Below the regional level, there are sub-regional partnerships in County Durham, 
Northumberland, Tees Valley, and Tyne and Wear. The agencies created by them are County 
Durham Development Company (CDDC), Tees Valley Development Company (TVDC) and 
Tyne and Wear Development Company (TWEDCO). In the county of Northumberland, the 
inward investment promotion function is performed by the County Council's Business Centre. 
Most local authorities such as individual districts or cities have retained their own economic 
development department but commissioned the above-mentioned sub-regional development 
agencies with inward investment promotion. For example, all five local authorities of the 
former Tyne & Wear Metropolitan County have agreed to have their inward investment 
promotion activities carried out by the Tyne and Wear Development Company. Similar 
arrangements exisLin Teesside and COlmty-Durham. 
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There are some agencies that cannot unambiguously be assigned to a particular scale. The 
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), for example, that were established in the North 
East's agglomerations of Tyneside, Teesside and Wearside, were heavily engaged in 
attracting inward investment to regenerate the areas assigned to them. While UDCs are local 
in their scope, they are quangos funded and controlled by central government. The importance 
of UDCs has diminished with the establishment of RDAs, but their legacy is a reminder of the 
penetration of local government by central government bodies. 
4.5.2. Organisations of inward investment promotion in the Ruhr 
In contrast to North East England, the institutional framework for economic development of 
the Ruhr has been rather stable over the decades. The Federal Commissioner for Foreign 
Investment in Germany (BfAI), trading as Invest in Germany, is responsible for inward 
investment promotion on the national scale. Each of the 16 Uinder has its own agency, but 
they vary greatly in scope. The government of North Rhine-Westphalia established the 
Gesellschaft fUr Wirtschaftsforderung Nordrhein-Westfalen mbH (North Rhine-Westphalia 
Economic Development Corporation) in 1960 as an inward investment promotion agency but 
its scope had widened by the end of the 1980s to also include export promotion. On the sub-
state level, most cities and Kreise (districts) have their own agencies. Duisburg, for instance, 
has established its own Gesellschaft fUr Wirtschaftsforderung (GfW-DU). The Emscher-Lippe 
Agentur (ELA) is the only sub-regional agency set up jointly by several local authorities to 
take care of their inward investment promotion. The Ruhr's regional body, the KVR, is in a 
peculiar position. One the one hand, it performs for its members a vital element of economic 
development: public relations. On the other hand, the powers of the KVR do not include other 
instruments of place promotion, let alone economic development. The KVR has neither the 
mandate nor the resources to subsidise inward investment, or to influence the 'place product' 
that is the Ruhr. It cannot, for example, buy or sell land or train the labour force. 
There are two main differences in the institutional set-up of inward investment promotion 
between North East England and the Ruhr. Firstly, the number of scales involved in this 
policy area is much greater in the Ruhr. Secondly, economic governance and inward 
investment promotion are much more a two-way process in the Ruhr, while the approach in 
England is rather top-down, as set out in fig. 4.12 above. 
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However, during recent years both regions have experienced changes in the governance of 
inward investment promotion. In the North East, an RDA has been set up, taking 
responsibility for the region's economic development in general and inward investment 
promotion in particular, and there will be a referendum on the introduction of a regional 
government on the 41h ofNovember 2004. Also in Germany, the seemingly stable institutional 
arrangement in the Ruhr has recently become more fluid. The state ofNR W has intensified its 
control over the Ruhr's inward investment promotion at the expense of the KVR 
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet), the Ruhr's 'regional parliament' which had already lost 
many of its powers in a 1979 reorganisation. While according to its statutes the promotion of 
the Ruhr to inward investors and general public relations are two of the KVR's areas of work, 
the financial and political powers to fulfil this role have been undermined by disputes along 
party-political lines among its local government membership as well as by declining funding 
from the Land government. As a 'competitor' institution the Land set up Projekt Ruhr GmbH 
in an attempt to bypass the KVR and fund local government projects directly. However, up to 
now the funded projects did not include any specific image promotion activities, but the 
selection criteria for the funding of projects clearly favour initiatives with a 'communicative 
yield'. 
4.6. Summary 
In this chapter I have sought to make clear why the two regions are in need of inward 
investment promotion and an improvement of their old-industrial image. From the social and 
economic indicators laid out above it becomes clear that both regions are 'problem cases' in 
their countries, as they perform at levels below their respective national average in almost any 
category. Many politicians pin their hopes on that the healthy growth of the UK economy will 
help narrowing down the gap between the North East and the UK's wealthier regions. Adams 
and Robinson (2002: 1 ), however, point to the fact that growth is occurring unevenly: "Despite 
reasonable overall economic growth in the UK, regional differentials in GDP per head are 
increasing (given current trends, by 2020 GDP per head in the North East could be half the 
UK average)". Thus, even with a highly efficient regional policy the North East is likely to 
keep its 'problem case' image for at least the near future. 
In its national context, the outlook for the Ruhr is less grim, as its growth rates have largely 
- .. -~ ~. ·- - - - - - --
kept up with the national average, and structural change is more advanced than in the North 
East. However, both areas share the burden of being stereotyped as old-industrial regions by 
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both media and society. Some of the steps the two areas have taken so far taken to remedy this 
disadvantage will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The second conclusion from the comparison of socio-economic indicators is that both regions 
are far from homogenous. Wealth, industrial structure, employment and unemployment vary 
widely within each region. These significant intra-regional disparities are likely to impede 
efforts to market each region as a whole and to build a coherent and strong regional image. 
Thirdly, this chapter has also introduced the organisational-institutional set-up for inward 
investment promotion and image management in the two regions and has outlined actual and 
potential lines of conflict in image management activities. A central theme is that of 
complexity and uncertainty. The arrangements in both regions are complex, where many 
different organisations with often competing or even mutually exclusive interests are 
involved. Secondly, a re-scaling of economic governance is apparent in both regions, but the 
scale and speed of change are bigger in the North East. This uncertainty of fluid structures 
will be the central theme of chapter 6, Image and Governance. 
87 
§. CHANGING IMAGES 
As laid out in the previous chapter, both North East England and the Ruhr are lagging behind 
their respective national averages on almost any socio-economic indicator. The associated 
stereotyping by the media has raised concerns in both regions that an unfavourable image is a 
hindrance to their economic development. This chapter outlines some of the attempts of both 
regions to counter negative perceptions. As set out in chapter 2, places seeking to change their 
image have various tools at their disposal, including media advertising, public relations, press 
liaison, personal contacts, and the staging of events. This chapter looks at the previous image 
efforts made in the two regions from the mid-1980s, and at the tools used. Image-building 
efforts in the Ruhr involved the sustained use of advertising campaigns in various media, 
whereas North East England's efforts mainly relied on other tools of image building and 
overall were low-key, intermittent and, to a degree, unsystematic (fig. 5.1). 
Compiling the material for this chapter was a challenge, as only few image building efforts 
have been recorded systematically. Very little material from the The Great North campaign, 
carried out by the then Northern Development Company (NDC), is available in archives. The 
information on The Great North therefore largely relies on the memory of the two 
interviewees of the then NDC who were involved in the design and execution of the 
campaign. In contrast, the two campaigns of the Ruhr are well-documented in the form of two 
books. The fact that these books are commercially available and have sold quite well 
demonstrates that the organisation in charge of the Ruhr's image campaign, the KVR, takes 
pride in the campaign, and that motifs were well-received. 
5.1. The Ruhr 
Since the first systematic efforts of image management in the Ruhr started in 1985, media 
advertising has been at the forefront of promotional activities. Other activities included the 
mailing of brochures, a presence at real estate fairs, press releases and newspaper/magazine 
supplements. Advertising has also been the most visible form of image management, and for 
these two reasons the following section concentrates on the advertising used in the two 
campaigns Ein starkes Stiick Deutschland and Der Pott kocht. 
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RUHR NORTH EAST ENGLAND 
Ein starkes StOck Regional Image 
Deutschland Der Pott kocht The Great North Strategy I "Here. Now." 
One North East 
Lead body KVR KVR NDC (with input from 
Regional Assembly) 
Duration 1985- 1995 1998-2000 1988- c.1992 2002-
Total PR 
budget p.a. 2.2 3.0 0.4 1.3 
(million£) 
Campaign 
budget p.a. 1.3 1.9 0.1 Aim: 1.0 
(million£)_ 
Redress negative Build positive image Raise awareness "Counteract 
of the Ruhr as a perceptions of a Aim perceptions of the 
vibrant and unique and redress negative 'dusty and dark' Ruhr place stereotypes North East" 
"The Ruhr isn't as 
bad as you thought", 
"The Ruhr is "The North East is a 
Main claim "We offer everything different, and an welcoming, modern "The North East is you would expect 
exciting place to live" region" thriving" from a large 
conurbation" 
Main Infrastructure, Lifestyle, quality of Successful economy, Unique character, 
selling education, life, cultural positive business 
point(s) successful economy attractions climate quality of life 
Target General public General public (but Businesses, opinion Not clear groups focus on tourism) formers 
Target Germany (from U K (overseas to a 1992: Germany, F, Germany Not clear 
countries UK, NL, B, L) limited degree) 
Represen- Balanced Balanced Balanced Selective. Sub-tativeness regional brands 
Personal 
communication of 
Main tools Advertising in print Advertising in print supporting 
of image media and on media, billboards stakeholders, e.g. Not clear 
building billboards and TV stakeholders were 
equipped with 'fact 
books' and toolkits 
Detailed and Detailed and 
Market systematic systematic Detailed but rather 
research I perception research perception research Only anecdotal unsystematic 
evaluation before and during before and during evidence used perception research 
campaign (every two 
years) campaign 
Fig. 5.1: Key characteristics of image building efforts in the two case study regions 
5.1.1. Ein starkes Stuck Deutschland 
The first campaign, Ein starkes Stiick Deutschland ('A strong piece of Germany', fig.5.2), 
was developed by the KVR (Ruhr Local Government Association) and PR company RSCG 
Butter+ Rang (later Euro RSCG), and ran from 1985 to 1995 over a period of 10 years. To 
date, it still is the longest place marketing campaign ever undertaken in Germany. The aim of 
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the campaign was to 'correct' the outdated and largely negative perceptions of the Ruhr held 
in the rest of Germany. In the last two years, the campaign was extended to cover the United 
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg as well. 
The enqumes generated through the advertising were followed up through sending out 
promotional material available in German and English. The brochures available were: 
"Economy", "Education and Training", "Transport", "Gastronomy", "The Sporting Ruhr 
Region", "Culture", and "Industrial Heritage". Ein starkes StUck Deutschland generated 
80.000 written enquiries over ten years, and an estimated I 00.000 calls to the dedicated 
hotline (Thies 1996). 
DAS RUHRGEBIET. 
Ein starkes Stuck 
Deutschland. 
Fig. 5.2: The campaign logo and slogan 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: cover) 
The campaign was professionally designed and implemented, and has won several prestigious 
awards. The KVR commissioned a panel perception study of 2,000 randomly selected 
households in Germany from the Centre of Applied Social Research at the University of 
Bochum, which comprised an analysis of the Ruhr's perceptions before the start of the 
campaign and in every second up to 1995, when the campaign ended. The first perception 
study in 1984 revealed negative perceptions on two levels, factual and attitudinal. On the 
factual level, the survey revealed a basic ignorance of present-day realities in the Ruhr: For 
example, most respondents thought that there were hardly any green spaces in the Ruhr, and 
on average respondents thought that 15 % of the Ruhr' s workforce worked underground, even 
though in reality this percentage is less than 1. On an attitudinal level, less than 10 % of 
respondents would be prepared to move to the Ruhr with its low cost ofliving even if they got 
a better job there. Overall, in a ranking of German regions the Ruhr came second to last, only 
just ahead of the Saarland. By the end of the campaign in 1995, perceptions had become 
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significantly more positive (fig. 5.3), but whether this correlation also signifies a causal 
relationship between the use of advertising and changes in perceptions remains unclear. 
Green land (1) Prepared to move Attractiveness 
to Ruhr (3) ran kin 
1984 8% 15% 9% 19 
1995 14% 7% 19% 14 
40% < 1% -1- -1-
Fig. 5.3: Some results of the Ruhr perceptions panel study 
(1) Question: how much of the Ruhr do you think is green land like parks, meadows, rivers, lakes, 
forests, etc.? 
(2) Question: how much of the Ruhr's workforce do you think works underground? 
(3) Question: would you be prepared to move to the Ruhr if you were offered a much better job there 
and if your living costs were considerably lower than where you live now? 
(4) Question: how attractive would you rate the Ruhr compared to these 19 other Germany regions? 
Source: Thies (1989), KVR (1995) 
The following section examines more closely the advertising motifs used in Ein starkes Stiick 
Deutschland. The main tool of the campaign was advertising in magazines and on billboards. 
Across ten years, 160 motifs appeared as double page, A3 size ads in German-language 
weekly newsmagazines such as Der Spiegel, Focus, F AZ-Magazin, Stern, and Zeit-Magazin 
(Thies and Kaler 1995). From 1993 five motifs also appeared in international publications 
read by opinion-formers such as Financial Times, Daily Telegraph, International Herald 
Tribune and Le Monde, and in (re)location magazines such as Corporate Location Europe. 
The motifs and messages used can be grouped into six themes: 
• Quality of life/nature/culture 
• Successful companies of the Ruhr, or their products 
• Science and the knowledge economy 
• Industrial heritage 
• High-quality infrastructure and accessibility 
• Celebrity endorsements 
The overriding concept was the presentation of surprising facts combined with headings that 
play on words. The aim was to counter the outdated perceptions that (according to the survey 
that preceded the campaign) the majority of Germans held about the Ruhr. A mix of all six 
themes was used in any year, but in its initial years the campaign focused on quality of life 




Quality of life/nature/culture 77 
Successful companies/ 60 
products made in the Ruhr 
Science, knowledge economy 19 
Industrial heritage 10 
Infrastructure/accessibility 6 
Celebrity endorsements 2 
Other 3 
Total 176 
Total number of mot1fs: 160. Some ads featured more than one theme. 
Fig. 5.4: Themes of the Ein starkes Stock Deutschland campaign 
Source: Own content analysis of advertising posters in KVR, EuroRSCG (1995) 
Apart from five very obvious exceptions, all pictures were shot in the Ruhr. The campaign's 
first motif (fig. 5.5) set the scene in countering the notion that the Ruhr was completely built-
up and polluted. Figure 5.6 conveys a similar message, depicting a regenerated former open 
cast mining site. A rural idyll is pictured in figure 5.7, and the text points out that 45% of the 
Ruhr's area is agricultural land, and one out of two litres of milk consumed in the Ruhr is 
produced within the Ruhr's boundaries. Figure 5.8 quotes a recent study by an international 
NGO, according to which the Ruhr has the highest quality of life of all European 
conurbations. Figure 5.9 directly addresses the Ruhr's unfavourable image as being polluted: 
Rub your finger across this area and smell the Ruhr. 
(As you can smell, you don't smell anything.) 
The second strongest element in the campaign was that of successful Ruhr companies and 
their products. This category comprises traditional companies that are highly successful in 
their niche markets, traditional companies that have diversified their product portfolio from 
coal and steel to more technology-intensive products or services (mirroring the overall 
structural change of the Ruhr), and more recently founded SMEs that produce knowledge-
and technology-intensive products. Figure 5.10 conveys three messages: Firstly, the ad points 
out that the state-of-the art Opel (General Motors) car plant in Bochum has manufactured 
more than six million cars. Secondly, the factory is an example of the successful restructuring 
of the Ruhr economy, where tens of thousands of jobs lost in the closure of mines and heavy 
engineering have been replaced by 'future-proof industries such as car production and IT. 
Thirdly, the text stresses that most of the traditional companies of the Ruhr have diversified 
their product portfolio. Chemical, mechanical engineering and environmental technology 
industries are now the Ruhr's most successful companies. However, the ad at the same time 
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acknowledges that to master economic restructuring the Ruhr "still needs a lot of time, effort 
and, above all, self-esteem". According to figure 5.11, a company based in the city of 
Duisburg built an incinerator for old tyres in California so that tyres are no longer left to rot in 
the desert. The ad mentions two other Ruhr companies that convert rubbish into energy in an 
environmentally-friendly way. Figure 5.12 states that the world's leading escalator 
manufacturer is located in the Ruhr town of Hattingen. 
Also strongly represented in the campmgn was the theme of education, science and the 
knowledge economy. It was particularly emphasised that the Ruhr is home to no less than six 
universities, numerous polytechnics and research institutes, and several schools that offer 
particularly rare subject combinations. This thematic category picks up on the previous theme, 
the Ruhr's successful companies and products, as many of the products are high-technology. 
Figure 5 .13, for example, points at a new laser therapy for retinal detachment which was 
developed in the Essen University Eye Clinic and is now being used all over the world. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ein starkes Stiick Deutschland campaign was designed to address 
and reverse outdated and negative perceptions of the Ruhr. The first three themes can be seen 
to refute the perceptions that the Ruhr has a low quality of life, is uncultured, and has an 
unsuccessful economy. The following two themes, industrial heritage and infrastructure and 
accessibility may seem unexpected, as in these two themes the Ruhr does not suffer from 
negative perceptions. According to the masterminds of the campaigns that I interviewed, the 
inclusion of these themes reflects the desire to stress the uniqueness of the Ruhr, a claim 
which is central to the follow-up campaign Der Pott kocht (see below). However, the fact that 
no more than 16 out of 160 motifs used in the campaign fall into the categories of 'well-
known facts' about the Ruhr makes it obvious that the aim of the campaign was to refute 
negative stereotypes rather than to reinforce positive perceptions. Accordingly, the theme of 
industrial heritage featured much less prominently than the first three themes. Figure 5.14 
mentions the fact that in the Ruhr many monuments of the industrial history have been 
preserved and are now being used as museums, concert halls, and for housing. 
The campaign included a limited number of motifs alluding to the central location of the 
Ruhr, its good accessibility, its proximity to large markets and the well-developed physical 
infrastructure. On some occasions even the current industrial landscape was used, such as the 
port ofDuisburg (fig. 5.15). The text points out that the world's busiest inland port is located 
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in the city of Duisburg, with more than 40,000 ships calling per year. It goes on to say that it 
has enabled the Ruhr economy to export easily to locations around the world. 
The campaign featured a very limited number of celebrity endorsements. The two persons 
used have a personal connection to the Ruhr. In figure 5.16, the actor Gotz George, alias 
Horst Schimanski, praises the people of the city of Duisburg. He is one of Germany's most 
well-known actors and starred as a police detective in more than fifty episodes of the 'Tatort ' 
homicide investigation series that was set in Duisburg. 
In the last two years the campaign was extended to cover the UK, France and the Benelux 
Countries. The design of the international campaign was undertaken by a different agency 
(FGK) and thus was different to the national campaign, but the messages were very similar: 
successful restructuring (figure 5.17), quality of life, exciting and cultured place to live . 
Wo, bltte, geht's hier zum Ruhrgebletl 
Fig. 5.5: The first motif of the Ein starkes Stock Deutschland campaign ( 1985) 
"Which way to the Ruhr please?" 
"You are already right at its heart. " 




Fig. 5.6: "The Ruhr returns nature to nature" (1991) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 109) 
Fig. 5.7: "The Ruhr makes muck heaps" (1992) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 123) 
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Fig. 5.8: "The Ruhr Conurbation" (1992) 
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Fig. 5.9: "Rub your fingers across this area and smell the Ruhr. 
(As you can smell, you don't smell anything)" (1991) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG ( 1995: 111) 
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Fig. 5.10: "Bochum fares just as well without coal" ( 1988) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 64) 
Hot's der Geier. Oder Dulsburg. 
Fig. 5.11 · ''To hell with it. Or to Duisburg." (1993) 




Saudi-Arabien errelc:ht man am bequemsten uber Hattingen. 
Fig. 5.12: "Saudi Arabia is best reached via Hattingen" (1989) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 77) 
Fig. 5.13: "Many people now see Essen in a different light. " (1986) 
Source· KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 25) 
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Dortmund hat der lndustrie-Archltektur eln Denkmal gesetzt. 
Fig. 5.14: "Dortmund has put up a monument to industrial architecture." (1989) . 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 78) 
Fig. 5.15: "Duisburg unloads constantly" ( 1985) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 13) 
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Fig. 5.16: "Why Duisburg is my favourite shooting location." (1987) 
Source: KVR/EuroRSCG (1995: 49) 
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Fig. 5.17: One of the four motifs used in the international advertising campaign, 1993 - 1995 
§.li.Z. li))er !Pott lkocihlt 
The Ruhr's second regional image campaign, Der Pott kocht1, ran for three years from 1998 
to 2000. It was led and funded by the KVR and designed by Springer&Jacoby, one of 
Germany's most prestigious PR agencies. At£ 1.9 million the annual campaign budget was 
considerable higher than for Ein starkes Stiick Deutschland, mainly because the campaign 
motifs not only appeared in print media (quality daily newspapers) and billboard advertising 
but also in TV commercials. In addition to the six themes featuring in the Ein starkes Stuck 
Deutschland campaign, Der Pott kocht also contained an element of political statements. The 
campaign was different from its predecessor in that it was mainly concerned with 
demonstrating the uniqueness of the Ruhr. As the KVR's Head of Communications pointed 
out to me in an interview, "Ein starkes Stuck Deutschland said, look, we are just as good as 
the other German conurbations. We have everything that the others have got. Der Pott kocht 
is bolder. It says, we are unique. We don't have to catch up with the other big cities. We are 
different and we know that this is not a weakness but our strength." This is reflected in the 
selection of the motifs which are more provocative and have attracted much more controversy 
than the previous campaign. The most prominent theme of the campaign is industrial heritage 
and how it contributes to the quality of life in the present-day Ruhr. In contrast to the previous 
campaign, the motifs of Der Pott kocht contained very little text (mostly fewer than 100 
words, compared to up to 500 words in Ein starkes StUck Deutschland). 
In its first year the campaign was restricted to advertising in the Ruhr itself. The motifs used 
in this first phase were rather place-unspecific. The motifs of two laughing women, a kissing 
couple, mating rabbits, a group of excited football fans, and an old lady wearing a virtual 
reality mask could have been shot anywhere. However, the text related these events to 
particular times and places in the Ruhr. Figure 5.19 allegedly features CentrO in the city of 
Oberhausen, one of the biggest shopping centres in Europe and built on industrial wasteland. 
Figure 5.20 depicts a football fan at a match of Schalke 04, one of the Ruhr's Bundesliga 
clubs. Both figures exemplify the campaign's inclusion of emotions, whereas Ein starkes 
Stuck Deutschland sought to present facts. 
1 The mcanine of this slogan is difficult to explain. "Pott" is derived from Ruhrpott, the colloquial name of the 
Ruhr. "kocht" (" is cooking", "is boiling") has a double meaning. It refers to both steel-making (in German 
steelworkers are called Stahlkocher, "steel cookers") and to "boiling with passion" (which is supposed to be one 
of the main characteristics of the honest, hard-working, down-to-earth yet passionate population of the Ruhr). 
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In 1999, the campaign went external and advertisements appeared in national newsmagazines 
and on TV. The most prominent theme of the campaign, present in the vast majority of the 
motifs used, was that of culture, with an emphasis on popular culture, almost invariably set in 
converted industrial buildings. For example, figure 5.21 depicts a coal pit that has been 
converted into a night club, and figure 5.22 shows how the former steelworks of Meiderich in 
the north of Duisburg is being used as a dramatic setting for a classical concert. 
Figure 5.23 and 5.24 allude to the lifestyle element of the campaign. Figure 5.23 depicts 
Europe's largest beach volleyball hall, and figure 5.24 presents the Ruhr as a 24-hour party 
place. As mentioned previously, many ofthe photographs used were much less place-specific 
than those of Ein starkes Stiick Deutschland, and indeed most of them were shot outside the 
Ruhr. 
Like its predecessor campaign, Der Pott kocht also featured heavily the theme of economic 
strength, mainly using successful Ruhr companies or the perceived business potential of the 
region. Figure 5.25, for example, claims that from the centre of the Ruhr, 12 million 
customers can be reached in a one-hour drive. 
As set out in chapter 4 (Regional Case Studies), in 1999 the KVR increasingly felt politically 
threatened in its existence. The KVR therefore commissioned a number of special motifs to be 
advertised on billboards and in regional magazines and newspapers in the Ruhr only. The 
messages were highly political, alluding to the fact that the three districts between which the 
Ruhr is divided are ruled from places outside the Ruhr (fig. 5.26). Figure 5.27 remained 
unpublished as it was seen as going to far by many KVR delegates. 
Theme Number of ads 
Culture, mainly popular 8 
Industrial heritage 8 
Successful businesses I business potential 6 
Lifestyle 3 
Natural beauty 1 
Total number of motifs 26 
Total number of ads: 18. Some ads featured more than one theme. 
Fig. 5.18: Main themes of the Der Pott kocht campaign 
Source: Own content analysis of advertising posters in KVR/Springer & Jacoby (2000) 
As with its forerunner, the KVR again commissioned detailed market research and an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of Der Pott kocht. Three surveys were undertaken in 1998, one 
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just before and one just after the start of the campaign, and one at the end of the campaign in 
2000. The campaign generated enormous public debate and press coverage, which contributed 
to 28 % of the 1,500 German households interviewed in the year 2000 remembering one or 
several of the motifs (KVR 2000). 
Fig. 5.19: "7.23 p.m., CentrO, Oberhausen" (1998) 
Source: KVR/Springer & Jacoby (2000: 32) 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgeblet 
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Fig. 5.20: "3.53 p.m., Parkstadion Gelsenkirchen" (1998) 
Source: KVR/Springer & Jacoby (2000: 36) 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgeblet 
Der Pott kocht. "" 
Komrnuf1aNtrband Ruhrt-tMt 
Fig. 5.21 : "His granddad has worked in the pit. His dad has worked in the pit. Now he works here, too." 
(1999) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 42) 
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Der Pott kocht. 
Kommuna'-bond .............. 
Fig. 5.22: "Until recently the foreman gave the beat here. Today it is the conductor." (1999) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 46) 
Der Pott kocht. 
Fig. 5.23: "2, 150 square metres of beach under one roof. In the Ruhr everything is a bit bigger". (1999) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 57) 
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Fig. 5.24: "You alone decide when the night is over" (2000) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 72) 
Der Pott kocht. 
Fig. 5.25: "Nowhere in Europe is it easier to find buyers for your product. And nowhere is it harder." 
(2000) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 69) 
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Fig. 5.26: "Nice to see we're being taken care of. What's your opinion on the divided Ruhr?" (1999) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000: 53) 
"Ganz oder gar nlcht." 
Fig. 5.27: "Properly or not at all. " (1999) 
Source: KVR/Springer&Jacoby (2000:52) 
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5.2. North East England 
Advertising has not been the only image building tool used by the KVR over the last two 
decades. However, the advertising campaigns were always used as the pegs to hang other 
promotional activities on such as newspaper and magazine supplements, stalls at real estate 
fairs and the staging of sports and cultural events. In contrast to this, advertising has so far 
played a minor role in the image building efforts of North East England. The Great North 
largely relied on media reporting, the staging of events, and an ambassador scheme whereby 
North East businesspeople were equipped with promotional 'toolkits'. The current image 
building efforts of the region are very unclear, with continuing delays in the formulation and 
implementation of an image strategy. There is also a wide gap between the image strategy on 
paper and its practical implementation. To date, only very few parts ofthe strategy have been 
implemented, and the overall preparation process is more than two years behind schedule. The 
Regional Image Strategy as currently proposed is unspecific about whether or to which degree 
advertising will be used, but earlier drafts suggested the extensive use of advertising. 
5.2.1. The Great North 
So far, there have been two formal PR campaigns in the North East. In what was then the 
Northern Region, the Northern Development Company (NDC) began a five-year image 
campaign in 1998 called The Great North, which after two years was re-branded as the 
Quality North campaign. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain any advertising motifs of the 
campaign. David Williams, the then Marketing Director of the NDC and now independent 
consultant, had -ironically- thrown away all documentation he had kept in his private archive 
ten days before I approached him for an interview. However, according to Mr. Williams, 
advertising had not been a central element of The Great North anyway, something which is 
confirmed by the only three official and internal NDC documents available. The promotional 
activities associated with the campaign can be grouped into general promotion and a series of 
events (NDC, c. 1989: 4f.). The first group includes brochures, newspaper supplements (paid 
for through advertising), an ambassador scheme, and very limited advertising. The latter 
group of tools comprised sport events, the Gateshead Garden Show, conferences (for 
example, on media perceptions of the region), and a series of smaller business-to-business 
fairs targeted ut particular industries (NDC 1990: 8f.). According to Marketing Director 
Williams this focus was not purely a choice but equally a necessity. The campaign had a very 
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low budget, and due to financial constraints the main tool of promotion had to be to induce 
media attention and reporting through the staging of events that were largely financed by the 
sponsorship of local companies. 
The Great North, re-branded as Quality North in 1990, had no official end date. Rather, it 
slowly petered out after it had lost its momentum in 1991/1992 and came to a halt when the 
NDC's marketing director left in 1994, although remnants of the campaign have survived for 
a number of years: the Great North Run, the biggest race in the North East that is open to 
everyone, has retained its name, and the headquarters of the NDC (and later One North East) 
in Newcastle's Sandyford Road carried the name "Great North House" until 2001. 
5.2.2. "Here. Now." I Regional Image Strategy 
The issue of image lay largely dormant in the period between 1994 and 2000. Due to an 
absence of documentation or studies accounting for this absence I can only speculate on the 
reasons for this. NDC' s Marketing Director David Williams, who was the creator of The 
Great North and the driving force behind it, left the company in 1994, and it was not until the 
year 2000 that the next traceable reappearance of the issue of image within the regional 
economic development body (now One North East) occurred. In this year, consultation for a 
new campaign was initiated by the NDC's successor, One North East, and the North East 
Regional Assembly (see timescale in tig. 5.28). At that time, only the aim of the campaign 
was clear: the improvement of the North East's image through redressing outdated and 
negative perceptions. However, One North East and the Assembly were much less clear about 
the individual targets and tools to achieve this aim, and left these matters open to debate. 
The initial uncertainty has continued throughout the development of the North East's regional 
image building plans. The two lead agencies organised a further stakeholder consultation 
event at Durham Castle in March 2001 and sent out to the participants of this event a first 
draft for consultation of a Regional Image Strategy six months later. In early 2002 the Here. 
Now. advertising campaign was launched at three high-profile events in Newcastle, London 
and Brussels. The course of events between then and the publication of the second draft of the 
Regional Image Strategy in April 2003 is much less clear, and my key contacts at both One 
North East and the Assembly were very reluctant to give out information on this period. The 
110 
Here. Now. campaign disappeared only a couple of weeks after it had been launched with 
great fanfare. Poster and billboard advertising ceased, and stakeholder consultation was 
discontinued. I was ultimately unable to find out what had happened, but parts of the story can 
be reconstructed using publicly available minutes of One North East's board meetings and the 
recollections of a person involved in the process (who would like to remain anonymous). In 
mid- to late 2002 the person responsible for the RIS at One North East took ill and eventually 
left the company. The key person at the other lead agency, the Regional Assembly, left at 
around the same time. 
It seems that the formal collaboration ofthe Assembly ended at this stage, and One North East 
was now the sole lead agency. A new Director of Marketing at One North East had taken over 
the responsibility for the RIS and in March 2003 presented an updated version of the RIS to 
the Board of Directors. The board minutes state that "it had not yet been decided whether to 
continue the linkage with the earlier 'Here-Now' campaign" (ONE 2003b). This has been the 
last mention of the RIS to date in any publicly available One North East document, including 
the board minutes. Despite numerous enquiries through letter, e-mail and telephone the only 
comments I was able to personally obtain from One North East said that work on the RIS was 
"ongoing" and thus no further details could be provided. However, both from the minutes and 
from the second RIS draft of April 2003 it became clear that the focus of the campaign, which 
now seems to be back at the planning stage, has changed. Up to and including the Here. Now. 
campaign the aim was to represent the region as a whole and to develop a regional brand and 
logo, whereas the second draft of the RIS of April 2003 recommended a focus on four or five 
"fighting brands" that have a national and international profile (ONE 2003a: 7), such as 
Newcastle-Gateshead, Durham or the 'Coast & Castles' of Northumberland. This switch of 
strategy apparently came as a result of further market research, concluding that "the value of 
regional brands is not proven" (ONE 2003a: 6). 
According to the draft document of October 2001 (ONE I NEA 2001 a), advertising would be 
one of the central elements of the North East Regional Image Strategy. However, the resulting 
Here. Now. campaign lasted for no more than a couple of weeks, and the only motif I was 
able to obtain is reproduced below (fig. 5.29). The short duration meant that not many motifs 
saw the light of day anyway, and the second problem in obtaining copies of the motifs was the 
bankruptcy of the company that desiened the motif.,, Yellow M. According to the owner-
manager of the PR company hired to develop a creative concept for the image strategy, 
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Persuasion (then called Gentle Persuasion), the initial concept for the campaign envisaged the 
use of testimonials of celebrities like the singer Elton John, but these motifs have never been 
produced. One North East's Annual Report 2001/2002 lists other celebrities set to support the 
campaign, such as Lord Puttnam, Ian Wright, Lesley Garrett and Digby Jones (ONE 2002c: 
17), but for reasons to be explored in the following chapters the campaign did not go ahead. 
Understandably, One North East's next, and currently latest, Annual Report (2002/2003, ONE 
2003c: 18) makes no mention whatsoever ofthe Here. Now. campaign, its high-profile launch 
and its associated celebrities. 
June 2000 First event (at Sunderland's Stadium of Light) to kick-start debate about 
regional image 
Dec 2000 New persons at the two organising bodies (ONE and NERA) take over 
Early 2001 Market research on existing perceptions in Germany, France, the US and Japan 
as well as on self-image of people in the North East 
March 2001 Durham Castle event 
October 2001 First draft for discussion of a Regional Image Strategy (sent only to selected 
stakeho lders) 
Feb. 2002 Launch of Here. Now. campaign in Newcastle and London 
March 2002 Launch of Here. Now. at the British embassy in Brussels 
End of 
March 2002 Here. Now. discontinued 
Mid- 2002 Person responsible for the RIS at One North East took ill and left subsequently 
Key person at the Assembly left 
Dec. 2002 New phase of market research completed 
March 2003 Presentation of second RIS draft to the One North East Board by the new 
Director of Marketing 
April 2003 Publication of consultation document "Towards a Regional Image Strategy for 
the North East" by ONE North East. Publicly available from their web page 
Fig. 5.28: Timeline of key events of "Here. Now." and the Regional Image Strategy 
Source: ONE (2002a, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c}, internal consultation documents, ONE North EasUNorth 
East Regional Assembly press releases, interviews 
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Fig. 5.29: A full colour press ad of the "Here. Now." campaign (2002). Source: from the campaign 
launch folder. The text of the ad reads: 
"lt has a heartbeat a soul and a life-blood all of its own 
it's more than just a place where you live, where you work. 
it's a part of you, it happens all around you. You live it, you breather it, you create it. 
The North East is thriving." 
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5.3. Summary andl condusiollD 
This chapter has given an overview of recent image building activities on the regional scale in 
North East England and the Ruhr. In the Ruhr, advertising has been the central instrument of 
image building. In North East England's first campaign in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
advertising has only played a minor role. Most documents available for the North East's 
currently planned Regional Image Strategy envisage strong use of advertising. 
Overall, image efforts in the Ruhr have been much more sustained than in North East 
England. The Ruhr has been developing, applying and frequently reviewing a systematic 
image management from the early 1980s onwards, resulting in well-planned, well-resourced 
and sustained campaigns based on advertising. In contrast, the approach taken by the North 
East has been one of intermittent, short and piecemeal efforts. The Great North campaign was 
well-planned but eventually petered out after stakeholder interest had vanished. The current 
Regional Image Strategy has been in the planning stage for four years now but still has not 
been implemented, apart from a very short-lived advertising campaign in early 2002. 
There are a number of possible explanations for these differences. Firstly, the very limited use 
of advertising in the North East might have been a choice by the individuals responsible, but 
this approach might have also been adopted out of necessity as general budgets for image 
building and promotion were and still are very low, not only compared to the Ruhr but also to 
the two main UK competitors Scotland and Wales. This leads to the second point, a lack of 
resources. As shown in figure 5.1 on the second page of this chapter, budgets for PR and 
image building have been much lower in the North East than in the Ruhr. This might be due 
to a general lack of resources on the regional scale, but in the face of the high budgets of both 
the NDC and One North East the question arises as to whether the lack of resources reflects 
an underlying lack of commitment, resulting in the non-allocation of resources these 
activities. Image building indeed is only an evolving policy area and a controversial topic, and 
its usefulness is still open to debate. This point will be revisited in the following three 
chapters. 
Thirdly, it seems that one of the key reasons for the inconsistency of the North East's image 
building activities since the year 2000 is the fluctuation of key staff, which in itself can lead to 
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delays. But these fluctuations can lead to a strategy breakdown only within an organisational 
and institutional framework that either lacks robustness in that it has serious deficiencies in its 
design, distribution of responsibilities and/or accountability, or places little strategic 
importance on the policy area of image building. These questions will be further examined in 
the following chapter, governance. The degree to which the differences in the image-building 
efforts can be attributed to differences in individual leadership will be examined in chapter 8, 
Leadership. The question whether and in which ways self-reflexive learning and learning 
from other places has influenced image building in the two regions will be the object of 
chapter 7, Learning. 
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6. IMAGE AND GOVERNANCE 
There is 'the problem of many hands' where so many people contribute that 
no one contribution can be identified; and if no one person can be held 
accountable after the event, then no-one needs to behave responsibly 
beforehand. 
(Rhodes 1997: 55) 
6.1. Introduction 
Issues of governance are important to this thesis in a number of ways. This section looks 
at the interplay in the image building process of organisations and institutions of both 
different scales and sectors. This includes the questions of how important regional actors 
of place promotion are and whether the region is an appropriate scale for promotion. Two 
main trends are identified: the shift from government to governance, and, within this, a 
move from regulation to partnership. This chapter expands on chapter 4 (which looked at 
power relations between regions and the national level in general) in its analysis and 
examines what theories of governance can contribute to an understanding of the image 
building process, and how current theories can be modified in the light of empirical 
findings. The main criticism of the current debate on governance is that it significantly 
overestimates the decentralisation of power. I argue that presently the North East is still 
very much centrally governed while only the mechanisms of policy delivery have 
changed. Claims such as the 'hollowing-out' of the state are not supported by my 
empirical findings. The governance literature is also overly centred on processes of re-
scaling of the British state. In the terms of this debate, the German central state has 
always been 'hollowed-out'. 
The first part of this chapter introduces the basic concepts of governance. One central 
element in the transition from government to governance is a rise in the number of 
organisations involved in policy making. Hence in the second part actors of the image 
building process will be identified and their contribution to image building on the 
regional scale identified. The third part examines the second central feature of 
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governance, the changing nature of relationships between these organisations ( co-
ordination versus competition, hierarchy versus networks). In terms of empirical results, 
this chapter identifies economic development stakeholders in both regions, examines 
whether and to what degree they are involved in image making, and looks at whether and 
how these organisations interact in this process. 
Theories of learning and governance intersect in interpreting the interplay of 
organisations in the image-building process. Accordingly, some issues raised in this 
chapter will be revisited in chapter 7, Policy Learning. 
As discussed in chapter 3 (Methodology), the data analysed in this chapter have some 
limitations, partly due to the fact that previous image efforts were carried out a long time 
ago and no systematic records have been kept, and partly because the organisations 
involved in present image campaigns were reluctant to give out information. The two 
lead organisations of the North East Regional Image Strategy, One North East and the 
Regional Assembly, had been very supportive of my work. After the key person of each 
agency had left in 2002, One North East, now the sole lead agency, became increasingly 
reluctant to give out information. As described in chapter 3 (Methodology), I even 
encountered a degree of secretiveness which I attribute to One North East being 
embarrassed at the failure of the "Here. Now." advertising campaign and at the fact that 
after this setback, the image strategy had not led to any tangible results in spite of four 
years of preparations. 
As set out in chapter 3 (Methodology), the collection of information on the North East's 
first systematic image improvement effort, "The Great North" campaign, was 
compounded by the instability of the organisational landscape in the North East. Many 
relevant organisations had either been abolished, or have had a high staff turnover, and 
many key staff had left their organisations. As demonstrated at the end of chapter 4 
(Regional Case Studies), the organisational set-up for economic development and inward 
investment promotion has changed frequently and rapidly. Not only is One North East the 
seventh regional inward investment I economic development body after World War 11 
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(see figure 4.13 in chapter 4), but there has also been considerable re-organisation on the 
national level. UK Trade & Investment, formerly InvestUK and Invest in Britain Bureau, 
has changed its name and functions twice since 1997. Other central government agencies 
such as Urban Development Companies have been established and abolished at a speed 
few observers could follow. Metropolitan county councils have been established in 1974 
and abolished in 1996, and most sub-regional inward investment I economic development 
agencies have only been founded in the early 1990s. The referendum on 4 November 
2004 could bring further changes, including the transformation of the currently largely 
consultative Regional Assembly into a regional government with executive powers. This 
contrasts sharply with the relative organisational stability of the Ruhr, where few 
organisations have been abolished or newly set up. However, the regional body KVR has 
seen frequent re-organisation and has been stripped by the NR W state government of its 
far ranging powers in certain areas (most notably, planning) in 1979 but gained 
responsibility for public relations for the Ruhr area. 
The collection of data has been much easier in the Ruhr. The K VR, the organisation in 
charge of the Ruhr's public relations, has been very open and supportive. They made 
several key persons available to me for interviews, and allowed me access to their 
comprehensive and well-kept archives. KVR also introduced me to the agencies to which 
they had commissioned two advertising campaigns. 
The differences in organisational and institutional stability between the two regions are 
not only a methodological point but also an analytical issue in their own right. The fact 
that changes in the organisational landscape of the North East and the departure of key 
persons from lead organisations of the Regional Image Strategy were able to set back the 
image building process by two years suggests that the image building process in the 
North East is very vulnerable, or that the task is not very high on the region's agenda. 
With sufficient backing from inside the lead organisations and with sufficient stakeholder 
pressure from the outside the image strategy might have continued more smoothly. 
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6.2. The concept of governance 
Distinguishing between the practice and study of governance, the term is used both as a 
description of changes in the material conditions of governing, and as a tool of analysis. 
In other words, the concept can either be used to describe (perceived) changes in the way 
power is exerted, or as a new way of looking at processes of governing which may or 
may not have changed significantly over the last decades. 
In the explanation of societal and territorial development there has been a shift in 
frameworks of analysis from 'government' to governance'. The dominant view now is 
that government and government agencies are just one group of agents of policy-making 
and implementation among many (Painter 2000a: 317). The key dimensions of 
governance are sector and scale of organisations and individuals involved, and the mode 
of co-ordination between them. Figure 6.1 illustrates the array of actors in the image 
management process: 'Governance' includes elected government of any scale, "a range of 
non-elected organisations of the state (at both central and local levels) as well as 
institutional and individual actors from outside the formal political arena, such as 
voluntary organisations, private businesses and corporations, the mass media and, 
increasingly, supra-national institutions such as the European Union" (Goodwin and 
Painter 1996: 636). "To some extent this definition is a belated recognition that the 
coordination of complex social systems and the steering of societal development have 
never been the responsibilities of the state alone, but have always involved interaction 
between a range of state and non-state actors" (Painter 2000a: 317). 
The relevance ofthe governance literature for my topic lies in its strong focus on process 
and an explanation of the multiplicity of actors involved in the image-building process. 
The great number and variety of actors throws up the question of whether and how 
consensus in opinion-forming and decision-making is reached through interaction. A key 
element in place marketing is the collaboration of public administration with civil society 
and business interest groups, resulting in various arrangements of informal coalitions and 
formal or informal public-private partnerships (Kearns and Philo 1993: 3ft). While this 
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collaboration has been quite well researched on the local scale (e.g. Bassett 1996, Bennett 
and Krebs 1994, Boyle 1995, Goodwin and Painter 1996, also see Millington et al. 1997 
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Fig. 6.1: Interaction of place marketing stakeholders in the image-building process 
In contrast to government, where hierarchy is dominant, and markets, where relations are 
individualised, most governance structures rely on networks and partnerships. Many 
authors ascribe self-organizing powers to these networks and partnerships: "self-
organization of inter-organizational relations" (Jessop 1997: 59) or "self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks" (Rhodes 1997: 53). This personification of organisations as 
self-organising bodies provokes the question of what constitutes the "self' in this case: 
who influences this 'self' -organisation, and in which way does this happen? Regulation 
theory could provide clues to answers, with its central idea that economic activity is 
sustained and constrained by the 'mode of regulation', "a set of state and private 
institutional forms, social practices, habits, and norms ( ... ), which induce private 
individuals to act in the interest of achieving overall economic stability" (Gertler 2000: 
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691, my italics). Consequently, my research has to ask how and by whom agencies of 
regional economic development in general, and private sector companies in particular, are 
induced to engage in an image-construction and management process. 
Drawing on the focus of governance research on the variety of organisations involved and 
the relationships between them it is essential to ask which actors and institutions are 
involved in the image construction and communication process, and how they work 
together, including questions of 
(a) power relations (such as how much control the state (still) holds over economic 
development and marketing of the region) 
(b) the authority of organisations and individuals involved to represent others 
(c) in connection with (b), how the organisations and individuals involved see 
themselves: what are their official goals? What is on the 'hidden agenda'? Whom are they 
reporting to (formally or de-facto)? What are their motivations for driving or at least 
taking part in image building? What is 'in it' for them? 
(d) To what extent, if at all, do actors need to be territorially embedded in the region in 
order to have a voice in the image management process? This is especially relevant for 
specialised service providers such as advertising agencies that are often brought in from 
outside the region, and for private sector companies who have newly (re)located to the 
region and are now themselves promoting the region. Or they have become 'part of the 
promotional message' themselves through being used by the region as a success story to 
show its competitiveness, in the hope of an image transfer from the company's brand(s) 
onto the region. 
These questions are especially relevant for territorial economic development, and for 
place marketing and image management in particular as images and representations of a 
place are rather loosely defined, fluid and intangible and thus open to multiple ways of 
reading. It is the nature of images and representations that they are very much open to 
individual interpretations. As a result, regional images are likely to be contested by many 
interest groups and to be subject to constant re-negotiation. 
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6.3. Institutions engaged in image building and management 
This section attempts an overview of the most important organisations exerting influence 
on the images of the Ruhr and North East England ('image making') and establishes 
whether or not these contributions are conscious (' image building'). If they are, are they 
aimed as a contribution to a joint regional image building effort ('image management')? 
Particular emphasis will lie on participation in formal and co-ordinated image-building 
activities such as advertising campaigns (see figure 6.2). 
Fig. 6.2: Image campaigns are only a small part of all image-making activities. 
Not all regional economic institutions are directly engaged in place marketing, let alone 
image building. lt can be argued, however, that indirectly all organisations are invariably 
contributing to the region's image, as every communication to the 'outside world' entails 
conveying a message that in some way contributes to outside perceptions. In this 
overview, however, I want to pay particular attention to those institutions that 
purposefully aim at changing or improving the image of the region, or of parts of it, be it 
explicitly (as stated in the organisation's statutes or mission statement) or implicitly, as 
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part and parcel of general economic development, place marketing or investment 
promotion activities. 
The reason for this focus on 'image-builders' as opposed to 'image-makers' lies in the 
fact that establishing an exhaustive list of the latter is impossible. This is due, firstly, to 
methodological difficulties. The number of potential sources for the formation of 
perceptions held by potential inward investors is seemingly infinite. Secondly, the 
evidence from previous studies on the influence of various sources of information on 
inward investment decisions is patchy and mainly deals with the transmission of 'hard 
facts' rather than images of the investment destinations (Grabow et al. 1995). In two 
surveys of information sources for foreign direct investment decisions Bickl (2000) and 
Oilier (1990) found, through questionnaire surveys and interviews with CEOs and 
technical staff (e.g. accountants and engineers), that the most widely used sources were: 
knowledge already present within one's own firm (be it codified or tacit), industry 
associations and chambers of trade, economic development agencies, and own travel to 
the destination country. In both studies various types of media were reported to be used 
but were largely considered unreliable, especially the internet, but also financial 
newspapers and magazines were treated with caution. The decision makers thus reported 
that the media were of little influence for their investment location decision. lt became 
clear that the most valued and trusted source of information was personal contacts, 
preferably with senior persons from the same industry. This leaves my PhD research in a 
dilemma as it is virtually impossible to identify personal contacts as sources of 
information as this would require knowledge of whether and which information about the 
two case study areas is discussed in private conversations in business circles. But even if 
the sources of investment-relevant information were definitely known, it is unclear which 
of those sources are more or less influential in forming perceptions in the decision-
makers' minds. It might be that some sources are employed to obtain 'hard facts' only, in 
which case the likelihood that these sets of information effectively transmit images tends 
to be little. In the light of these considerations the following analysis will largely focus on 
the following information sources: economic development agencies, business 
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associations and organisations of civil society. This list will be followed by a discussion 
of whether and how these organisations are relevant to the image-building process. 
6.3.1. The Ruhr 
The identification of image-relevant actors in the Ruhr is compounded by the fact that 
there is no general agreement on the boundaries of 'The Ruhr' . For example, the 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Office for Statistics) uses a definition different from the 
Kohleverband (Coal Board). The most commonly accepted territorial extension of the 
Ruhr is those cities and districts that are member of the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 
(KVR, Ruhr local government association, fig. 6.3), the organisation that represents the 






Fig. 6.3: The member cities and Kreise (=counties) of the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (KVR) 
The 11 cities (which in the British system would all be labelled as unitary authorities) are shown in 
light red, the four Kreise (counties) in light or dark green . Altogether the KVR contains 53 
Gemeinden (local authorities, in black font). 
Source: www.kvr.de 
Administrative borders cut across the area, creating several territorial divisions within the 
Ruhr. Firstly, the Ruhr is split up between the three Regierungsbezirke (districts, an 
administrative level between Kreis (county) and Land) of DUsseldorf, Arnsberg and 
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Mi.inster. These three districts, however, each extend well beyond and have their seats 
outside the Ruhr (figure 6.4). Secondly, many administrative boundaries still follow the 
Napoleonic border between the Rhineland and Westphalia (Kilper 1995:75) which cuts 
right across what in the early 1800s was agricultural land but only decades later had 
developed into an industrial conurbation of six million inhabitants. In 1949 the Rhineland 
and Westphalia were joined together in the creation of the Land of North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW), but the old boundary is still reflected in present-day administrative-
territorial arrangements. For example, both the protestant church and the DGB 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, association of German trade unions) have two regions 
within the Ruhr, Rhineland and Westphalia. This is mirrored by the five chambers of 
commerce, whose administrative boundaries have little resemblance with the Ruhr as 
defined by the K VR. 
Even within one city or sub-region there is sometimes a plethora of organisations 
involved in economic development, often without a clearly defined division of labour. 
For example, the city of Dortmund has the Wirtschafts- und 
Beschaftigungsforderungsgesellschaft (economic and employment promotion agency), 
the Dortmund-Project (public-private partnership for economic development), the City-
Marketing-Agentur (public-private partnership for the development of the city centre), 
the Stadtmarketing-Agentur (city centre retailers' association), and the Tourismus-
Agentur (tourism promotion agency). Given the multiplicity of actors even on the 
regional scale, the following list of organisations is not exhaustive but aims to include the 
most relevant actors. 
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Fig. 6.4: The location of the Ruhr in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, and its division between 
three Regierungsbezirke (RG, districts) 
Source: author. 
State institutions and institutions with a state mandate 
Federal state: Federal Commissioner for Foreign Investment in Germany (BfAI) , trading 
as Invest in Germany 
Federal Commissioners b r 
Foreign lnveSir'T'MI 
in Germany 
The central inward investment promotion agency of Germany 
provides information on the whole of Germany as an inward 
investment destination but has links to all 16 State economic development agencies 
(among them GfW-NR W, see below). Invest in Germany has not engaged in any image 
campaigns but has implicitly been concerned with image building efforts through their 
general promotional work. 
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Land: GjW-NRW Economic Development Corporation ofNordrhein-Westfalen 
j 
Where lurope does txJSirM.'S5 
I 
Gtw-NRW is a private corporation wholly owned by the 
state of NR W and reports to the NR W Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Labour. Gtw provides services 
both for NR W companies wanting to go international and 
for companies from abroad wanting to set up operations in NRW, engaging in 
international business location PR. It was set up in the sixties to "cope with the masses of 
pushy investors" (interview with the Director-General) but changed its stance from 
administrative to entrepreneurial in the early 1980s. Its current campaign is "Welcome to 
the 21 st Century, Welcome to NR W". It involves publications, events, stalls at fairs , 
congresses, but no advertising. Gtw also provides information and consultation services 
for municipal and regional economic development institutions 1• 
District governments. The example of Regierungsbezirk Dusseldorf 
Telephone calls to all three district governments and an examination of their www pages 
revealed that none of them carries out any deliberate image building initiatives. 
Traditionally, district governments have been more concerned with administration and 
regulation of the economy and less with promotion. The one district government 
interviewed, DUsseldorf, has a business liaison office, which undertakes marketing 
through organising conferences, fairs , and liaising directly with potential investors and 
multipliers. However, the district of DUsseldorf is not engaged in any explicitly image-
building efforts and its influence on the image of the Ruhr seems to be limited. The two 
business liaison officers interviewed at Regierungsbezirk DUsseldorf were unaware of 
most ofthe aspects of the KVR's current image bui lding efforts. 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (KVR) 
Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet 
The KVR is the lead agency of image management in the 
Ruhr. All 15 Ruhr Kreise (roughly equivalent to English 
counties) and kreisfreie Stadte (roughly equivalent to English 
1 www.gfw-nrw.de, accessed 02/ 12/2003 
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unitary authorities, see fig. 7.2) are obliged by law to be members of the KVR. Due to 
this compulsory membership not all local governments wholeheartedly support the KVR. 
It was set up in 1920, and changed to its current form as a public corporation through an 
act of NR W state parliament in 1979. Through this act the KVR lost many of its powers 
but gained responsibility for PR for the Ruhr. The KVR has, in the past 20 years, run two 
image campaigns for the Ruhr: "Ein starkes StUck Deutschland" and "Der Pott kocht" 
(see chapter 5). 
Projekt Ruhr GmbH 
RUHR Operating like a private sector company but wholly 
owned by the state of NRW, Projekt Ruhr has the same spatial area of responsibility as 
the KVR. According to many commentators it was set up as an attempt of the Land to 
curb the power of the local-government-led KVR. [t does not carry out projects itself, but 
provides money and advice to kick-start individual and especially collaborative projects 
between two or several local governments, private sector companies or social 
organisations. Projekt Ruhr sees itself as a 'network connector' and does not engage in 
image campaigns, and none of the projects sponsored by it is a PR campaign. However, 
one of the selection criteria for the projects it supports is 'communicative yield', and it 
therefore supports a number of flagship projects that are likely to attract media and public 
attention to the Ruhr and its restructuring. 
Local government economic development offices I companies 
All 15 counties and unitary authorities in the Ruhr either have an economic development 
department or have set up a private sector company to undertake place promotion (see 
fig. 6.5), mostly in the form of partnerships between local government and local 
businesses or business associations. There is only one 'supra-local', sub-regional 
arrangement: Emscher-Lippe-Agentur undertakes place marketing for one county and 
two adjacent cities. 
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County I unitary 
authority 
Bochum, city of 
Bottrop, city of 
Dortmund, city of 
Duisburg, city of 
Ennepe-Ruhr, Kreis 
Essen, city of 
Gelsenkirchen, city of 
Hagen, city of 
Hamm, city of 
Herne, city of 
MOiheim, city of 




Name of economic development body 
Wirtschaftsforderung Bochum 
Amt fOr Wirtschafts- und Beschaftigungsforderung 
Wirtschafts- und Beschaftigungsforderung Dortmund 
GmbH 
Gesellschaft fOr Wirtschaftsforderung 
Duisburg mbH 
Sachgebiet Kreisentwicklung, Wirtschaft und Verkehr 
EWG, Essener Wirtschaftsforderungsgesellschaft mbH 
Amt fOr Stadtentwicklung, Wirtschafts- und 
Beschaftigungsforderung 
Wirtschaftsforderung Hagen GmbH 
Wirtschaftsforderung Hamm GmbH 
Wirtschaftsforderungs-
gesellschaft Herne mbH 
MOiheim & Business GmbH 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft Neu-Oberhausen mbH 
Emscher Lippe Agentur GmbH 
(for Kreis Recklinghausen plus cities of Gelsenkirchen and 
Bottrop) 
Dezernat fOr Arbeit und Soziales 
EntwicklungsAgentur Wirtschaft 


















(gd = government department, ps = operates like private sector company but is wholly owned by 
the city or county, ppp = public-private partnership) 
Source: County I city www pages and own research results 
The following three county I unitary authority economic development agencies were 
interviewed: 
• EWG (Essener WirtschaftsfOrderungsgesellschaft mbH, Essen Economic 
Development Agency) 
. - -- -~ EWG, a partnership between the City of Essen, Germany's 
~~W.u-rst·oRot:Rmms sixth biggest with a population of over 600,000, and the Essen (/\J'JIOF-~RU.SCIIAf> ~11111 
Business Association, have outsourced most of their 
marketing activities to their wholly-owned subsidiary EMG (Essen Marketing GmbH). 
Due to a lack of financial resources the EMG leaves most inward investment promotion 
efforts abroad to the GfW-NRW (see above). EWG has so far only engaged in low-key 
image-building efforts and relies in its marketing predominantly on personal 
communication with 'multipliers' such as management and relocation consultants. 
129 
• Gesellschaft fur WirtschaftsfOrderung Duisburg (Duisburg economic development 
agency) 
Duisburg's Gtw was founded as Germany's first public-private 
GFW Duisburg ~ ~ 
doewuucn.ftsfOO!ttung ,.- economic development partnership on a local authority scale. Its 
partners are the City of Duisburg and predominantly larger 
companies of Duisburg (Thyssen, Mannesmann, Krupp) in 1988 as a reaction to the rapid 
decline of heavy industry employment (especially in steel-making) and dwindling tax 
revenue. Straight after its foundation it ran a two-year image advertising campaign for 
Duisburg. Other image-building tools used are fair stalls, personal contacts and tours of 
Duisburg to investors, location service for the film industry, and congresses. 
• Emscher-Lippe-Agentur (Emscher-Lippe Agency) 
ELA is the joint economic development agency for the northern part of the 
Ruhr that contains about one fifth of the Ruhr's total population. It covers the 
county of Recklinghausen and the unitary authorities of Gelsenkirchen and Bottrop. 
Founded in 1990 as a public-private partnership it is the Ruhr's only sub-regional 
economic development agency, located on a scale between regional and local authorities. 
All other cities or counties have individual agencies. The agency has not run any 
advertising campaigns but works to improve media coverage of the area through 
highlighting positive trends and projects. 
Private sector initiatives 
Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet and proRuhrgebiet e. V. 
INITIATIVKREIS RUHRGEBIET .J Both organisations have a joint history. They have been 
set up by Ruhr companies who, in the early 1980s, felt the need to join forces and 
complement government efforts of restructuring and, not least, to change perceptions of 
the Ruhr in other parts of Germany and abroad. Both organisations had joint offices 
which they separated in 1996. 
Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet is run by currently 44 major companies that are based or have 
significant operations in the Ruhr. Those include Aldi, Boston Consulting Group, 
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Deutsche Bank, Ope!, Siemens, and ThyssenKrupp. One of its mtsstons ts the 
" improvement of the region's image" (IR 200 I: 2). To achieve this, IR is staging high-
profile projects rather than general image campaigns: 
• Studentship programme: every year some 20 Masters and PhD students from abroad 
receive a nine-month studentship to undertake research in the Ruhr 
• Rowing cup for the Ruhr universities 
• Ruhr Piano Festival with internationally acclaimed pianists 
• A visiting journalists programme for young journalists from abroad 
ProRuhrgebiet is an initiative of about 180 SMEs. Compared to IR it is financially much 
less potent. In an interview the executive director admitted that even though the 
" improvement of the Ruhr Image within and outside the region" is one of its missions, 
proRuhrgebiet lacks the money to efficiently do so. Its main activities are directed 
towards the inhabitants of the region. For example, proRuhrgebiet awards the yearly 
' Citizen of the Ruhr ' award to an ' ordinary ' citizen of the region who has contributed to 
the communal spirit. 
IHK (Jndustrie- und Handelskammern, Chambers of industry and commerce) 
It is the mission of the local IHKs to " foster the common interests of its member 
companies" (interview with IHK Duisburg) . Owing to compulsory membership of all 
German companies oftheir local IHK the IHKs represent a very broad membership base, 
even though not all members are enthusiastic about their chamber. Normally, the IHKs 
are rarely engaged in direct image-building activities. I interviewed two of the five IHK 
districts that extend into the Ruhr: 
• IHK Essen 
As explained above, the IHK districts do not match with the boundaries of 
the Ruhr. According to IHK Essen, local lHKs decide on an individual 
basis whether or not they see themselves as part of the Ruhr. In the past, there have been 
some divisions within the group of the Ruhr IHKs over this question. For example, in 
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1999 eight IHKs of the Western part of the Ruhr ran a campaign for the " Lower Rhine 
High Tech Region", not making any reference to the Ruhr. 
• IHK Duisburg 
Just like IHK Essen, its Duisburg equivalent is not directly involved in 
regional image-building efforts. IHK Essen ' s activities concentrate on 
attracting attention through creating a positive location ' climate' . 
Arbeitgeberverband NRW 
(NRW employers 'federation) 
Mlleltctelbel' "The federation calls on the government to ensure an economically-
nrw 
friendly climate. It is crucial to advance Nordrhein-Westfalen as an 
investment location in the competition of regions. ( . .. ) The federation 
organises frequent exchange of opinions with all relevant groups of society in politics, 
administration, education, and churches, to make clear fundamental and recent 
employers ' views."2 However, according to a telephone enquiry, Arbeitgeber NR W is not 
engaged in any conscious image building activities. 
Civil society 
DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Federation of German Unions) 
The DGB is not undertaking any image building itself, but it is on the 
advisory board to the KVR and has had its say in the two image campaigns 
run by the KVR. However, one of the DGB member unions, IGBC (Mining and 
Chemicals Union) has recently started the "The Ruhr needs coal mining" campaign to 
influence public opinion in order to sustain government subsidies for coal mining, which 
would otherwise not be profitable. This campaign is aimed at the Ruhr internally and is 
unlikely to be noticed by many inward investors. 
2 
www.arbeitgebernrw.de, accessed 12/06/02, own translation 
2 www.dgb.de, accessed 0 I/ 12/03, own translation 
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Bistum Essen (Essen diocese of the catholic church) 
Founded in 1957 in an attempt to create one single diocese for the 
whole of the Ruhr, it comprises about two thirds of the Ruhr as defined by the KYR. 
Bistum Essen is not engaged in any image-building activities. However, the IR (see 
above) owes its existence to the initiative of Cardinal Hengsbach, a former Bishop ofthe 
Diocese of Essen. It was largely due to his reputation, respectability and leadership that 
Ruhr companies were persuaded to take responsibility for their area's economic well-
being and positive image. 
Telephone enquiries to the two protestant dioceses revealed that they are not concerned 
with image building activities. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir Industriekultur (DGP, German association for industrial 
culture) 
The DGtl is a charity made up of individuals committed to 
preserving the industrial heritage of the Ruhr. They do not 
undertake any purposefully image-building activities themselves but have had an 
advisory role in the drafting of the KVR image campaigns, both of which featured the 
region's industrial heritage. Their argument is that the rich industrial heritage is unique to 
the Ruhr and a major drawing point, and hence should be used more extensively in any 
image building effort in the Ruhr. 
Media 
This section includes the press and advertising I PR agencies. The WAZ group is the 
biggest media group in the Ruhr. The W AZ newspaper strongly associates itself with the 
Ruhr, branding itself "The newspaper of the Ruhr" (figure 6.6). As its readership is 90% 
inside the Ruhr I feel that its influence on the image that inward investors have of the 
Ruhr is rather limited, something which was confirmed by the interview with the chief 
editor. However, since most of its readers are within the Ruhr the W AZ group has a 
strong interest in the economic well-being of the area. 
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Fig. 6.6: Front page of the WAZ www edition, displaying the contours of the Ruhr 
Source: www.waz.de, accessed 12/04/2001 
Advertising I PR agency EuroRSCG (Dilsseldorf) undertook the conceptual work of the 
KVR' s first image campaign " Ein starkes StUck Deutschland" from 1985 to 1995. 
Agency FGK Die Zweite (Dilsseldorf) undertook the international part of "Ein starkes 
StUck Deutschland" which only lasted for two years. Springer & Jacoby (Hamburg) 
developed the creative concept for " Der Pott kocht". 
In essence, there are many institutions in the Ruhr that are directly and purposefully 
engaged in place marketing and investment promotion as two of their aims. The two 
crucial issues are: Firstly, the organisations do not agree on a common notion of the 
extent of the Ruhr. It seems to be the case that depending on whether or not they can see 
an advantage in taking part in a particular project, local governments choose on an 
individual basis whether or not they want to be considered part of the Ruhr. This 
approach was further encouraged through the creation of Projekt Ruhr, which only funds 
specific projects, and which in some areas (including landmark developments or events) 
competes with or even bypasses the traditional, hierarchical structures ofthe KVR. 
Secondly, compared to other German regions the Ruhr can still be considered ' image-
disadvantaged', and thus it is hard to find a sense of regional identity and a communal 
spirit in the Ruhr institutions. In other words: Nobody wants to be part of the Ruhr, unless 
there is money in it. The operation of ' centrifugal forces' in local governments at the 
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edges of the Ruhr was evident throughout the 1980s, when the restructuring problems 
such as high unemployment and out-migration had reached their peak. Not wanting to be 
associated with the Ruhr and its unfavourable image was frequently mentioned in the 
interviews and in the literature (e.g. Blotevogel 200 l b, Butzin 1995). The Ruhr is now 
considered much less of a 'problem case' than it was in the 1980s, but not only for 
reasons of identity but also out of the more pragmatic reason of having to fight a constant 
battle against unfavourable perceptions, many local authorities on the edges of the region 
play down their association with the Ruhr. The quasi-denial of being part of the Ruhr is 
evident in the investment promotion material of local authorities such as Hamm and 
Xanten (the latter tries to position itself as a rural idyll), but also of more centrally located 
cities such as Dortmund. It is debatable whether peripheral areas like Hamm or Xanten 
should indeed form part ofthe Ruhr or whether in this case the borders of the Ruhr have 
been drawn arbitrarily and for administrative convenience, and the lack of fondness for 
the label "Ruhr" therefore suggests itself. Looking at the historical and functional 
association of cities like Dortmund with the Ruhr it becomes clear that they have been 
and still are an integral part ofthe (ex-)industrial conurbation. It seems that many of those 
local authorities have given up the uphill battle against negative perceptions and have 
been trying to shed their association with the Ruhr. This is most obvious in slogans such 
as Duisburg's "Gateway to the Lower Rhine" or Dortmund's "Heart of Westphalia". In 
my interviews a number of economic development practitioners admitted that they insist 
on their own identity and branding, even if this involves a denial of the Ruhr. 
It can therefore be expected that there is not just a lack of co-ordination and collaboration 
in the regional image-management process, but even 'contradictory competition' 
(competition that leads to contradictory representations). While in North East England 
there is scope for competition under the umbrella of a common brand, the common brand 
is not supported by many of the Ruhr's local authorities. They are in the strange position 
that they, on one hand, support the KVR's campaigns (at least financially and with lip-
service) but on the other hand produce their own publicity material that undermines the 
building of a coherent image for the Ruhr as a whole. The half-hearted support of the 
KVR's image management efforts could stem from KVR membership being compulsory 
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for all Ruhr local governments. The biggest reform ofthe KVR since 1979 will come into 
effect in October 2004. While compulsory membership is set continue for the foreseeable 
future it no longer seems unthinkable that at some point in the future it will be abolished. 
It remains to be seen how much of an image management effort on a regional scale 
would remain in this scenario. 
6.3.2. North East England 
In contrast to the Ruhr the boundaries of North East England have been clearly laid out 
with the establishment of Government Offices for the Regions in 1994 (Bogdanor 200 I: 
268f.). However, some organisations are still in the process of reorganising their 
territorial structure to match the North East ' s boundaries, and the legacy ofthe 'Northern 
Region ' of pre-1996 Government planning is still visible. For example, Northern Arts has 
restructured its boundaries in 2002 so that it now no longer includes Cumbria, and it was 
not before 200 I that an umbrella organisation for social and voluntary groups had been 
formed within the boundaries of the North East. 
State institutions and institutions with a state mandate 
National/eve!: UK Trade & Investment (formerly Invest UK and Invest in Britain 
Bureau) 
UK I~ lRADE& 
INVESTMENT . 
Invest UK, a central government agency, changed its 
name to UK Trade & Investment in July 2003. According 
to its former chief executive " it both leads the marketing 
of the UK overseas, and co-ordinates the activities of UK development agencies at home" 
(Fraser 1999: 17). UK Trade & Investment does perceive any need for advertising or 
image campaigns as "the UK' s unique competitive position in Europe ensures it is on 
(almost) every company ' s consideration list. Overt ' lead generation ' activity is therefore 
relatively limited, although specific markets and sectors are targeted on a highly selective 
basis" (ibid: 17). Fraser ( 1999: 23) also makes reference to the difficulty of co-ordination 
of a joint marketing effort between RDAs and the national body, UK Trade & 
Investment: "Given the inevitable tensions inherent in managing any programme 
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requiring both cooperation and competition, some may imagine this creates difficulties. 
Some would be right! However, the tensions managed by the IBB [the pre-2000 name of 
Trade & Investment UK] are no different from those shared by other development 
agencies, including regional agencies within the UK who face pressures to 'share ' 
investments equitably." 
UK T&l's limited image-building efforts are aimed exclusively at foreign markets and 
undertaken for the UK as a whole. While it aims to project an image for the whole of the 
UK it does not directly co-ordinate regional image-building effort to result in one, 
coherent target image for the UK. However, UK T&I does have an indirect influence on 
the image of the North East as projected by One North East, one of the two leading 
agencies in the drive for a regional image strategy for the North East. Up to 200 I, One 
North East had been receiving an annual grant-in-aid from UK T &I earmarked for 
investment promotion, including image management. While this grant is now no longer 
separate but included in a single ' pot' together with other streams of central government 
funding, One North East ' s inward investment promotion plan (including image-building) 
still has to be agreed by UK T &I. In this way, the central government ' s inward 
investment promotion agency still retains a certain influence on regional image 
management efforts, but this control is characterised by negotiation and bargaining rather 
than hierarchy. This process is rather complex and involves three parties, as the funding 
stream passes through the central government executive in the region, the Government 
Office for the North East (GO-NE). GO-NE's Head of Industrial Support, Inward 
Investment and Technology pointed out in an interview with me that UK T &I and GO-
NE have a veto on One North East's inward investment promotion strategy and therefore 
have some degree of control over the image strategy. 
Regional/eve!: One North East (Regional Development Agency) 
Regional development agencies (RDAs) were set up in all English regions 
in 1998/1999. One North East's regional economic strategy (RES, ONE 
2002a) contains the aim of improving the region's image in order to aid 
economic development. Together with the North East Assembly, One North East has 
been the main driving force behind the formulation of a regional image strategy. ONE is 
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funded by central government and reports to both central government and the North East 
Assembly. 
North East Assembly 
"The North East Assembly was established in 1999 by the Government as part of its 
commitment to strengthening policy in the English regions. It came into operation in 
April 1999 at the same time as the Regional Development Agency One North East."3 The 
Assembly is funded by subscriptions from local authority members, together with 
Government funding to carry out its responsibilities under the central government's 
"Strengthening Regional Accountability" initiative. Its members are appointed from local 
councils and other 'stakeholder groups' rather than elected (Robinson et al. 2000). The 
Assembly has been one of the two key drivers of the Regional Image Strategy until 2002 
but seems to have withdrawn its formal involvement since then, leaving One North East 
as the sole lead agency. 
Association of North East Councils (ANEC) 
ANEC, the association of all 25 North East local 
ASSOOA TION OF 
NORTH !EAST COUNCILS governments, has lost influence after the establishment of the 
North East Assembly, to which many of its functions were transferred. ANEC is funded 
by and reports to central government. It does not undertake any image-building efforts 
geared towards investors. Its main remit is to lobby for local government interest with the 
central government. Chair of ANEC is Bob Gibson, leader of Stockton-on-Tees Borough 
Council. ANEC's web pages state, under the heading of 'Economic Development', that 
"the Association influences what is happening in the region, through its working 
relationship with the Regional Development Agency, One North East and the 
Government Office for the North East. The Association has made a positive contribution 
to the consultation on the Regional Economic Strategy and in reviewing it (sic.) progress 
in key areas."4 
3 
www.northeastassembly.gov.uk, accessed 02112/03 
4 
www .northeastcouncils.gov.uk, accessed I 0/05/04 
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Government Office for the North East (GO-NE) 
1 GO-NE is the central government presence in the region. Its objectives are to co-ordinate the Government's sectoral policies and to manage the Government's relationship with regional partners. It sponsors and supervises 
the Regional Development Agency One North East. GO-NE itself is not directly engaged 
in image building activities but does promote partnership between regional actors, 
especially with regard to EU funding. It has an indirect influence on regional image-
building processes through the allocation of government funding and through its role as 
an intermediary between UK Trade & Investment and One North East. 
Northumbria Tourist Board 
In April 2003 the regional development agency One North East assumed responsibility 
for tourism promotion and hence ONE is in a better position to co-ordinate the image-
building activities geared to tourists. However, this dissertation is concerned with the 
target group of inward investors only and therefore omits tourism promotion. 
Sub-regional or local level: county I unitary authority economic development agencies 
Apart from Newcastle and Gateshead (see below), the place promotion and image 
building efforts of local authorities are rather low-key. The vast majority of this work is 
undertaken by the three sub-regional economic development agencies CDDC, TVDC, 
and TWeDCo, and by a department within Northumberland County Council. 
• Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative (NGI) 
r' . \ 
newcastle qateshead 
The Newcastle Gateshead Initiative, formerly the Newcastle 
Initiative, is a destination marketing agency for Newcastle and 
Gateshead. As part of its focus on the attraction of visitors it 
tries to improve overall perceptions of the area. There are four 
main working areas ofthe Initiative: 
• "Improving the general image and perception of the area 
• Proposing the Newcastle and Gateshead bid for European Capital of Culture. 
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• Observation of the visitor market and consideration of how the Initiative can 
increase visits to the region and spending on the 'Urban Tourism' product 
• Development of a high profile media strategy to support these objectives."5 
NGI is funded by Newcastle and Gateshead Councils as well as private sector 
stakeholders. 
• County Durham Development Company 
COUN1Y DURHAM 
M V!LOPMENT COMPANY 
CDDC operates according to private-sector mechanisms but is 
wholly owned by Durham County Council. Established in 1987 
it is the inward investment and local business support arm of the 
Council. CDDC does not run any advertising image campaigns 
but focuses on attracting attention through bringing high-profile sports events to the 
County. CDDC is fully funded by and reports to the County Council. 
• Tees Valley Development Company 
Tees Valley 
Tees Valley Development Company (TVDC) is the inward 
investment promotion agency of the five unitary authorities 
TEE S VAL LEY 
n EVELOP MENT co MPANY m Tees Valley (Middlesbrough, Darlington, Stockton-on-
Tees, Redcar and Cleveland, and Hartlepool), to which it reports and by which it is 
funded. TVDC was set up in 1996 to continue a joint marketing effort following the 
abolishment of Cleveland County Council which covered the area of the five unitary 
authorities. TVDC does not undertake any general image-building activities but relies in 
its image efforts exclusive ly on direct marketing. It markets Tees Valley within Britain 
only and leaves international marketing to One North East and UK Trade & Invest. 
• Tyne and Wear Development Company (TWeDCo) 
TWeDCo is the economic development agency of the five unitary 
authorities of the former county of Tyne and Wear, Newcastle, 
z~::,o;;:~t Gateshead, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland. It was 
corrpany 
5 www.onenortheast.co.uk, accessed 0 I I 12/03 
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set up m 1996 to act in place of the abolished Tyne & Wear County Council as an 
economic development unit. It is wholly owned by and reports to those unitary 
authorities. Whi le TWeDCo undertakes image advertising only to a very limited degree 
its publications are clearly characterised by the desire to improve the perception of Tyne 
and Wear. 
• Northumberland County Council 
Northumberland is the only one of the four sub-regions not to 
have a separate economic development agency. The council 
has a "Business Centre" division which, due to its restricted budget, is not engaged in any 
purposeful image-building activities. It nevertheless provides brochures for interested 
inward investors and maintains direct relationships with them. 
Private sector initiatives 
North East Chamber of Commerce 
The North East Chamber of Commerce is a business association owned by its members. 
It exists to give advice and support to its members and to advocate business interests to 
government in the general policy-making process. It has a membership of 5,000 and is 
the biggest chamber of commerce in the United Kingdom. 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
THE VOICE Of IUSIIHSS 
Civil society 
According to its www pages image management is not a major 
concern for neither the CBI nor its regional office in the North 
East. 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
Telephone enquiries revealed that, unlike its German equivalent the TUC is not involved 
in the North East' s image building efforts. 
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Churches 
The Church of England plays a role in so far as the then Bishop of Durham, Michael 
Turnbull, was a leading figure in bringing diverse organisations together to discuss an 
image strategy. 
Media 
Like British media in general, the press in the North East is fragmented and dominated 
by (inter)national corporations. The regional newspapers with the highest circulation are 
The Northern Echo, The Journal, and the Sunderland Echo. 
Gentle Persuasion, a PR agency, was involved in drawing up the first attempt of the 
North East regional image strategy. It was commissioned by One North East in October 
2000 to develop a concept for a publicity campaign for the North East, including an 
advertising campaign. The collaboration ended in 2002 when One North East decided to 
interrupt the formulation of the image strategy. Gentle Persuasion undertook market 
research into existing perceptions of the North East both in Britain and in selected 
countries abroad, organised stakeholder consultation events and developed the short-lived 
advertising campaign called "Here.Now." Yellow M is a media design and production 
company that undertook the artwork for the "Here.Now." campaign. Yellow M went 
bankrupt in early 2002 before I got the chance to interview them. Otherwise, very little 
information on the company is available. 
6.4. Involvement of organisations in image-building and -management 
The first central feature of governance, an increase in the number of organisations 
involved in policy making, is apparent in both case study areas. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 list 
the organisations most relevant to image-building in both case study areas. Six out of the 
17 organisations listed for the North East have only been created over the last couple of 
years, most notably organisations on the regional level such as the RDA One North East 
and the North East Assembly (both founded in 1998/99). Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative 
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(re-established in 1999), Tees Valley Development Company (established 1996), Tyne 
and Wear Development Company (1996) and the North East Chamber of Commerce 
(1998) are relatively new creations as well. Many of the 'old-established' organisations 
have undergone substantial reorganisation and often renaming, such as UK Trade & 
Investment, which has changed its name and organisational structure twice within five 
years. In addition to formal organisations, a wealth of sub-regional and local partnerships 
have been established in the years following the creation of the RDA in 1998/99. In the 
Ruhr the institutional landscape has remained more stable, with the only significant 
addition being Projekt Ruhr, a Land-controlled organisation promoting project-based 
collaboration between local governments to support structural change. I will return later 
to the question of whether this creation translates into a greater degree of control by the 
Land government over image management. 
Part of the reason for the increase in the number of organisations lies in the fact that 
image improvement is undertaken for several target groups, the most prominent of which 
is tourists. Accordingly, while tourism organisations such as the Northumbria Tourist 
Board or Ruhr Tourismus, the tourism promotion organisations of North East England 
and the Ruhr, may cover and promote the whole of the region they are not purposefully 
involved in inward investment promotion, even though their advertising campaigns 
certainly have an influence on how the regions are perceived and may aid in promoting 
the quality of life aspect in inward investment promotion. 
As outlined in figures 6. 7 and 6.8 a plethora of organisations contribute to the formation 
of representations of both the Ruhr and North East England. Their number decreases 
somewhat if only those organisations are taken into account that contribute to building 
the image of the area, that is those organisations that are trying to purposefully 
manipulate the region's image in order to improve its attractiveness to inward investors. 
This group mainly comprises economic development or marketing agencies on the 
regional scale. This number is further reduced when looking at the image management of 
the regions, as it becomes apparent that many organisations on the sub-regional and local 
scale do not take part in co-ordinated regional image management but have the remit of 
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only improving the image of 'their' area. This is more prominent in the Ruhr than in 
North East England. In the former region many local/sub-regional organisations charged 
with inward investment promotion are either unaware of regional image building efforts 
or unwilling to collaborate. In the North East, awareness and co-ordination seem to be 
somewhat more developed. This will be one of the central themes of the next section. 
6.5. Complexity, partnership and hollowing-out 
The central argument of this section is that one part of the explanation of the differences 
m Image management between North East England and the Ruhr lies in different 
processes of policy making within different institutional setups and modes of co-
ordination. While the Ruhr is still dominated by hierarchy (albeit decreasing) the North 
East is characterised by partnerships and networking. An apparent contradiction lies in 
the fact that the North East's policy making is still very much dominated by central 
government, but on the other hand image building in this region relies heavily on 
partnerships and networks. This may have to do simply with the fact that image 
management is an evolving policy field, but could also have a deeper, structural reason 
inherent to policy making in general. 
Some observers find that what is a state responsibility (the social and economic well-
being of a region) is increasingly being taken care of by - often unaccountable - quangos 
(quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations) and partnerships, with many 
functions being sourced out to private firms. Pierre (2000: 4) observes that "what 
previously were indisputably roles of government are now increasingly seen as more 
common, generic, societal problems which can be resolved by political institutions but 
also by other actors". 
There is widespread recognition that the role ofthe state has changed from managerial to 
entrepreneurial, from 'handing out orders' to negotiation, from intervention to 
cooperation (MUller 1998: 35fT., for a more general discussion see Hall & Hubbard 
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1998). This is often attributed to pressure stemming from the increasingly complex 
environment in which governments of all scales operate, as well as to the globalisation of 
economic processes such as increasing capital mobility and supranational agreements that 
reduce the room for manoeuvre of individual governments. Thus in my empirical work I 
looked at the degree of entrepreneurialism, co-operation and negotiation between actors 
in the two regions, and what induces or compels them to cooperate and negotiate an 
image strategy. Do actors have an understanding of why the strategy is undertaken? Are 
they aware of pressures on the region arising from the above-mentioned changes in the 
environment in which (regional) policy operates? 
Most actors involved in the image building of both case study areas have a clear 
understanding of why such an activity is necessary. Frequent reference is made to the 
pressures of inter-regional competition, a declining industrial base, high unemployment, 
and the need to diversify the economy. Many interviewees also thought that an 
unfavourable image generally presents an obstacle to economic development, even 
though they could only present anecdotal evidence that the unfavourable image had 
deterred inward investors in the past. On the other hand, especially at the local 
government level, some interviewees had a rather vague idea as to why image building 
was necessary. An economic development officer of a Tyne & Wear local government 
said, "Hmmm. A tricky one, that. You would think you've got to try and be modem.( ... ) 
You just can't look like a former manufacturing or coal mining area, can you?" Hence, in 
part it seems to be a normative discourse of entrepreneurialism that induces local 
governments to engage in inward investment promotion without really being clear about 
their motivations and objectives. 
These changes in governance have been accompanied by an increased emphasis on social 
learning and policy learning. Because of this central importance an individual chapter is 
devoted to issues of policy learning and transfer, and learning in networks (chapter 7). 
Robinson and Shaw (200 1) and Robinson et al. (2000) have criticised fragmented 
governance and a lack of accountability: partnerships are being formed, altered and 
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dissolved with a speed that makes it hard to follow. They claim that even policy makers 
get confused, and that for the onlooker it is almost impossible to find out who is in 
control and who is responsible for initiatives delivered through partnerships6. During 
empirical research I certainly encountered this problem in both case study areas. I find 
therefore the contention of 'self-regulating' networks unsurprising as it is indeed hard to 
work out the basic properties of each partnership, such as raison d'etre, authority, 
structure and controlling power. I therefore wanted to find out whether or not the actors 
involved in the regional image effort do comprehend the plethora of initiatives and 
partnerships, and how they operate. 
There was some evidence in North East England but none in the Ruhr that the 
incalculability of the organisational and institutional landscape deters actors from taking 
part in the image management effort. The institutional landscape of the Ruhr both 
comprises fewer actors and is laid out more clearly, with more rigidly defined areas of 
responsibility (with regard to both scale and policy areas) between organisations. In the 
North East, especially civil servants at the local government level and business sector 
participants complained about the 'jungle' of institutions and were often unclear about 
how image building and inward investment promotion were co-ordinated on the regional 
level. This finding could be explained by two facts: Firstly, the system of regional 
governance is only emerging in the English regions and changes invariably are frequent 
and sometimes profound. Secondly, there seems to be no clear allocation of responsibility 
for policy areas to particular organisations7• In contrast, the system of regional 
governance has been fairly stable for three decades in the Ruhr, where Projekt Ruhr is the 
first new regional body formed since the late 1970s. In the Ruhr, the distribution of 
6 Indeed, some authors argue that there is little evidenced of any regulation (for a comprehensive critique 
see Messner 1997, esp. chapter 3). While this view may seem extreme it does raise important questions as 
to whether the state is still in control of the design and delivery of policies that are in the public interest and 
hence the responsibility of the state. And there can be little doubt that economic development policy 
ultimately is the responsibility of the state, by whichever means governments are pursuing development. 
7 This is illustrated by the policy field of image building, which cuts across several other policy domains, 
including some that are not under the control of the Regional Development Agencies (for example, small 
business support and skills and education). Furthermore, the policy areas that regional organisations feel 
responsible for might change over time. The Regional Image Strategy was initially the brainchild of both 
One North East and the Regional Assembly, but the latter pulled out two years into the process, leaving 
One North East as the sole lead agency. 
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responsibilities is less a matter of negotiation and evolution but more of constitutional 
allocation where governments on different scales know and can insist on their rights and 
responsibilities (this theme has been covered in more detail in chapter 4, Regional Case 
Studies). 
Many commentators have perceived a 'hollowing out' of the state, losing power to sub-
national and supra-national bodies. Rhodes' (1997) findings suggest that the increasing 
influence of the EU and other supranational organisations on economic and political 
processes in its member states lessens the autonomy of nation states to govern. The new 
'differentiated policy' is characterised by what Rhodes (1997) calls a 'hollowing-out of 
the state', but the term 'hollowing-out of the central state' seems more appropriate as, 
according to this model, central government loses power upwards to the European Union, 
downwards to local and regional governments and outwards to special purpose bodies 
(also know as 'quangos') and agencies (see figure 6.9). 
Fig 6.9: The 'hollowing-out' of the state 
As far as central-regional relations are concerned, in its move from regulation to 
partnership the state is seen as merely a 'strategic enabler' (Raco 1999). But Gibbs et al. 
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(200 I) view this process not as a hollowing-out of the state, but rather as a change in the 
way state influence is exerted because, as they have found in their Humberside case 
study, it is often the state that dominates partnerships. What is more, while there is local 
variation, local governance depends on the frameworks set by the nation state and, 
increasingly, the EU. Gibbs et al. (200 I: I 06) view this as "central localism, that is, 
where central government determines the 'rules of the game' for local actors, albeit that 
these may in turn be reinterpreted in different local contexts." This insight provides a 
strong incentive for an international comparative study of different regions, examining 
the influence of national and EU policies. Why are rules being reinterpreted in different 
ways, and who interprets in which ways? Thus I will try and explain the extent of and 
reasons for regional variation. Connected to this is the question whether EU regional 
policy has realised the importance of image management and whether it provides any 
form of assistance or exerts any other influence on this matter. 
As explained in chapter 4 ('Regional Case Studies') central-local relations in North-East 
England and the Ruhr are fundamentally different. Whilst devolution in England could be 
seen as a handing down of power from the central to the regional level of government 
there is strong evidence that despite all government efforts to get regional stakeholders 
involved the institutional arrangements for image improvement is still very much 
dominated by the central state. As briefly alluded to previously, most key drivers of the 
North East image campaign are controlled 'at arms length' by Government. For example, 
One North East's board consists of a wide range of stakeholders including private 
businesses, local government, education, trade unions, community and voluntary 
organisations, environmental groups and rural associations, but its members are 
appointed by central government departments (Robinson et al. 2000: 53f.); at first by the 
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), now by the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). In addition to the ultimate approval of One North 
East's leadership the Government exerts financial control over it as its exclusive funding 
body. One North East's inward investment policy has to be approved not only by the 
Government Office for the North East (GO-NE) but also by UK Trade & Investment, 
another Government body. A senior GO-NE official confirmed that Government 
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ultimately controls the regional inward investment strategy and hence, to a large degree, 
image management: 
"One North East pull together every year an inward investment plan. They 
have to discuss that with me and gain my agreement that it's sensible for this 
region. I look at the sectors that they're targeting, I'll see how I think it fits 
with their economic strategy, consider how I think it fits with the national 
policy. I then send that to InvestUK8 in London( ... ) to look at it to see if One 
North East are proposing to cut across something which they want to do. And 
they then agree the plan. ( ... ) One [North East] can't do things to conflict 
with Government policy because it's Government that gives them the 
money." 
In addition to these indirect ways of exerting influence on One North East, central 
government has direct powers of control as set out in the Regional Development 
Agencies Act of 1998 (Painter 2002: 122), which states that "the Secretary of State may 
give a regional development agency guidance and directions in relation to the exercise of 
its functions", in particular with respect to the Regional Economic Strategy (RES), the 
blueprint for action for each RDA. In practice, however, the responsibility of a regional 
economic strategy has been largely placed into the hands of the RDA, but many delivery 
agencies that do (or should) play a role in the effective implementation of image 
management still directly report to Government. A One North East senior official 
complained that many delivery mechanisms were not under RDA control: 
"One North East does not control the LSC [Learning and Skills Councils]. 
They have a national agenda and national targets, are driven centrally and 
currently have no mechanism for regionalising its agenda. English Business 
Links is a franchise that is run from a central body called Small Business 
Service. Both organisations are not under our control. Can you actually do 
economic development without controlling the business support mechanisms 
and the skills agenda? Until that gets sorted out we won't have the policy 
mechanisms in place to really harness all the delivery mechanisms in the 
region." 
The situation in the Ruhr is different in that the main driver of previous and current image 
management efforts, the KVR (Ruhr Local Government Association) is not set up as an 
economic development agency. Rather, it has a limited area of responsibility of providing 
8 Now UK Trade & Investment 
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specific services on behalf of its members and some responsibilities for the Ruhr as a 
whole, including public relations. The KVR is controlled and funded by local 
government. However, the Land government has recently (in 2000) set up a 'rival 
organisation' with similar merits, Projekt Ruhr. In the formal Objective 2 bidding and 
implementation process this agency effectively bypasses the KVR. Altogether, there is 
little evidence for a hollowing-out of the nation state from below in North-East England 
or the Ruhr. 
Examining a possible hollowing-out from above, the European Commission's Regional 
Development Fund does not specify image management as a tool of economic 
development. A senior Commission official remarked that 
"perhaps we have to ask ourselves whether we should adopt a more 
systematic approach to image development as a point in its own right. 
Presently we only support such an initiative if it is put forward by the region, 
if they said, we have a huge image problem and we want to turn it around. 
( ... )However, image is not a point that we would suggest ourselves." 
Accordingly, the EU's regional policy guidelines are very non-prescriptive in this regard. 
The North East of England Objective 2 Programme 2000-2006 of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) does not mention the project of an image strategy as a tool of 
economic development. However, on two occasions it makes reference to the possible 
image benefits from improving the physical appearance of the region, for example 
through cleaning up the Durham coast from industrial waste (GO-NE 200 la: 85) and 
through the regeneration of derelict land (GO-NE 200la: 86, GO-NE 200lb: 145, GO-
NE 200 I c: 112, 163). The tourism section of the document identifies image improvement 
as a further strategic development opportunity (GO-NE 200 I b: 90). None of the 
documents, however, contain any reference to image improvement as a tool of inward 
investment promotion. The EU Commission's priority seems to be the improvement of 
the image of its own projects, most notably those of the ERDF, which requires that all 
projects include a publicity plan "to increase understanding and awareness amongst all 
publics, by providing tangible images ofthe results of Structural Funds" (GO-NE 200lc: 
191 ). 
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The North Rhine-Westphalia Objective 2 Programme 2000-2006 does acknowledge the 
unfavourable image of parts of the Land, including the Ruhr (Land NRW 2000a: 34). Part 
C of the document (overview of measures) explicitly mentions the necessity of image 
improvement as part of efforts to encourage tourism and culture (Land NRW 2000b). The 
programme complement outlines a number of criteria against which the eligibility of 
funding is determined (Land NRW 2000c: 54, 74). Again, improvement of the region's 
image is mentioned here as one of many criteria, but as in the rest of the set of documents 
no reference is made to image improvement in connection with general economic 
development or inward investment promotion in particular. As pointed out by a senior 
ERDF official the main reason for this is that image improvement is an objective that sits 
oddly with the ERDF's drive to establish and monitor performance targets. Image 
improvement, admittedly, is hard to quantify. 
It is important, however, not to underestimate the influence of the ERDF. A recurring 
theme in the interviews was that the ERDF effectively encouraged the delimitation of 
regions and forced regional stakeholders to form partnerships for the bidding for funds 
and the implementation of its programmes. 
In summary it can be said that the respective central states have not seen a significant 
change of their degree of control over the regions' promotional and image building effort. 
The degree of control has remained very high in England and very low in Germany. What 
has changed significantly, however, is the way this power is being exerted. In North East 
England hierarchy has to a large degree been replaced by networks and negotiation, and 
the Ruhr is moving the same way, even if the change is much less pronounced and 
hierarchy is still dominant. 
6.6. Governance and networks 
As outlined in the previous section there is little evidence that the central state is 
loosening its grip on economic development in general and image building in particular. 
However, this finding conceals important changes in the way this power is exerted. This 
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section first outlines central concepts of the literature on governance and networks, 
especially Rhodes' ideas, and subsequently links them to the empirical evidence gathered 
in the two case study regions. 
Rhodes' ( 1997: 8) starting point is to "counter the image of the directive, all-pervasive, 
unitary centre with that of a differentiated polity characterized by a maze of institutions: 
the 'centreless society."' It is no longer central government (in the British literature this is 
usually referred to as 'Government' with a capital G) alone who controls policies. Over 
the last decades, two processes have been at work at the same time: Firstly, hierarchy has 
often been replaced by networks of stakeholders. These partnerships draw in private 
sector companies and the civil society (interest/pressure groups) into policy delivery and, 
to a lesser extent, policy making. Secondly, Government has lost some of its powers to 
local, regional and supra-national levels of government. As a consequence of both 
processes, "there is not one but many centres linking many levels of government." 
(Rhodes 1997: 3). Rhodes ( 1997: 7) calls this the transition from the unitary state of the 
Westminster model to a differentiated polity, which is "characterised by functional and 
institutional specialization and the fragmentation of policies and politics." 
There is widespread recognition that for these 'new' fragmented policies and politics to 
function there need to be linking elements, a way of connecting stakeholders. This 
function is usually ascribed to policy networks, but there is some confusion over the 
meaning and usage of this term. In the literature it is often used to describe the most 
integrated and durable network between interest groups and government (as opposed to 
issue networks, which are only lightly integrated, and unstable). In the majority of 
publications, however, 'policy network' is used as a generic term for all types of 
government-interest groups networks, and I will adopt this definition here. 
Rhodes ( 1997) sees the concept of policy networks as an alternative to both pluralism and 
corporatism. However, he also admits that this distinction is not clear-cut, with the 
corporatist model essentially being a sub-type of policy networks, "a tight policy 
community composed ofthe state and the interest groups representing capital and labour" 
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(Rhodes 1997: 32). Rhodes' ( 1981 and 1997: 39) typology of policy networks is based on 
two dimensions, integration (broken down into membership, stability and inclusiveness) 
and interest (which interest dominates the network, be it professional interest, economic 
interest, or government). Along these two dimensions Rhodes distinguishes between 
policy (or territorial) communities, professional networks, intergovernmental networks, 
producer networks, and issue networks. This list is in descending order of the first 
criterion. Policy (or territorial) communities are most closely integrated, have a highly 
restrictive membership and have an overall high stability of relationships. However, 
Rhodes does not define what he means by "stability of relationships" nor does he explain 
what vertical as opposed to horizontal interdependence mean. 
As far as the dominant interest in networks is concerned, Rhodes ( 1997) asstgns 
supremacy to government because of its "legitimate monopoly of coercive power" and its 
ability to "set the parameters to network actions" (Rhodes 1997: 12), insisting that 
professional and economic interests can have varying degrees of participation but can 
never be dominant. However, Peterson ( 1995) argues that professional and economic 
interests are still crucial for the existence of a policy network and therefore bear 
considerable weight. Even if government "has an interest in a policy sector [and] the 
resources to effect an outcome" it still needs "other resources to pursue its policy 
objectives." (Peterson 1995: 402, original emphasis). In other words, government finds 
itself in "a persistent tension between the wish for authoritative action and dependence on 
the compliance and actions of others" (Rhodes 1997: 15). 
Wilks and Wright (as quoted in Rhodes 1997: 40-43) use the same two dimensions in 
their typology of policy networks. However, in contrast to Rhodes their model 
emphasises interpersonal rather than structural (i.e. inter-organisational) relations in each 
policy network, which renders this model less useful for my analysis. 
The Marsh and Rhodes typology (1992) builds on the Rhodes model and identifies 
further dimensions according to which policy networks can be classified: membership, 
interdependence (vertical vs horizontal, resources, and the dominating interest. Using the 
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opposing ends of the spectrum, policy communities and issue networks, the typology 
clarifies the markedness of the dimensions (see figure 6.10). 
Dimension Policy community Issue network 
Membership 
Number of participants Very limited number, some Large 















groups consciously excluded 
Economic and/or professional 
interests dominate 
Frequent, high-quality interaction 
of all groups on all matters related 
to policy issue 
Membership, values and 
outcomes persistent over time 
All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome 
All participants have resources; 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship 
Hierarchical. Leaders can deliver 
members 
Balance of power among 
members. Although one group 
may dominate, it must be a 
positive-sum game if community 
is to persist. 
Encompasses range of affected 
interests 
Contacts fluctuate in frequency and 
intensity 
Access fluctuates significantly 
A measure of agreement exists, 
but conflict is ever-present 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited. 
Basic relationship is consultative 
Varied and variable distribution and 
capacity to regulate members 
Unequal powers, reflecting unequal 
resources and unequal access. 
Zero-sum game. 
Fig. 6.10: The "Marsh-Rhodes" typology, a comparison of the two ends of the network continuum: 
policy networks versus issue networks 
Source: adapted and modified from Marsh and Rhodes (1992), Rhodes (1997) 
It is obvious from the 'Marsh-Rhodes typology' that the main weakness of models of this 
kind lies in the fact that the divisions between the categories are arbitrary. Rhodes' 
( 1997) division into five types of policy networks is rather confusing and stands little 
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chance of being applied in empirical research. Thus, the merit of Rhodes' and Rhodes 
and March's typology lies in its identification of dimensions rather than in its theoretical 
organization or applicability. However, I will try and use the above-mentioned 
dimensions to characterise the networks around the issue of image management in the 
two case study areas. 
The design and delivery of image policy in the North East is clearly characterised by a 
network approach. In the Ruhr, the policy-making process of image management has 
been a hybrid of hierarchies and networks. The hierarchical element consists of the K VR 
(Ruhr local government association) that draws in not only the state but also employers, 
unions, and some members of the general public. The KVR comprises the 'Ruhr 
parliament', the Verbandsversammlung, that votes on all projects initiated by one of its 
member parties. This organ consists of representatives sent by the member local 
governments, who together elect a number of representatives of employers and unions as 
well as 'lay members'. Lay members usually represent an interest group concerned with 
issues like environmental protection, integration of foreigners, or voluntary social 
services. The elected members together hold about ten per cent of the total seats. All 
members have one vote, and through this system the views of "all relevant forces of 
society" (W AZ 2003a, own translation) are represented. In this sense, the KVR already 
reaches out to the private sector and civil society, but a great deal of participation goes on 
outside this formalised system. Some of the main players such as the lnitiativkreis 
Ruhrgebiet (IR) are consulted informally owing to their economic or political power. 
Figure 6.11 outlines the main differences between the two case studies. Firstly, in the 
Ruhr, the network has relatively few participants, mainly in the form of organised 
interests, e.g. business associations. In the North East most of the participants in the 
image strategy consultations were individual companies and therefore relations in the 
North East are more individualised. Secondly, most of the networking activities in the 
Ruhr are contained in the formalised consultation and decision-making routines of the 
KVR, whereas the North East lacks such a policy-making routine. As a result, the 
network in the North East is more accessible, yet less stable. 
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Dimension North East England 
Membership 
Number of participants Aim: large membership. Practice: 
limited 















Economic interests dominate 
Contacts fluctuate in frequency 
and intensity 
Access fluctuates significantly 
A measure of agreement exists, 
but conflict is ever-present 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited. 
Basic relationship is consultative 
Varied and variable distribution 
and capacity to regulate members 
Central and emerging regional 
state dominant. Private sector and 
civil society consulted, but no 
power of decision. 
The Ruhr 
Comprehensive membership, but 
limited access 
Political interests dominate 
Frequent, high-quality interaction of 
most groups on most matters 
related to policy issue 
Membership, values and outcomes 
persistent over time 
All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome 
All participants have resources; 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship 
Partly hierarchical. Leaders can 
usually deliver members 
Regional state dominant. 
Guaranteed powers of consultation 
and eo-decision for private sector 
and civil society. 
Fig. 6.11: Key dimensions of image building policy networks in North East England and the Ruhr 
The access in the Ruhr is more strictly defined, and little effort was made to draw in 
stakeholders' views other than of those already represented in the KVR. Thirdly, the 
dominant interest in the North East is economic, as demonstrated by the fact that the 
Regional Image Strategy (RIS) has been developed out of and claims to be rooted in the 
Regional Economic Strategy (RES). Furthermore, the orientation of one of the two 
dominant organisations, the RDA One North East, is clearly economic in scope, and it 
has limited control over policy issues other than economic policy. In contrast, the remit of 
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the Ruhr's KVR is both narrower (in that it has a very limited influence on economic 
policy) and wider (even though critics say not very well-defined) in the sense that it 
includes a number of non-economic responsibilities as well, such as green belt planning, 
planning for leisure and recreation facilities, public relations, geodetic and cartographic 
services, infrastructure provision and waste disposal (Petz 1995: 49). 
In summary, image management policy in the Ruhr can be characterised as a policy 
community, as it takes place almost exclusively within boundaries and structures of the 
KVR. In contrast, the North East's efforts to establish a regional image strategy can be 
argued to take place in an issue network, as relations are individualised and the policy-
making process largely takes places outside of formalised routines. 
6.6.1. Interaction of actors in the network 
Despite the criticism raised in the previous section, Rhodes and Marsh's ( 1992) and 
Rhodes' ( 1997) model offers some insight into how interaction between stakeholders in 
the image building effort might take place. Rhodes argues that in Britain the traditional, 
strong unitary government has been superseded by governance through these networks. 
As a result of the above-mentioned processes, he argues, central government now has to 
rely on the compliance of members of these networks. Government now has "more 
control over less" as it is "compensated for its loss of hands-on controls by reinforcing its 
control over resources." (Rhodes 1997: 16). Similarly, Hirst (2000: 20) finds that despite 
seeking a more negotiated, network approach governments have "increased some 
dimensions of central control through budgetary constraints, accounting procedures, and 
forms of inspection." Cameron, Danson and Halkier (2000: 272) see an 'encouragement' 
of partnership through financial 'carrots': "Local partnerships in Europe are very much 
led by the public sector under a 'semi-coercive framework' from central government." 
Rhodes ( 1997: 15) claims that "self-organising, interorganisational networks (are) 
characterised by ( .. ) significant autonomy from the state." Similarly, Kickert (1993) 
suggests that networks are self-organising, self-governing and autonomous. In Rhodes' 
(1997: 52) account, 
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"The control capacity of government is limited for a number of reasons: lack 
of legitimacy, complexity of policy processes, complexity and multitude of 
institutions concerned etc. Government is only one of many actors that 
influence the course of events in a societal system. Government does not have 
enough power to exert its will on other actors. Other societal institutions are, 
to a great extent, autonomous. They are not controlled by any single 
superordinated actor, not even the government. They largely control 
themselves. Autonomy not only implies freedom, it also implies self-
responsibility. Autonomous systems have a much larger degree of freedom of 
self-governance. Deregulation, government withdrawal and steering at a 
distance ( ... ) are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, 
which lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions." 
There is clear evidence from both case study areas that in the case of image management, 
those networks are not as autonomous as the literature may suggest. As outlined above, 
the British government is still the 'supervisor' and paymaster of the image strategy as 
currently attempted in the North East. In the Ruhr, the process is very formalised and in 
firm control of Land and local government agencies. This is in line with Pierre (2000: 2f.) 
who contradicts Rhodes in stating that policy networks are complementing rather than 
replacing the traditional forms of governing through hierarchies and markets. He argues 
that "these emerging forms of governance should be seen as alternative expressions of the 
collective interest which do not replace but supplement the pursuit of collective interests 
through traditional, institutional channels." While conceding that "formal authority is 
being supplemented by an increasing reliance on informal authority, e.g. in the shape of 
negotiated patterns of public-private co-ordination" he maintains that "the emergence of 
governance should not( ... ) be taken as proof of the decline of the state but rather of the 
state's ability to adapt to external changes" (Pierre 2000: 3, my emphasis). 
Rhodes sees one of the reasons for the nse of networks in policy-making as a 
consequence of the fact that British government continues to create agencies, bypass 
local government, use special-purpose bodies and encourage public-private partnerships 
(Rhodes 1997: 51). Weir and Hall ( 1994) estimated that at that time there were 5521 
special-purpose bodies, contributing to an increasingly complex maze of institutions. 
Some interviewees in the North East complained that even if all image building 
stakeholders could be identified it would be very difficult to reach all of them for 
consultation and negotiation. The communications director of One North East, who is 
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responsible for the development of a regional image strategy, reported that the 
consultation and negotiation process was long and arduous: 
"We had to go out to a whole host of forums rather than just one. There 
wasn't a mechanism there. The nearest mechanism that we had was probably 
the sub-regional partnerships. They were in existence already and they had 
quite a few constituent people in it like local authorities, universities. They 
were quite a meaningful forum for getting some of the message out. I had a 
whole year of doing this. But there was criticism from local authorities saying 
'You've spoken to the sub-regional partnerships. That's all very well, those 
are the chief execs.' But as it turned out some of the chief execs didn't 
necessarily come back and speak to the officers that were responsible for the 
hands-on delivery through their own economic development programme, they 
didn't feel engaged. I've been doing stakeholder consultation that was pretty 
high up the food chain. And that meant that I had to go back out again and do 
more of the grassroots consultation. ( ... ) So there isn ~ a forum that exists for 
an image strategy. The constituency I had to deal with was just too wide." 
Similarly, the marketing director of County Durham Development Company noted that 
"There isn't a meaningful forum that would allow for consensus (for an 
image strategy, M.B.). And even if there was, you would probably find it very 
ineffectice, because of the inability to meet the multiple objectives and 
multiple political requirements that each of the organisations' funding 
partners strive to meet. ( ... ) One has to accept the fact that there are a number 
of bodies with their own political directives, their own stakeholder desires 
and needs to be seen and score goals. ( ... ) Fortunately, there is not a 
hierarchical structure (in the image management process, M.B.). One North 
East is not here to control us. They're there to co-ordinate things. But on the 
other side that makes co-ordination difficult." 
He also complained about a lack of leadership of One North East in the image 
management process: 
"One North East has a mission. But for a variety of reasons it doesn't have 
the budget, it doesn't have the remit in which to take a lead. They did once 
upon a time, with something called the Great North campaign. ( ... )That was 
something we all agreed on: the North East needs a positive image. ( ... ) 
There isn't a regional forum for issues such as an image strategy. But that's 
where ONE North East should take a lead." (original emphasis) 
Since economic development in general is a much more formalised process in the Ruhr 
there were no complaints in the interviews about a lack of co-ordination. Consultation 
and negotiation are much more channelled and institutionalised in the Ruhr, where the 
KVR's membership and board provide a routine mechanism for region-wide consultation, 
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including employers, unions and the voluntary sector, on all matters within the remit of 
the KVR. 
Another weakness of self-organising networks and their policies is that they may have 
little continuity: "There is 'the problem of many hands' where so many (organisations 
and) people contribute that no one contribution can be identified; and if no one person 
can be held accountable after the event, then no-one needs to behave responsibly 
beforehand" (Rhodes 1997: 55). Indeed, the North East image strategy still is not 
finalised let alone implemented after a period of four years of consultation and drafting, 
and some interviewees considered the strategy to have failed. The managing director of 
the advertising agency commissioned with a first creative concept for a North East image 
campaign remarked "I'm afraid to say the Regional Image Campaign simply didn't go 
anywhere. ( ... ) The momentum disappeared." (pers. comm. 13/1 0/2003). This might be 
due to the missing organisational routines at One North East and due to the fact that in 
the North East image management is a presently evolving policy field where it is not 
totally clear which of the 'many hands' ultimately is responsible for driving the strategy. 
Thus it seems that the driving-forward of the image campaign was highly depended on 
individuals taking the initiative (this issue will be examined in chapter 7, Leadership). In 
contrast, the Ruhr strategy was planned by the KVR, an experienced bureaucracy with 
long-established working routines and sufficient numbers of staff embedded in clear 
hierarchies. In the words of Cameron, Danson and Halkier (2000: 270) the KVR operates 
in a "web of formalised interaction". 
6.6.2. Governance and scale 
Governance is undoubtedly bound up with questions of scale and the delimitation of 
territory. The rather intangible nature of a place image is aggravated by an equally 
unclear notion of what constitutes a region. As Alien et al. (1998) have demonstrated for 
south-east England, regions are not entities that exist independently of social relations. 
They are 'made' and constructed through human activity, through social, economic and 
political agency and leadership. In an easy definition, a region could be seen as an 
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administrative unit (e.g. the EU's classification into NUTS 1, 2, or 3 regions). More 
functional definitions of a region include those of the region with close economic 
interdependence, or with a shared cultural identity (see Jones and Keating 1995, Keating 
1998, MacLeod and Goodwin 1999, Vanhove 1999: 129-147). Consequently, in exploring 
the role of different place promotion stakeholders in the image construction process it 
could be vital to examine what different stakeholders identify as 'their' region and 
whether or not the stakeholders actually agree on the same territory as being 'theirs'. 
Underlying this is the question whether there is anything like a partition of territory into 
'marketable' entities ideal for image building. 
The 'cohesion' of both case study regions in terms of felt attachment to the region is 
generally contradictory and seems to have changed over time and to a certain degree 
depends on the target group of the promotion. While many economic development I place 
promotion agencies in the Ruhr generally take pride in their region it is often seen as 
detrimental to the inward investment promotion effort to be identified with the Ruhr. 
"The homogeneous unit 'Ruhr' no longer exists. ( ... ) Especially at the edges 
of the Ruhr 'centrifugal forces' are high. If you look at cities like Duisburg or 
Dortmund, who are at the Western and Eastern edge of the Ruhr, they don't 
want to be seen as part of the Ruhr unless there's money in it for them. But 
things have improved as the image of the Ruhr has improved. In the eighties 
nobody wanted to be part of the Ruhr. 'Every man for himselfl' Duisburg and 
Dortmund always have the advantage of being able to associate themselves 
with the lower Rhine area or Westphalia. In the eighties poor old Bochum or 
Gelsenkirchen had no choice. They were stuck with the Ruhr. They just 
couldn't claim to be part of anything else." (interview with Duisburg 
Chamber of Commerce) 
Indeed, cities on the boundaries of the Ruhr make little reference to the Ruhr in their 
branding. In its promotional literature Duisburg sees itself as "The Gateway to the Lower 
Rhine", Dortmund brands itself as "The Heart of Westphalia", and Hagen for a long time 
promoted itself as the "Gateway to the Sauerland"9• The managing director of GtW 
Duisburg admitted that 
"Duisburg has never unambiguously declared itself for the Ruhr. ( ... ) It really 
depends on what industry sector we target: if we want to attract logistics 
9 Sauerland, the Ruhr's primary 'country getaway', is a rural, hilly landscape south-east of the Ruhr. 
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companies we market ourselves as 'The Gateway to the Lower Rhine." lfwe 
want to tap into the purchasing power of the Ruhr's five million inhabitants 
then we claim to be an integral part of the Ruhr. If we're eying film and 
media industry we have to make sure we stress that we're part of the 
Cologne/DUsseldorf conurbation." 
The communications director of Dortmund-Project was very clear in saying that "the 
Ruhr is an invention. It is not a region delimited by boundaries. It is not a natural area. 
The Ruhr has been invented by someone long ago. In my opinion, just like we made it up 
we could bin it." 
Similarly, many companies traditionally located in the Ruhr refused to be associated with 
the area and only recently became part of the Ruhr's promotional message (interview 
with Duisburg economic promotion agency). There also is anecdotal evidence that in the 
1980s investors such as Deutsche Bank and Rank Xerox decided against locating in the 
Ruhr as they felt that the unfavourable image would make the recruitment of qualified 
staff from outside the region very difficult (Interview with Duisburg economic promotion 
agency). 
This phenomenon of 'denial of the region' is much less pronounced in North East 
England where not a single interviewee- not even in Teesside, which has a tendency of 
not feeling adequately represented by the regional agencies - claimed that his or her 
locality was not part of the North East. This may be due as much to the fact that there are 
no major, well-known cities just outside the North East as to an active and wholehearted 
declaration to the region. 
6.7. Conclusion 
The breadth of organisations involved in image-building in North East England reflects 
the move from government to governance. The responsibility for image-building lies with 
public administration which works in collaboration with private and business interest 
groups. The resulting various arrangements are informal coalitions rather than formal 
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partnerships, even though the region seems to abound with coalitions called 
'partnerships'. In contrast, in the Ruhr a more formalised system still operates which is 
characterised by relative stability, even though a new regional player, Projekt Ruhr, has 
been established by the NR W Land government and has increased direct Land 
interference. 
For the North East, image management is a fairly new policy area, and the current 
political institutional framework seems not geared towards coping with this process. 
Interviewees frequently pointed to the lack of suitable forums for co-operation and 
negotiation. The KVR, the Ruhr's driving body ofthe image campaigns, provides a well-
established bureaucracy that is capable of drawing in a wide range of stakeholders as part 
of its administrative routine. 
In essence, many differences in the image management efforts between North East 
England and the Ruhr can be attributed to different and changing institutional 
arrangements. Whereas in the North East the process is largely controlled by central 
government it is still largely in the hands of local government in the Ruhr, even though 
the Land government is 'tightening the reins'. What is often referred to as 'devolution' 
has, in the North East, in reality been a decentralisation, but this is set to change if a 
regional government is approved in the referendum on 4 November 2004. 
Altogether, the empirical evidence of any hollowing out of the central state in the two 
case study areas is limited. Central-local relations have certainly changed more in North 
East England, where the responsibility for economic strategy has to a certain degree been 
transferred to the regional level. However, central government still controls the process 
through its 'gate keeping' functions in funding and senior appointments in the RDA. In 
the Ruhr, there is no evidence of central government interference in the image building 
process. However, the setting up by the land government of a rival organisation to the 
KVR, Projekt Ruhr, could be seen as an undermining of the Ruhr's self-governing 
capabilities. No hollowing out from above is discernable as the ERDF funding is non-
prescriptive with regard to image improvement. This policy area is largely unregulated by 
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EU programmes but on the other hand the ERDF will consider 1mage improvement 
activities if desired by the region in question. 
In the light of these findings a number of assumptions in the existing literature on 
governance must be questioned. Firstly, there is no evidence in the data obtained for 
North East England that the central state has lost influence as a policy-maker and -
deliverer in the field of place marketing and image management. These processes are still 
clearly governed by the central state, but the mechanisms of the control have changed 
away from direct hierarchical command by the state towards a dominance of partnerships 
and informal networks which are only weakly institutionalised. Secondly, the British 
governance literature overestimates the process of decentralisation in federal states. In the 
terms of the literature, the German central state has always been 'hollowed-out'. 
This chapter has examined the importance of networks for the governance of the image 
building process. The following chapter will look, among other issues, at whether and 
how these networks are being used as a resource for intra- and inter-regional learning. 
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i. POLICY LEARNING 
There's a bit of cynicism about, particularly in the business community, of 
'we've seen it all before. ' My fear is that it will just peter out like so many 
initiatives before. Good idea, nobody picks it up, and three years down the 
line somebody will say 'oh, that's a good idea' and re-invent the wheel. 
(Bill Midgley, past president of the North East Chamber of Commerce and 
Director ofthe British Chamber of Commerce) 
In an age where a plethora of policy-relevant information is available through the media, 
especially the internet, and through personal contacts, policies are hardly designed in a 
vacuum. They are likely to be informed by lessons drawn from successful or unsuccessful 
policies elsewhere. Even though the Ruhr undertook what is widely regarded as the first 
fully-blown place marketing campaign in Germany, the concept of using publicity to sell 
places was hardly novel in the mid-1980s. How did the idea make its way to the Ruhr? In 
contrast, in its national context, North East England was relatively late to embrace an 
image strategy, even though various activities of image-building had been carried out 
previously in this region. Why was image-management eventually adopted? 
This chapter looks at the role of policy learning and transfer in the process of realising the 
need for an image building strategy and of designing and implementing it. The first 
section looks at how stakeholders within the region learn from each other, and the second 
part examines policy learning from other places and from the past. How important were 
lessons learned from and experiences shared with other places for the awareness and 
adoption of image management? Did the two regions deliberately turn to other places for 
advice? Or were the strategies drawn up without having looked at experiences elsewhere? 
Is there any connection between current image building efforts and earlier attempts in the 
same region? 
In addressing these questions I encountered two methodological problems; organisational 
discontinuity, and the timing of previous image building efforts. With regard to the first 
point, the Ruhr has, until recently, been characterised by a relative stability of 
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organisational arrangements in administration and regional economic development. One 
organisation, the KVR (Ruhr local government association), has been in charge not only 
of public relations for the region, but also of the two image campaigns undertaken so far. 
I was able to speak to one member of staff at KVR who has been working in a senior 
position in the public relations department and who has been involved in image 
management from 1983 to date. North East England, in contrast, has been marked by 
changing organisational arrangements, from re-designing central government in the 
region (for example, the creation of the Government Offices for the Regions) and the 
rearrangement of local and county governments (for example, the abolition of Tyne & 
Wear and Cleveland county councils). Recently, the region has been given more self-
responsibility for its economic well-being with the creation in 1998/9 of the regional 
development agency One North East and a Regional Assembly. Together, these 
rearrangements meant that it was very hard in the process of the research to track down 
individuals who have been involved in image building efforts over the last 20 years. In 
some cases, especially in the North East, organisations or agencies involved in earlier 
image building efforts had been abolished altogether. It was particularly difficult to find 
people who had been working with the Northern Development Company (NDC) in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s when it ran an image campaign for what was then the Northern 
region. Secondly, and connected with the first issue, is the problem that the earliest 
'modern' image improvement initiatives in the two regions date back to 1985 and 1988 
respectively so that it was often impossible to interview the people who were a driving 
force in the campaigns, as they had retired, started their own business or moved on to a 
different employer. 
This chapter consists of two parts that are both informed by the learning literature. The 
first part deals with social learning and asks how economic development stakeholders in 
each case study area learn about each other's views and aims, and whether and how 
consensus is being reached. The second part is concerned with what is referred to in the 
academic literature as policy learning, lesson drawing, or policy transfer and seeks to 
establish to what degree and through which processes the adoption or refinement of 
image-building activities have been informed by policies in the same field elsewhere. As 
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set out by Stone (200 I), the two strands of literature on social learning and policy 
learning - that are often viewed in isolation from each other, or even regarded as 
incompatible- can indeed be linked together through a policy network approach 10 . While 
chapter 6 (Governance) has looked at individual policy networks in the two case study 
areas, the application of the concept of policy networks in this chapter is extended to 
include links across national boundaries. Policy networks can extend in their scale from 
local to global and thus be a constitutive element for learning both within regions and 
between regions and other places. 
7.1. Intra-regional learning 
This section deals with how the image stakeholders learned about each other's aims, 
expectations and motivations for taking part in the image management process. The 
initial starting point for the analysis of this sub-section was theories of organisational 
learning. However, it soon became apparent that, despite their richness in explaining 
processes of learning, the literature was overly concerned with the private sector 
economy. This is particularly the case with the concept of the learning region which 
centres around the competitiveness of the region as a whole, created and supported by the 
ability of the aggregate of private sector companies contained within the region to learn 
and therefore innovate, creating a competitive advantage over other regions. The theory 
of the learning region does offer insights into how public policy can or cannot support 
learning as a tool of economic development, but offers little in the way of explaining how 
learning influences the design and delivery of regional policies. However, the basic 
concepts or conditions that underpin regional learning do have a certain power of 
illuminating the latter process. In particular, it can point to the shared social context that 
1° For reasons of simplicity I use here the term of policy networks as an umbrella term for the varied and 
often competing concepts that seek to explain the flow of knowledge, ideas and other resources in networks 
between politicians, bureaucrats and other agents such as pressure groups, professional bodies, and 
professionals of associated industries such as advertising or consultancy. As demonstrated by Stone (200 I) 
these concepts include epistemic communities (Haas 2001 ), communities of practice (Wenger 1998, 
Wenger and Snyder 2000), policy communities (Sabatier 1991), advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 
1998), discourse communities (Hansen et al. 200 I) or discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993). In a more spatially 
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facilitates learning, or that could even be considered an indispensable prerequisite for 
learning. 
7.1.1. Key concepts 
Gertler (200 I) revisits the claim that a shared cultural context facilitates learning. This 
insight is largely based on Michael Polanyi's pioneering works of 1958 and 1967, in 
which he introduced and refined the concept of tacit knowledge. Because tacit knowledge 
is embedded in social context, so his argument goes, this knowledge could more easily be 
shared by a person who shared the same socio-cultural context. Through this 'social 
proximity', i.e. the sharing of norms, values and rules and a common language (this does 
not just refer to different languages but also to different 'technical languages' such as 
'legalese' or geographers' technical terms), communication between two persons 
('knower' and learner) is facilitated. Gertler (200 I: 11) argues that an analysis of learning 
falls short of a full understanding and explanation if it takes this shared social context as 
given. He notes that Michael Polanyi "never fully specifies how 'context' and 'rules' are 
produced". For an explanation of the underlying factors behind the 'context' Gertler turns 
to the work of Michael Polanyi' s brother Karl, whose work (e.g. 1945) provides the 
insight that "markets and the behaviour of economic actors are socially constructed and 
governed." (Gertler 200 I: 11 ). It follows from this that 
"the ability of individual workers or firms to produce and share tacit 
knowledge depends on much more than spatial proximity or cultural affinity. 
In particular, it depends on institutional proximity - that is, the shared norms, 
conventions, values, expectations and routines arising from commonly 
experienced frameworks of institutions." (Gertler 200 I: I I, my italics) 
For Martin (2000), this explanation does not go far enough. He goes one step further and 
asks how the 'frameworks of institutions' are being shaped in turn and encourages us to 
look at the overriding regulatory regime. However, there seems to be confusion over the 
what 'mode of social regulation' means. Martin (2000: 77) refers to the 'mode of social 
regulation as "the ensemble of rules, customs, norms, conventions, and interventions", a 
oriented literature some of these concepts have been demonstrated to exist on the local or regional level as 
'growth coalitions', 'growth machines' or 'booster coalitions'. 
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description that comes rather close to what Gertler (200 l) termed 'social context', but the 
two authors are referring to something different: Martin refers to the 'mode of social 
regulation', "which mediate(s) and support(s) economic production, accumulation, and 
consumption." (p. 77). This throws up the question to what degree institutions can be 
shaped from the 'other end', that is by the actors that operate in the social context- the 
learners- as opposed to regulation from 'regulatory frameworks'. In other words, it can 
be argued that institutions and regulatory frameworks are also a product of shared norms, 
rules, culture, context (cf. Gertler 2000: 691). Amin and Cohendet (2000) pick up on this 
feedback issue, arguing that there is a mutual rather than a linear dependence between 
regulatory regime, institutional frameworks and the social context on which learning is 
based (fig. 7.1). 
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Fig. 7.1: Institutional frameworks, social context, and learning 
Source: author's own work, based on Gertler (2001 ), Martin (2000), Am in and Cohendet (2000) 
In geography and other spatially-oriented disciplines the discussion focuses much on how 
'proximity' can be achieved, for it is 'proximity' which is regarded as most crucial for 
inducing learning. Proximity can be achieved through closeness, which does not 
necessarily have to mean spatial proximity. Out of the following three approaches, the 
learning region relies most heavily on spatial proximity, even though, as we shall see, it is 
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not necessarily a prerequisite. According to Amin and Cohendet (2000: 112), proximity 
can also be relational or cognitive. 
A useful concept m the context of my thesis is communities of practice (Amin and 
Cohendet 2000: I 05-113, Gertler 200 I: 8f.). This rather recent concept aroused 
widespread interest through a book chapter by Brown and Duguid ( 1996), followed by a 
number of publications by the same authors and others (e.g. Brown and Druguid 1998, 
Wenger 1998, Wenger and Snyder 2000). Communities of practice are individuals 
working together out of a common interest to achieve a common goal. The concept of 
'communities of practice' aims at bridging the gap between individual and organisational 
learning, as these communities can exist completely inside one organisation or its 
members can be made up of members of many different organisations. The group is 
defined by a common goal (that is, a common project) and learning occurs "through 
ongoing practice, drawing on social energy and power generated through interaction in 
joint enterprises." (Amin and Cohendet 2000: I 07, drawing on Wenger 1998). 
What seems to be surprising, at first sight, is that teams of very different functions and 
levels act as communities of practice (Am in and Cohendet 2000: I 08). This suggests that 
the often-quoted distinction between 'radical' learning and 'incremental' learning can no 
longer be sustained: "( ... ) the processes behind scientific innovation in the R&D 
laboratory were not that different from those behind innovation in the Breton fishing 
industry or the learning described by Wenger (insurance claim processors, M.B.). In the 
laboratory too, the production of novelty drew upon routines, conversations, meetings, 
scripts, memory, stories, and other soft technologies, grafted onto the technologies of 
formal knowledge acquisition and application" (Am in and Cohendet 2000: I 08, drawing 
on Latour 1986, Latour and Woolgar 1986). 
The concept of knowledge enablers (or incubators) recognizes that while producing tacit 
knowledge is relatively easy, disseminating it is very difficult (Gertler 2001: 9). The 
application of the concept seeks to exploit the fact that new tacit knowledge can be 
incorporated into an organisation most effectively by integrating a new member of staff 
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with the desired specialist knowledge. This person, it is hoped, will 'incubate' innovation 
in a group or organisation. The most common application of this insight is the rotation of 
key personnel, ensuring that a member of staff gets in contact with colleagues from as 
many different backgrounds as possible, or the 'buying in' of expertise through hiring a 
member of staff from an organisation in which the desired knowledge or innovation is 
embedded. The idea of knowledge incubators is linked to the concept of diffusion, which 
will be taken up in the section on policy learning. 
It needs to be stressed that a shared cultural context not only facilitates learning, but this 
shared belief in certain norms, values and ideas also to a certain extent coerces learning 
and reaching agreement. Haas (200 I) contends that within policy communities or 
epistemic communities the common belief systems are not only analytic but normative. It 
has been argued, for example, that the discourse of competitiveness has resulted in places 
of all scales being widely open to suggestions of how to improve their competitive 
position in 'the global game'. It can therefore be assumed that the idea of image 
management would fall on fertile ground in most regions of Western Europe, but in 
particular in a region such as North East England where competitiveness is one of the 
central themes of the newly-developed Regional Economic Strategy. Dr. Fred Robinson 
of Durham University argues that this process has been evident in the North East's image 
management process over the last decades: 
"The 'Here. Now.' Campaign is very similar to 'The Great North' campaign. 
The feeling at the time of the 'Great North' campaign was that the only way 
somebody comes up here and invests is if they're convinced that the place is 
good, it's positive, it's on the way up, it's a place where you can make 
money. But basically it's like a shithole, so that you have to present it - in 
their jargon - in a positive light. Bring in promotional agencies, create an 
image and sell, sell, sell. It has not proven that difficult in this region to create 
that kind of 'growth coalition' or 'boosters'. Those people are used to that. 
They do suspend disbelief.( ... )" (interview) 
Indeed, in both case study regions there seemed to be overarching agreement that image 
management is necessary. (This is surprising as to date- to my knowledge- there are no 
studies that are able to quantifY the economic benefit of a positive image for a locality 
and whether purposeful image management or image campaigns can actually contribute 
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effectively to this image change 11 ). Among the interviewees in both case study areas 
disagreement arose not as to the necessity of image management but merely as to what is 
the most effective and most efficient way of undertaking it. The widespread agreement on 
the necessity of image building might have two reasons. Firstly, and as alluded to above, 
there seems to be a powerful normative discourse on competitiveness and the 
'competitive region', to the degree that it has become 'conventional wisdom' among 
economic development practitioners (see Jessop 1998, Leitner and Sheppard 1998, 
Painter 1998). Secondly, and associated with the first point, private-sector management 
styles have been widely applied in the public sector (for a systematic overview see Hood 
[200 I]). Indeed, not only is the lead agency of the North East's current regional image 
strategy organised along private-sector principles, but private-sector companies and 
associations were also widely consulted for publicly-led image building efforts in both 
regions in an effort to receive feedback form the intended target group of the image 
building efforts. Private-sector input was especially sought for the current campaign in 
the North East, where many of the members of the 'image steering group' (see below) 
came from the private sector companies. 
7.1.2. Image and sociaB learning 
Once One North East and the North East Assembly had agreed in 2000 that they would 
drive forward a regional image strategy (see timescale in figure 5.1, chapter 5), they 
commissioned an agency called Gentle Persuasion (which in the meantime has changed 
its name to Persuasion) to develop a concept for an image strategy. Persuasion, One 
North East and the Assembly together aimed at informing and drawing in the views of a 
wide range of economic development stakeholders from business associations to trade 
unions. The first consultation of regional economic stakeholders took place in Durham 
Castle in March 200 I. Around 30 persons attended, representing some 20 stakeholders at 
11 Wells and Wint (2000) comment on the general lack of research on "the effectiveness of the investment 
promotion function in general and the relative effectiveness of different promotional techniques and 
structures" (p. 7). The reason for this neglect mainly lies in methodological difficulties. For example, a 
correlation can be established between the use of an image building tool and the improvement of 
perceptions among the target groups, but owing to the absence of laboratory conditions it is almost 
impossible to prove a causal relationship. To follow from this that there are no financial benefits to be 
reaped from a positive image, however, would be short-sighted. 
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a presentation and discussion of the Regional Image Strategy (RIS). In this meeting 
interested individuals were asked to volunteer to become part of the image steering group 
(see figure 7 .2). The members of the steering group were sent further drafts of the image 






















































Fig. 7.2: Organisations represented at the Durham Castle event 
Source: ONE/NEA consultation documents 
Media 
Evening Chronicle I 
The Journal 
Century Radio 
In addition to the organisations named, several representatives of the two organising bodies One 
North East and the North East Regional Assembly took part. Organisations marked with (*) sent a 
representative to the 'image steering group'. 
As examined, in the North East an image working group has been set up to deal 
specifically with the image campaign. In the Ruhr this process happened in much more 
formalised administrative routines, which also resulted in a much less broad consultation 
with fewer stakeholders involved other than those representing local government. Issues 
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of PR and image building were considered by the 'Fachausschuss flir Marketing, Kultur 
und Sport' (committee for marketing, culture and sport) which is made up of a majority 
of local government representatives and a number of employers' and employees' 
representatives plus a small number of volunteer citizens ('lay members') with more or 
less expertise in this policy field. The campaign was decided on by the KVR's plenary 
board, which is made up exclusively of local government representatives. Unfortunately, 
all of the K VR marketing committee members have retired since the early 1980s so that 
none of them could be interviewed. What can be said, however, is that the decision-
making in the Ruhr case was more streamlined since only one organisation was involved, 
but it was also much less comprehensive in its consultation. 
I interviewed most of the individuals who had attended the North East's initial image 
meeting, the Durham Castle event. They had different experiences about in what way and 
to what degree learning of each other's aims of image improvement and motivations to 
become involved in the image strategy took place. The outcome of the discussion 
amongst the participants of the Durham Castle event was laid down in the document "A 
regional image strategy" edited by One North East and the North East Regional 
Assembly (ONE/NEA 200 I b). The participants discussed a number of key points of the 
strategy: 
• The image strategy should be a sustained effort over five to ten years. 
• Themes and messages used in the strategy should be based on reality and be 
recognized by local people. 
e Some participants emphasised learning from other places. "Those with particular 
experience of similar initiatives suggested that information should be gathered about 
the image/marketing strategies implemented in other cities/regions such as Dublin, 
Glasgow and Barcelona" (ONE/NEA 200 I b: 6). This point will be taken up below. 
• The participants agreed that "a strong leadership of 6-8 representatives should be the 
driving force behind the strategy" and that all participants of the Durham Castle 
event should be updated on the progress of this core group (ONE/NEA 200 I b: 7). 
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o It was also agreed that other organisations in the area who are involved in image-
building should be contacted "so that ideas can be shared and co-operation sought 
(ibid, p. 7). 
• The participants agreed that the campaign should first be internally to raise the 
aspiration and self-confidence of the region's inhabitants. Only in its second phase 
would the campaign then be carried out outside the region to address the intended 
target audiences. Some interviewees reported that this was a lesson learned from 
other places. 
• The findings of the market research carried out overseas in early 2001, mainly 
amongst businesspersons, "sparked considerable debate as to who to target, how to 
target, and thoughts on what messages would be the most effective" (ONE/NEA 
2001b: 8). 
A considerable part of the discussion revolved around the compatibility of the two ideas 
of presenting a coherent image versus reflecting regional diversity. It became evident in 
the discussion "that a single image could not reflect fully the true diversity of the region. 
The audience recognised that although there should be different messages for different 
audiences, the message should be a coherent one" (ONE/NEA 200 I b, p. 6). On the other 
hand, "local diversity ( ... ) should also be celebrated" (ibid). As solution to this 
contradiction the participants suggested that instead of using "a single brand for the 
region" to develop of a '"tool-kit' ofthemes, messages, and images( ... ) so that regional 
organisations can pick and choose the most appropriate ones for their audiences" (ibid). It 
remained unclear, however, how a coherent image on one side and a 'pick & mix' 
approach on the other side can possibly be reconciled. The comments of one participant 
of the Durham Castle event echo the views of many participants: 
"I think it's very difficult [to agree on a common strategy]. People want 
different things out of it. Some people want to say it's a positive, vibrant 
region. Other people want to say it's a region that's still disadvantaged and 
we need money to overcome that. Some people want to promote it for 
tourism, some for manufacturing, some want to promote the issue of regional 
government and that this is a powerful region that can look after itself. ( ... ) 
The region is a series of lots of different brands. The same time you're trying 
to present Northumberland's coast, castles, countryside you're trying to 
represent the North East as a good place for chemical industries. ( ... ) I think 
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One North East has a difficult job in pulling this together. The document 
(image strategy, M.B.) absolutely has to ask the fundamental question 'Who 
is it aimed at'? Part may need to be aimed at the population, part at industry 
outside the region, another part might be aimed at tourism. But you can't put 
the whole thing together and expect everybody to read it in the same way." 
(Andrew Dixon, Chief Executive of Northern Arts). 
Similarly, many interviewees said that the self-interest of organisations involved in 
image-building hindered co-operation: "I think one has to accept the fact that there are a 
number of bodies with their own political directives, their own stakeholder desires and 
needs to be seen and score goals" (Marketing Director of County Durham Development 
Company). 
Reflecting on the Durham Castle Event, ONE/NEA (200 l b) concludes that "whilst there 
were differing opinions in some areas it was pleasing to see that there were (sic.) no 
shortage of ideas for the executive group to consider and there was genuine consensus in 
many area" (p. 9). However, the paper recognises that promoting one coherent message 
from the North East while still allowing sub-regional entities to market their own 'turf as 
they please may turn out to be a problem: "Keeping all parties on board while still 
allowing the promotion of certain sub regional (sic.) issues will be the main challenge 
but, at this stage at least, the willingness to try is strong" (p. 9). 
This viewpoint was contradicted by several participants of the Durham Castle event who 
perceived a lack of willingness of many local governments who have recently gained 
borough status (mainly metropolitan boroughs) to co-operate. It seems to be difficult to 
convey strategic thinking to individual councils. Following the abolition of Tyne & Wear 
and Cleveland county councils, 
"areas now are very keen to shout for their little bit. So you get people of 
some political clout from Middlesbrough, Stockton, Gateshead or 
Sunderland, all desperate for a share of the sun. They are still in the 'We're 
free!' phase. They need another two or three years before they can accept 
submerging into the common interest again. In the meeting at Durham Castle 
it was quite clear that nothing will satisfy Bob Gibson, the leader of Stockton, 
unless there is a mention of Stockton. And the other leaders: 'We have to 
have Hartlepool in it (the image strategy, M.B.)!', 'Gateshead!', 
178 
'Sunderland!' There you start thinking, Jesus Christ, are these guys mad?" 
(John Ashby, County Durham Economic Partnership) 
It will be interesting to see how the participants of the Durham Castle Event will react to 
the change of strategy evident in the second draft of the North East RIS of April 2003. 
According to this document the RIS will now promote four or five 'fighting brands', 
which are nationally or even internationally known brands that are powerful enough to 
compete, such as Northumberland's 'Coast and Castles', Durham, or Newcastle-
Gateshead. Unfortunately, this change in strategy occurred after the vast majority of the 
interviews in the North East had been carried out. 
It seems that in both case study areas a mixture of both crisis and opportunity helped to 
create a climate in which economic development stakeholders were willing to learn and 
co-operate. Both regions had a similar economic structure in that they were dependent on 
extractive and heavy industries, which have been affected by similar market forces, 
leading to unemployment and a weakening of the tax base. These deteriorating material 
realities are likely to have contributed to the unfavourable perceptions that both regions 
suffered from at the time. As I will discuss in greater detail in the following chapter 
(Leadership) this was the time when leaders in the Ruhr realised that the unfavourable 
image had become an obstacle to development in its own right. According to a senior 
K VR official the recognition of this severe crisis was a decisive factor in the discussion 
and adoption of the first image campaign. In the North East, the bid for the European 
Capital of Culture 2008 was a major unifying force, along with the partial devolution 
from the central state to the region of responsibility for economic development. There 
was a realisation among economic development stakeholders that this 'beauty contest' 
could only be won if the perceptions of the North East held outside the region were 
largely positive (interviews with Northern Arts, Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative, One 
North East, the Regional Assembly, and a number of stakeholders from the private 
sector). The role of crisis and opportunity as a catalyst for change will be revisited in 
chapter 8 (Leadership). 
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7.1.3. Co-ordination of image management: hierarchy vs. negotiation 
If, as Stone (200 I) contends, intra-regional learning takes place in networks, the 
existence of such networks is a prerequisite for learning to occur on a regional level. 
Thus, the sectoral inclusiveness and scale of existing networks of learning have to be 
examined. Do these networks cover the whole of the region, as required for image 
management on a regional level, and if so, are these networks inclusive in that they 
comprise stakeholders of all sectors whose support is necessary for the design and 
delivery of image management efforts? As examined in chapter 6 (Governance), 
networks in both regions seem to be poorly integrated with the existence of several 
parallel networks in the public sector, the private sector, and civil society respectively. 
This suggests that the opportunities for key stakeholders of different sectors to learn 
across sectoral boundaries are limited. A closer integration has so far only been achieved 
on the local level. A key example is Dortmund Project, a public-private partnership that 
involves several departments of Dortmund City Council, a significant number of 
influential private-sector companies, and a number of organisations from civil society. 
An example from the North East would be the Newcastle-Gateshead Initiative. 
The lack of an inclusive network on the regional scale was frequently reflected in 
interviewees' comments such as "I wouldn't know whom to talk to if I wanted to discuss 
image-related things" or "I am not sure that One North East knows what individual local 
governments are doing to change their own image". As Alan Bell, Marketing Director of 
Tees Valley Development Company, remarked in an interview, "there isn't a meaningful 
forum that would allow for consensus on some of this stuff. And even if there was, you 
would probably find it ineffective because of the inability to meet the multiple objectives, 
multiple political requirements that each of the organisations' funding partners strive to 
meet." In the Ruhr the networks seem to be slightly more connected, mainly thanks to the 
KVR, the regional body that for a long time has had the ability to draw a wide range of 
stakeholders into its institutionalised mechanisms of dealing with regional issues. 
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Image management is part of overall economic development, be it specifically mentioned 
in economic strategies or carried out as explicit image management, or be it a 'side-
effect' of general economic development strategies or particular place marketing efforts. 
It is therefore important to take into account the power relationships between the key 
inward investment players in North East England, One North East, the Government 
Office for the Regions North East (GO-NE), and UK Trade & Investment (which was 
still called Invest UK when most of the interviews were conducted). 
The inward investment activities of One North East are funded by central government 
through GO-NE and UK Trade & Investment. It is a condition of the funding that One 
North East enter a contract with both central government organisations in which targets 
are specified such as how many visits by potential inward investors they have to attract, 
and how many actual investments they must win: 
"One North East come up with their ideas and we look at them and say really 
you need to this or you need to do that. These are the UK target markets this 
year, you haven't adequately reflected that, you need to do something along 
those lines. ( ... ) Or, these are the key factors which the UK are selling this 
year in terms of why one should invest in the UK, and really you should be 
doing something along those lines. They (ONE, M.B.) do have a lot of 
autonomy in what they do, but we make sure it's not silly, it's not stupid, it's 
value for money, that it doesn't cut across what lnvestUK are doing and that 
they're not missing anything that lnvestUK are doing from which they could 
benefit." (Rick O'Farrell, Head of Industrial Support, Inward Investment and 
Technology, Government Office for the North East) 
On the other hand, the Labour government that came to power in 1997 relaxed the 
'supervision' of the regions: "This government has instituted a fundamental shift of 
giving more control and responsibility to the region. We are still keeping a close eye on 
what they (One North East, M.B.) are producing but we now stand back more. ( ... ) We 
are the referee, the judge. We say "you can do this but you can't do that, don't you think 
you should be adding this to that'. But we're standing back a lot more now." (Rick 
O'Farrell). One of the central reforms was that funds are now given to the RDAs as a 
lump sum, with budget lines abandoned from 2002. In effect this means that rather than 
having a certain sum determined by central government to be used on inward investment, 
One North East has, from 2002, been free to spend as much as it likes for inward 
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investment and image management unless these activities are seen as a waste of resources 
by central government, which still retains a veto (Rick O'Farrell). Since 2002 One North 
East's activities have been subject to much less detailed control, of "micro-management. 
( ... ) We say 'look, here's 200 million pounds, get on and do it, and we expect you at the 
end of the year to have created so many jobs, moved up GDP so far, and some other 
measures. How you do it is up to you"' (ibid). 
Some ideas have been forced upon the region by GO-NE: "On some of the statistics we 
could have argued a case for Objective I status 12 • We here at the Government Office 
effectively forced upon the wider partnership- and a lot of them didn't like it- that we 
would not bid for Objective I status because it presented the wrong image. We summed it 
up: do you really want the rest of Europe to think of us in the same way they think of 
Liverpool, Glasgow and bits of Portugal? We wanted to present the image of a go-ahead 
region that does have some problems, so we forced through Objective 2" (O'Farrell, 
original emphasis). 
On the other hand, relationships between the regional and local government scale seem to 
be less hierarchical. There is indeed evidence of the regional scale being ineffective when 
it comes to forcing/inducing sub-regional organisations to submerge to a regional, 
consistent image-building effort: "Fortunately, there is not a hierarchical structure. One 
North East is not there to control us. They're there to coordinate things so that we don't 
duplicate our efforts. ( ... ) But we listen to their ideas ( ... ), and then we consider if it's 
appropriate for us to lend our support" (Phi! Eadon, Marketing Director of County 
Durham Development Company). In this way, for example, One North East has done the 
overseas marketing for the counties/metropolitan boroughs, with marketing in Britain 
largely undertaken by sub-regional agencies. 
In contrast to the North East, the Ruhr was much more stably institutionalised when 
image management entered the agenda and image campaigns were first drawn up. In 
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1979, six years before the start ofthe first image campaign, the KVR as the regional body 
gained- in a major restructuring- the responsibility for public relations and marketing of 
the region (Williamowski 1996). The KVR is a long-standing organisation established by 
NR W state law 75 years ago with clearly defined competencies and a large and 
functioning administration. The most important point, however, seems to be that all Ruhr 
cities and districts by law must be members of the KVR. Public relations activities like 
the image campaigns had to be consulted in the "Fachausschuss Offentlichkeitsarbeit" 
(board for public relations) and agreed on in the "Verbandsversammlung" (plenary 
board). Since the KVR's plenary board is made up of representatives from all local 
governments it reflects the political power relations in the region and is sometimes 
politically divided. On the other hand, the KVR has proven to provide a well-working 
forum for the discussion and implementation of image management that is capable of 
reaching out across part-political divides. 
7.1.4. Market research 
This section deals with one particular aspect of learning- how the stakeholders involved 
learn about the ways the target group(s) consume(s) the messages promoted, and whether 
the campaign was successful. This section therefore deals with self-reflexive learning. 
Image management is trying to (if necessary) bring existing perceptions in line with 
desired perceptions (the perceptions the recipients should have as a result of the image 
management being effective). Consequently, there are three categories of information the 
"image makers" need to collect: 
I. What are the target group's current perceptions of the region? 
2. What is the image that appeals to the target group? 
3. Has the image management been effective? In other words, have perceptions 
changed as desired? 
12 For the purpose of the European Union Regional Development Fund 2000 to 2006 round areas that 
receive assistance have been classified into five categories. Objective I are "least favoured regions" with 
great overall development deficits, whereas Objective 2 regions have problems of restructuring. 
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As to the first point, Gentle Persuasion undertook market research in south-east England, 
France, Germany, the USA and Japan to learn about the existing perceptions of the North 
East. They also looked at how people at home perceived their region, the North East. 
Interviews in Britain were undertaken with members of the general public, and abroad 
mainly with businesspeople and persons in higher education. As set out in chapter 5 
(Changing Images), the Ruhr has continually monitored the effectiveness of its image 
building efforts that were largely based on advertising campaigns. Perception studies 
have been undertaken across Germany and some neighbouring countries every two years. 
They showed that after ten years of advertising the Ruhr's first image campaign had been 
remembered by more than 60% of the German adult population. 
Neither of the two regions conducted any research into what images most appeal to 
potential inward investors. The interviews revealed that place promotion stakeholders 
largely relied on their 'instinct' and on anecdotal evidence that mainly resulted from their 
conversations with actual inward investors. 
As to the third point, most place promotion practitioners were sceptical that the 
effectiveness of image improvement initiatives can be measured: "How can you measure 
it all at the end of the day? But we have to start somewhere" (Paul Dobbie, Director of 
PR agency Persuasion [previously Gentle Persuasion]). The discussion draft for the North 
East Image Strategy (ONE/NEA 200 I b) suggested that focus groups be established 
within the North East and possibly in the South East to research the impact of the image 
strategy. It also recommends that "further market research should be done (at least 
annually and in the North East only initially) to determine whether attitudes are shifting 
and why. However, this monitoring has, along with the bulk of the other instruments of 
the image strategy, not been implemented. 
7.1.5. Lessons from the past 
Learning not only occurs between actors in a region (intra-regional), but places can often 
tap into their collective memory and lessons they have learned from previous efforts in 
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the same policy area or from previous experience of policy instruments in other policy 
areas. One facet of learning that is often neglected is the fact that most places have a 
history of certain policies, and change is more likely to be incremental than radical. 
The participants of the Durham Castle event drew on their experience of similar 
campaigns, in this case NDC's 'Great North' campaign. "It was felt that( ... ) the Great 
North campaign failed to some extent because it concentrated too much on attracting 
businesses from abroad rather than the rest of the population" (ONE/NEA 2001 b: 8). In 
the view of Ross Forbes, Director of Marketing and Human Resources at Atmel, the 
North East has in the past "failed to address the image problem." 'The Great North' was 
well developed as a campaign to attract inward investment, but the problem was that it 
did little to build the region's self-confidence: "There has been a failure to raise people's 
aspirations within the region since the mid-eighties when the region began to change 
from dark and derelict into bright and innovative" (ibid). As a reaction to this perceived 
shortcoming the first draft of the current image strategy suggested to target local people 
first before marketing the region to the outside world, but in the second and most recent 
draft of the current strategy this element has disappeared. 
John Ashby of the County Durham Economic Development Partnership thinks that 
lessons from NDC's 'Great North' have still been learned. "It (The Great North 
campaign) wasn't inclusive, it didn't have this partnership. It was very top-down. We 
weren't party to it apart from the fact that local authorities like us paid for it." 
Undoubtedly, the formulation of the current Regional Image Strategy has involved wide-
ranging stakeholder consultation, and has been much more inclusive in this sense than 
earlier attempts by the NDC. 
These negative experiences of past image improvement initiatives are feared to reduce 
the willingness to get involved in the new North East image strategy. According to Bill 
Midgley, past president of the North East Chamber of Commerce and Director of the 
British Chamber of Commerce, there is a fear in the business community that the new 
image strategy can only succeed 
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"if like so many other initiatives, for example the Great North, it doesn't just 
fizzle out in two years' time. There's a bit of cynicism about, particularly in 
the business community, of 'we've seen it all before.' My fear is that it will 
just peter out like so many initiatives before. Good idea, nobody picks it up, 
and three years down the line somebody will say 'oh, that's a good idea' and 
re-invent the wheel." 
In the Ruhr, image management efforts have a much longer history, and there has been a 
very systematic, reflexive approach of learning from past initiatives. The effectiveness of 
the image management has been monitored since the KVR obtained responsibility for 
public relations and initiated "Ein starkes StUck Deutschland" in 1985. For example, a 
survey has been conducted every two years during the ten-year duration of the campaign 
to monitor the changes in public perception of the Ruhr, mainly within Germany but also 
in selected European countries such as Britain or France. The results showed that, firstly, 
perceptions of the Ruhr had changed, and secondly, that the image campaign seemed to 
have contributed towards this change. Similar surveys were conducted for the second 
campaign, 'Der Pott kocht'. Details of both market research results have been presented 
in chapter 5, Changing Images. In the North East, image monitoring efforts have been 
both much less extensive and systematic. To date there has only been one study (in 2002) 
of public perception in the South-East of England, but further research is planned for the 
future. 
7.2. Inter-regional learning: policy learning 
This section looks at whether the image building efforts in the case study regions have 
been informed by policies in the same field elsewhere. While the previous section was 
concerned with intra-regional learning, this section looks at learning on an inter-regional 
scale, also referred to as policy learning. 'Policy transfer' is sometimes used 
synonymously with 'policy learning'. If regional learning is defined as the process of 
how regions learn about (and possibly adopt) ideas from outside the region, and of how 
these ideas in turn 'spread' within the region, then policy learning and policy transfer can 
be considered as a special case of regional learning. 
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Policy learning is a process through which policies in a certain area become informed by 
policies elsewhere. This process of seeking and evaluating information may not 
necessarily lead to the adoption of the policies and instruments examined. It could also be 
that an example looked at is deemed to have been unsuccessful and thus the policy from 
this particular place is rejected. In contrast, the term policy transfer usually refers to a 
policy being adopted (and maybe adapted) from elsewhere and often involves the 
learning from seemingly successful examples that are considered 'state of the art' or 'best 
practice'. If an increasing number of places adopt the same policy then policy 
convergence comes into existence. On the other hand, the idea of policy convergence also 
"allows for the possibility of similar developments taking place in different countries 
with or without any direct link between them. Countries with comparable economic, 
social, cultural and political formations develop broadly comparable policy 
arrangements" (Stone 2001: 5). In other words, policy transfer can be a causal factor for 
convergence, but may not necessarily be decisive, or may not be causal to convergence at 
all. Indeed, policy learning can also lead to divergence, especially if negative lessons are 
drawn, resulting in non-transfers (Ladi 2000: 205). While the absoluteness of Stone's 
statement can be doubted, it is likely that it also applies not only to countries but also to 
regions. 
The central question of this section is: how do policies travel? How is a certain policy -
in this case image management- adopted by a place? Thus the focus is on how policies 
are being transferred from one place to the other rather than on the individual learning 
process of a region's stakeholders. In other words, I will look at how stakeholders learn 
from sources external to the region rather from each other within the region. According to 
Dolowitz and Marsh ( 1996), policy transfer is a process in which knowledge about a 
policy and/or administrative or institutional arrangements in one place is used in the 
development of a policy and/or administrative or institutional arrangements in another 
place or at another time. They point at an important distinction. To them, the concept of 
'lesson drawing', which is often used interchangeably with 'policy transfer', differs from 
the latter in that it refers to voluntary transfer, whereas policy transfer can often be non-
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voluntary, as it is sometimes directly or indirectly forced upon a place by (supra)national 
governments or organisations, or by private sector companies. Thus, they propose the use 
of the term policy transfer. However, not all learning or lesson drawing results in policy 
transfer, as sometimes negative lessons may be drawn about how not to proceed 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). 
Most authors, implicitly or explicitly, assume that the transfer of a certain policy will lead 
to the successful implementation ofthis policy in the adopting place. But to Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000:6) "it is becoming increasingly apparent that policy transfer can, and often 
does, lead to policy failure. Policies that have been successful elsewhere seem to have an 
irresistible attraction for policy makers from all over the world. The underlying 
assumption is that policies that have been successful in one country (or one region, M.B.) 
will be successful in another." Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 17ff.) identify three possible 
reasons for how policy transfer results in failure: uninformed, incomplete, and 
inappropriate transfer. The first category refers to a situation where the adopting place 
has insufficient information about the policy and how it operates in the place from which 
it was transferred. Incomplete transfer occurs when elements decisive for the success of 
the policy have not been transferred. The failure to consider important differences 
between the transferring and the borrowing country in the cultural, social, political and 
economic environment in which the policy operates may result in inappropriate transfer. 
In short, unless policy makers of the borrowing region fully understand how the policy 
operates and why exactly it is successful the transfer is likely to be unsuccessful. 
It seems that the North East's recent image policy has never really taken off. There have 
been intermittent image-improvement initiatives in the past and the most recent attempt 
has been in the planning phase for four years now, and barely any of its elements has 
been implemented 13 • ln my research [ wanted to find out whether and to what extent this 
has been due to 'poor copying' from elsewhere or whether other reasons (such as a lack 
of financial resources, commitment or leadership) was responsible for the short lives of 
various image improvement attempts. 
13 For a review of image building attempts in both regions to date see chapter 5 (Changing Images). 
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However, the influence of policy transfer must not be overestimated. Not all incidents of 
policy development (the modification of an existing policy, the introduction of a new 
policy or the pioneering of a new field of policy) involve policy transfer. In this case I 
need to treat policy transfer not as the dependent variable, as something I need to explain, 
but as the independent variable, and look at whether and how much policy transfer has 
contributed to the adoption and modification of image management. Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000) stress that in the current age of easier communication with other regions and 
countries the exchange and the 'travel' of policies is more likely than it has been in the 
past. 
The theme of learning from other places for the North East image strategy featured 
prominently in the unpublished consultation documents drawn up by One North East and 
the North East Regional Assembly. It has also been a recurring theme in the interviews I 
conducted. The background/consultation documents include references like "A useful 
starting point [for the image strategy] would be to learn from others" (ONE/NEA 2001b: 
6), "Key to the [image] strategy would be benchmarking with other successful regions 
around the world" (ONE/NEA 2001a: 2) and "The Strategy has been informed by( ... ) a 
review oflearning from other regions in the UK and internationally" (ONE 2003a: 4). 
There is evidence that the transfer has been voluntary- that lesson drawing has occurred 
-even though it could be argued that some of the policies that lead to an overall political 
and economic climate of increased competitiveness and self-responsibility have partially 
been forced upon the region by central government. As outlined in chapter 4 the British 
government has shifted a significant part of the responsibility for economic well-being 
downwards to the regional scale, a process which culminated in the creation of regional 
development agencies in the English regions. Similarly, the European Union has only 
encouraged competitiveness between European regions but has not prescribed place 
marketing or image building as a competitive tool. Indeed, the EU regional policy 
programmes have so far not even mentioned image management as a tool of economic 
development (interview with a senior ERDF official) but it is worth noting that the EU 
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programmes for town twinnings and partnerships between regions have the explicit goal 
of sharing 'best practice' in policy-making and delivery. This point will be revisited later 
on in this chapter. 
There is evidence that both administrative/institutional arrangements and knowledge of 
policies from elsewhere have informed the most recent image improvement attempts in 
the North East. On a methodological side it is near impossible to answer this question for 
image management initiatives that have been undertaken years or even decades ago, such 
as the first image campaigns in the Ruhr (from 1985) and the North East (The Great 
North, from 1988). This is due to the fact that very few records exist of the process which 
led to the campaigns, and not all of the records have been made accessible to me. 
Furthermore, virtually all of the persons involved in the design of these early campaigns 
have left the organisations and thus cannot be interviewed. Consequently, it is almost 
exclusively the outcomes of the policy process that can be examined (i.e. artefacts from 
the actual campaigns such as advertising motifs and other promotional material 
produced). lt would border 'fortune telling from the coffee grounds' to infer from these 
promotional artefacts the processes that led to their creation and what role learning from 
the experience of other places indeed played in this process. There is an exception, 
however, in the creative director of the Ruhr Local Government Association who has 
been employed by the KVR since 1984, a year before the first image campaign of the 
Ruhr started. 
At the Durham Castle event participants reached consensus that "key to the strategy 
would be benchmarking with other successful regions around the world." (ONE/NEA 
2001a: 2). The 'steering group' 14 worked out a catalogue of four suggested themes for an 
image campaign, and comparisons with other places feature heavily in most of the 
themes. For example, it was pointed out by participants that to argue the case for 
devolution, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly could be used as examples 
14 One North East and the North East Regional Assembly recruited economic development stakeholders of 
the region from the Durham Castle event to take the image strategy further in an 'image steering group'. 
This group is composed of voluntary representatives of the public sector, private sector companies and 
organisations from civil society such as trade unions. 
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of the governmental basis of economic success. One of the instruments planned was to 
invite journalists for a trip to the Scottish Parliament to demonstrate the economic 
benefits of devolved power, and for the North East to demonstrated that it has similar 
aspirations, being a powerful, "unified, dynamic, and forward looking" region 
(ONE/NEA 2001a: 7). Obviously, the image steering group has looked around Britain 
and drew lessons from other regions and has identified how a devolved government, 
based on strong regional identity, could contribute to a strong and positive image of a 
region that is able to look after itself. Similarly, the section of the suggested image 
strategy that looks at employing the theme of culture in the campaign, suggests 
"benchmarking the North East against other 'cultural' centres. An audit of how other 
regions have successfully developed a 'cultural' image should be undertaken. Parallels 
should be sought with: Eire, Catalonia, Saxony, Alsace, Ardennes. For instance, Ireland 
would demonstrate that tax breaks for film and music industry can succeed" (ONE/NEA 
200Ia: 9). 
Asked in the interviews how they would like their place to be perceived, most economic 
development organisations compared their localities to places that already have a positive 
image. Many interviewees mentioned how they would like their place to attain the 
success that other places have already achieved: "We have a desire to replicate what has 
happened at Research Triangle Park in Durham, North Carolina, our other twinned area. 
They saw the opportunity and have projected from a rural, agricultural plantation 
community 40 years ago to where they are recognised now as being at the forefront of 
research and technology" (Phi! Eadon, Marketing Director, County Durham 
Development Company). 
There was concern amongst some participants of the image strategy steering group about 
what they perceived as a lack of lesson drawing from successful image campaigns 
elsewhere or about uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate policy transfer: "What [the 
draft of the regional image strategy] doesn't do is begin to compare or contrast this region 
with places like Ireland, Catalonia, city states, and areas like Bilbao or Lille, which are 
very interesting post-industrial economic regeneration areas. There are all sorts of 
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examples we could look at.( ... ) We haven't done enough benchmarking with similar and 
dissimilar experiences in turning around an image." (Ross Forbes, Director of Human 
Resources and Communication, Atmel UK). Other places made culture the driving force 
in their regeneration, and the Northumbria Tourist Board undertook benchmarking 
against "other cultural centres, drawing on parallels of experience between Southern 
Ireland, Catalonia and Saxony." (ibid) 
It seems that the main reason for the up-to-now failure of the latest North East image 
building effort lies in incomplete transfer. Both interviews and consultation documents 
suggest that a wide range of information was sought about how image policies operate in 
other places. In other words, the transfer has not been uninformed. The answer to whether 
or not the transfer was inappropriate is less clear. It is largely unclear whether important 
differences between the North East and places examined in the cultural, social, political 
and economic environment in which the policy operates have been overlooked. It seems 
that the main reason for the failure lies in the fact that one policy element that in other 
regions has proven crucial for success had not been transferred: the longevity of image 
campaigns. This is despite the consultation documents making frequent reference to the 
fact that any image building effort must be sustained over a long period of time, five to 
ten years. In practice, however, the first visibly implemented part ofthe North East image 
strategy, the "Here. Now." campaign, lasted for no more than a few weeks. Some 
possible reasons for this short-livedness have been identified earlier on in this chapter, as 
well as in chapters 5 and 6. They include a lack of financial investment, a lack of 
stakeholder interest and commitment, and the absence of a forum for comprehensive yet 
genuine and deep consultation. The contribution of a possible lack of leadership to this 
failure will be examined in the next chapter (Leadership). 
Members of the image steering group had drawn some very concrete lessons from other 
places, such as the need to target the own population first before addressing the actual 
target groups outside the region. "If you look at other successful campaigns such as 
Dublin and Barcelona, they have concentrated on instilling a sense of pride and 
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achievement within their own area first and then gone out and told the world" (Gary 
Cunningham, Director of Public Relations, Procter & Gamble, Newcastle). 
As noted in the policy learning literature it is not only policies that 'travel' but also 
institutional arrangements are transferred in the hope to replicate the success of other 
places. It could be argued that the very creation in 1986 of the body that ran "The Great 
North", the NDC, had occurred as a reaction to the set-up of Scottish Development 
Agency in the late 1970s (pers. comm. with John Tomaney, Professor of Governance, 
Newcastle University). 
Dolowitz and Marsh ( 1996:345) identify six main categories of actors involved in policy 
transfer: elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, 
policy entrepreneurs/experts, and supra-national institutions. In the case of the Ruhr and 
North-East England, some of those groups seem to have more influence than others (see 
figure 7.3). There needs to be a distinction between direct and indirect influence. Pressure 
groups and policy experts, for example, could exert influence indirectly through 
promoting an environment of competitiveness that is amenable to image improvement 
efforts rather than push image improvement itself onto the agenda. In this way, groups 
that are not involved in the formal consultation process can also influence the decision-
making process. As examined in the previous chapter (Governance), in the Ruhr large 
companies based in the region and their associations (most prominently, the Initiativkreis 
Ruhrgebiet [IR]), have been consulted largely outside the KVR, the formal framework for 
image policy-making. 
Both regions have no elected officials as they have no regional government. GO-NE is a 
regional office of central government. ONE North East as a quango is directly 
accountable to central government even though it has to consult with and take in the 
views of the regional interests represented in the Regional Assembly. Neither One North 
East's nor the Regional Assembly's members are elected by the people but they are 
appointed (Robinson et al. 2000: 52ff.). In the Ruhr, the governing board 
(Verbandsversammlung) of the only regional public body, the KVR, consists of elected 
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officials, but these have not been elected by the people but by the local and district 
councils they represent (KVR 2003a). Thus neither region has a regional government 
consisting of elected officials. However, both regions have a regional body which 
consists of directly elected local government councillors 15 • 
North East England Rulhr 
Elected officials Both regions have no elected regional government and thus no 
elected officials 
However: KVR is controlled by a 'regional parliament' of 
councillors elected by their local government to act as 
representatives. Officials of local governments represented in 
NERA (but appointed to rather than elected into NERA) 
Political parties Unclear. However, regional Some evidence of 
politics dominated by Labour increasing influence of 
political parties on KVR. 
KVR now 'bone of 
contention' 
Bureaucrats/civil Yes. Seem to be the driving force 
servants 
Pressure groups Limited evidence Strong evidence of 
initiative from private 
sector company 
associations such as IR 
Policy entrepre- Advertising agencies, business consultancies 
neurslexperts 
Supra-national EU: image improvement not specifically recognised as an 
institutions economic development tool 
Fig. 7.3: Involvement of groups of actors in image management 
Source: adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) 
There is some evidence that the influence of political parties on regional bodies is 
growing. Since the Labour party has been dominant in the North East for the last four 
decades there is little question that regional institutions such as the Regional Assembly 
which are composed of local government members are heavily influenced by party 
politics. The Ruhr had until 2000 been in a similar state of domination by the SPD 
(Social Democrats), but the local elections in that year resulted in the CDU (Christian 
Democrats) now having the majority in the KVR governing board. It emerged from the 
interviews and press articles that this has shook up the KVR's work as consensus is now 
15 It could be questioned whether in the case of the North East they have really been elected by the people, 
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harder to achieve. Some observers concluded that these changed power relations (and a 
resulting increased scrutiny and justification of budget spending) are responsible for the 
recently slow progress of image building efforts, whereas the period of 1985 to 2000 had 
seen two sustained image campaigns, the first of which had lasted for ten years. Overall, 
it can be said that while the opposing parties are generally unlikely to disagree on the 
necessity of image building they have been using the KVR as an instrument to pursue 
party politics. However, from the consultation documents and interviews there is little 
evidence for political parties to be involved in policy transfer. 
Bureaucrats and civil servants seem to be the driving force of image building. In both the 
North East and the Ruhr the lead persons of the organisations involved in the RIS have 
professional experience of marketing and/or communications from previous job. For 
example, the Regional Assembly's head of public relations has had the same position 
with Newcastle airport, and the creative director of both of the KVR image campaigns 
had previously been a university lecturer of communication studies. 
There is limited evidence that business pressure groups have played a role in the adoption 
of an image strategy in the North East. This may be due to the fact that the companies in 
the region lack a powerful and well-funded representation. In contrast, in the Ruhr 
companies have been one of the driving forces in the adoption of image improvement 
initiatives. This may be because a substantial number of Germany's biggest corporations 
are headquartered in the Ruhr, whereas the North East contains very few such 
headquarters. Most prominently, the Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet (IR, Ruhr Initiative), an 
association of the Ruhr's largest companies (including but not limited to those 
headquartered in the region) played a major role in 'pushing' image improvement onto 
the agenda. The second organisation, pro Ruhrgebiet, a non-profit organisation 
representing the Ruhr's smaller companies, is less actively involved in the image 
management process, mainly due to a lack of human and financial resources. 
given turnouts in the 2000 local elections between 19.2 and 51.6% (Robinson et al. 2000:37) 
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As far as the role of a location's image is concerned, the vast majority of companies 
interviewed viewed image as being important for staff recruitment. The most common 
line of reasoning was that highly skilled workers had a choice of where to work and if 
they held an unfavourable perception of the Ruhr or North East England they would 
decide against accepting a job with a company that is located there. Some companies also 
have the general desire to be seen to be coming from a successful, vibrant region. 
Thirdly, a few company interviewees also mentioned the desire to be seen as a good 
corporate citizen. 
The interest of Ruhr companies of working towards an image change partly stems from 
the fact that most of the old-established companies have undergone a similar image 
change. 'Steel-making-turned-high-tech' companies such as Thyssen-Krupp (advanced 
steel products), R WE (Germany's biggest energy corporation) and RAG (part of their 
portfolio is the only remaining coal mining in the Ruhr) are determined to turn around 
their image "from old-fashioned, mono-structured, inert and administrative to modern, 
flexible, innovative, dynamic and entrepreneurial" (Axel Schappei, Director of 
Communications, RAG). All of the major old-established companies are or have been 
undertaking an image 'make-over' -which in most cases involved extensive advertising 
campaigns- and have input their private sector expertise into the Ruhr's image strategies 
(Herr Dirks und Herr Starch, Department for Economic Development, City of Bochum). 
In addition to sharing expertise the private sector has also played a driving role in the re-
design of regional and local institutions along entrepreneurial lines (see below). 
In the Ruhr a certain degree of knowledge about image management and its importance 
came from what Dolowitz and Marsh ( 1996) call policy entrepreneurs such as business 
consultancies and advertising agencies. McKinsey was involved in the image campaign 
of the city of Dortmund. The Ruhr's first image campaign, 'Ein starkes StUck 
Deutschland', was heavily influenced by previous campaigns of the advertising agency 
involved (Butter 1997). Business consultancies also played a major part in facilitating 
learning about image management through the promotion of competitiveness and 
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entrepreneurialist ideas, and the resulting restructuring of public administration and their 
activities. There is no evidence for involvement of this kind in the North East. 
Rose ( 1993: 1 05) argues that the EU "promotes comparison ( ... ) so that member states 
can become aware of what their competitors are doing and decide which elements of 
foreign programs they may wish to copy or adapt." However, my analysis of official EU 
literature and interviews with the EU commission revealed that place promotion in 
general and image management in particular are not specifically recognised in the ERDF 
guidelines as a tool of economic development (EU Commission 1999, and two senior 
ERDF officials who wish to remain anonymous). Accordingly, the DG Regio does not 
specifically recommend image improvement but it does financially support it, if desired 
by a region, as part of the individual programme agreed between the region and the EU 
Commission. As a senior director of the EU Commission for Regional Development said 
in an interview: "We have never prohibited image campaigns but we also haven't 
encouraged regions to undertake them. Up to now no region has asked us to fund image 
management or image campaigns". 
The EU also supports strategic partnerships between towns and regiOns of different 
countries. For example, the North East is currently negotiating a strategic partnership 
with the Czech region of Moravia-Silesia which also is an old-industrial area with similar 
problems of economic and social restructuring (NEA 2003). Many local governments in 
the North East and the Ruhr are twinned with towns and cities in Europe and the US. 
Most of those partnerships seem to exist with a foreign place of equal standing, facing 
similar challenges of economic and social restructuring. For example, Middlesbrough is 
twinned with Oberhausen in the Ruhr, and both cities contain the highest concentrations 
of remaining traditional industries within their largely 'post-industrial' regions. 
Sunderland is twinned with Essen, the Ruhr's biggest city, County Durham with Kreis 
Wesel, a district at the edge of the Ruhr, and with Somme-Picardie in France. Both are 
struggling ex-coal mining communities. Apart from cultural exchange, these twinnings 
are being used as a platform for exchanging ideas of how to cope with restructuring, as 
there are frequent visits from city and county council officials. 
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In most cases the voluntary adoption of policies from elsewhere stems from a 
dissatisfaction with the current situation (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 346). Similarly, 
Benz and Flirst (2002:27) observe that "regions can be pressed to learn by crisis 
situations. The decline of industries regularly destroys traditional patterns of perception 
and delegitimizes the power of those linked to old industries while new actors gain 
political support". As long as the traditional routines are functioning properly regional 
actors tend to see no need to search for lessons. There is a problem, however, with the 
definition of "functioning properly" and "dissatisfaction". Dissatisfaction usually results 
from a perception - by politicians, unelected actors of economic development or by the 
public- of policy failure. Both in the Ruhr and North East England at some point in time 
the perception arose that an unfavourable image of their own region might hinder 
economic development in general and inward investment in particular. 
"The whole region itself has changed dramatically ( ... ) And in the next ten 
years it will have changed dramatically if everything is put into place that 
we're anticipating. You can't do that if you don't change the image. Because 
if people then still think, oh, the North East, alright, they build ships and they 
send people down the mines and they're all working-class living in back-to-
back terrace houses - all the things that are associated with the poverty of the 
past - then you'll be unable to achieve anything. Because if that's the 
impression that potential investors have of our region, why then would they 
choose to come here? So we've got to convince them that things have actually 
moved on and that we have an awful lot more to offer than they think." (Ruth 
Laing, One North East Communication Officer) 
While the underlying reason for the image campaign in the North East was the need to 
update public perceptions and to cope with greater self-responsibility for the prosperity of 
the regional economy, the defining moment in the Ruhr was a deep and desperate 
economic crisis: Udo Thies, the KVR's leading figure of the 'Ein starkes StUck 
Deutschland' campaign ( 1985 - 1995) says that "in 1985 local politicians said that the 
Ruhr is doomed unless the federal government comes to its rescue." Similarly, the Head 
of Communications of the KVR, Dr. Dieter Nellen, reports that "in the early eighties 
there were feelings of doom. 'The Ruhr is an end-of-range model! Leave while you can!' 
We had to do something against this." It seems that this widely-felt crisis ("Things 
couldn't get any worse", Dr. Nellen) motivated the regional actors to join efforts to 
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design and implement an ambitious image campaign. Traditional industries were closing 
down on a great scale, and the 'old' image was seen as unhelpful in diversifying the 
economy and attracting new investment (Peter Meurer, managing director of Duisburg 
economic development company). As the Ruhr's image improved over the years and a 
new, more controversial image campaign ( 1998-2000) had started, however, support for 
the joint image efforts declined, especially at the edge of the Ruhr where some local 
authorities would prefer to be associated with neighbouring areas rather than the Ruhr. 
For example, Duisburg is now keen on being seen as part of the 'Lower Rhine area' 
together with successful cities such as Dilsseldorf (ibid). 
The feeling that being an Objective I region was stigmatising was felt by many economic 
development practitioners in both regions: "If you think of Objective I, with all respect, 
you think of the south of Italy, the new Uinder, parts of Spain. Those regions are being 
associated with poor infrastructure and collapsed industries. I can see Objective I being a 
bit of a turn-off, really." (Juan Arregui McGullion, European Liaison Officer, North of 
England Office, Brussels). 
Bingham and Mier (1997) report a widespread dissatisfaction with traditional instruments 
of place marketing such as expensive grants or subsidies or the costly redevelopment of 
physical infrastructure However, this dissatisfaction did not seem to be the motivation for 
taking up image strategies in either of the case study regions. There is a strong 
perception, however, amongst the organisations involved in image management that 
changing the economic base and the physical appearance of the region would be useless 
unless accompanied by an image improvement programme to instil the 'new realities' 
into the heads ofthe region's population and of corporate decision-makers. 
The adoption of policies can also be forced onto a place (coercive transfer, Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996). While direct coercive transfer usually only occurs to Third World countries 
dependent on donor countries and organisations (such as the World Bank), indirect 
coercive transfer can occur in economically advanced countries through externalities or 
functional interdependencies. My interviews revealed that the perceived need to 
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formulate and implement an image improvement campaign often results from the simple 
fact that most 'competitors' already had such a policy in place, resulting in a fear of 
'being left behind' or being 'the odd one out'. Furthermore, the rationale for supporting 
such a campaign often stems from actors having internalised the deeply-rooted normative 
discourse of the need for competitiveness, incorporated in key concepts such as 
entrepreneurialism, neo-liberalism, efficiency, and the 'lean state'. Place marketing in 
general and image management in particular can be seen as one of the properties of a turn 
towards entrepreneurial policies in Western economies. 
Painter (1998) argues that entrepreneurial policies in a place do not occur naturally. The 
adoption of a policy such as an image strategy is a learned, adaptive behaviour, deeply 
rooted in the ideology and in the shared belief in entrepreneurial strategies. How did the 
regional actors in both of my case study areas learn that image management is 
'necessary'? Was it just the negative experience of an unfavourable image having 
deterred inward investors in the past? Or is it an idea that has been 'implanted' into the 
actors' conscience by strong normative discourses? Who or what made regional actors 
think along those entrepreneurial lines? Painter (1998: 269) points at a "strongly 
disciplinary discourse that threatens the loss of potential future investment to 'foreign' 
locations unless 'competitiveness' is maintained." As outlined above, the perception that 
the current or previous negative image had deterred investors clearly was a reason for the 
adoption of an image strategy. But the interviews revealed that often place promotion 
practitioners in both regions could not really give a particular reason as to why they were 
undertaking image improvement initiatives. Comments such as "we just felt we had to do 
it", "there somehow was a feeling that image is important" or "we thought if we are to be 
a modern, entrepreneurial region we have to have a good image" were common, 
especially at the local government scale. 
Also, changing investor behaviour (see Tsing 2000) could force regions to change the 
way they market themselves to potential inward investors. As Painter ( 1998: 271) notes, 
"the nature of private business has changed (perhaps from a more monopolistic, corporate 
form to a form which is prepared to accept higher levels of risk for the prospect of very 
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high returns)." This topic has been discussed in detail in chapter 2 (Research Focus), and 
clearly economic development organisations have reacted to this perceived change. 
The body of previous research on policy transfer or policy learning on the regional level 
is very limited. Most studies were carried out at the scale of the nation state (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996). Virtually all existing studies look at policy transfer as a process of one 
country learning from another, but inter-regional relations are mostly ignored. Benz and 
Filrst (2002:3) look at how actors within a region learn from each other, and how 
conditions fostering this process can be created. To them, "regional policy learning is a 
special case of policy learning: it is a process of collective learning geared to a strategy of 
regional development with those actors participating who contribute to regional 
development." (Benz and Fi.irst 2002:22). A second characteristic that distinguishes 
regional policy learning from policy learning is that in the former, "the territory is the 
field of reference, not single projects." (p. 22). They also point at the fact that regions 
(territorial units above local authorities but below the nation state level) are only weakly 
institutionalised if at all. This certainly is the case for North East England, and to a 
certain degree for the Ruhr as well. 
To Benz and Fi.irst (2002), whether or not policy learning is successful depends on 
specific structural characteristics of the regional networks, but also on the cognitive 
dispositions, orientations, strategies and interactions of the regional actors. One of their 
central claims is that autonomous regions are better able to learn, an argument which has 
been examined in the previous chapter on Governance. One of the elements of the 
dispositions named by Benz and Fi.irst (2002) is the presence or absence of leadership. 
This will be examined in the following chapter. 
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7.3. Summary 
This chapter has looked at intra- and inter-regional learning. The first part examined the 
role of (social) learning in the process of the formulation of an image building strategy. It 
became obvious that in both regions deliberate attempts were undertaken to consult a 
range of stakeholder interests, but the mode of consultation has been rather different in 
the two regions. In the Ruhr, this process largely occurred within the institutional routines 
of the lead agency, the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet, KVR. The negotiation work was 
undertaken in the Committee on Sport, Culture and Marketing, and the Committee's 
suggestions were then passed by the Plenary Board, which is under the democratic 
control of both local authorities and the organised interests of both employers and unions 
as well as a limited number of representatives from the civil I voluntary sector. In 
addition, owing to their ability to contribute large sums of money to the image building 
process, private sector initiatives that were not represented in the KVR's formal decision-
making process were consulted outside these structures. However, overall stakeholder 
consultation seemed to be less intense than in the North East, where the process was 
much less formalised. The need to consult widely without formalised routines and 
without even a sufficiently robust policy network opened the process of the formulation 
of a Regional Image Strategy very much to debate, and could be seen as one of the 
reasons for the slow progress of the RIS. The lead agency One North East was forced to 
undertake additional rounds of stakeholder consultations to ensure consensus on the 
contents of the strategy and co-operation in its delivery. 
The second part of this chapter looked at whether and how the image building efforts in 
the two case study regions have been influenced by policies in the same field elsewhere. 
Crisis was identified as one of the central factors that made the regions look for 
unorthodox, new tools of economic development and inward investment promotion. It 
became apparent that learning from the experience of other places particularly occurred 
in the North East, where the RIS involved benchmarking with successful regions. This 
process was much less pronounced in the Ruhr, where expertise had been introduced into 
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the lead agency KVR through the employment of PR professionals and through the input 
of experienced advertising agencies. 
The next chapter will expand on the examination of learning and look at the contribution 
of leadership to the development and implementation of image building efforts. As 
examined in this chapter, the structural bases of learning differ between the two regions, 
and chapter 8 will examine whether or not and by whom opportunities for leadership 
present in the current systems of learning and governance are being seized. 
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8. LEADERSH][P 
Leadership is the art of getting others to want to do something you are 
convinced should be done. 
(Kolzow 1990: 20) 
8.1. Xntrodlm:tion 
This chapter looks at whether and to what degree the image strategies that regions 
develop are being influenced by some person or organisation taking the initiative. Who 
are those leaders, and why are they important? This chapter builds on two previous 
chapters: governance, as leaders can be seen as those in (in)formal control of regional 
economic processes; and learning and policy transfer, as leaders can be influential m 
proposing new procedures and policies that have been successful elsewhere. 
My original thesis plan did not include a chapter on leadership, but in the process of 
undertaking the research I found that with their strong focus on structure, theories of 
governance and learning alone cannot fully explain the formulation and execution of 
image building strategies. Both regions felt the need, albeit at different times, that image 
improvement is necessary. The perceived necessity of a strategy in this policy area has 
been circulating in both regions for some time, especially in the business communities, 
but during the research process it became obvious that in both regions it took the 
leadership of charismatic individuals of moral integrity to bring all stakeholders together 
around one table. As examined in the previous chapters, both regions were marked by 
tensions, arising in part from national-local power struggles and the re-scaling of 
governance, but also from a clash of vested interests of economic development 
stakeholders. It became clear that without the unifying force of regional leaders it would 
have been unlikely that the stakeholders in each region would have started to seriously 
consider and negotiate joint efforts to overcome the economic difficulties. One of those 
options was image management. Who in the two case study areas was able to create a 
shared sense of purpose in the political and business communities? Two leaders were 
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particularly influential and brokered first consultations between public and private sector 
and civil society: Cardinal Hengsbach of the Diocese of Essen, and Bishop Turnbull of 
Durham. There were also a number of leaders in the business community who were 
crucial for obtaining organised business input into the regional image building efforts. 
It is often contended in the globalisation debate and in the urban and regional economic 
development literature that regions are at the receiving end of global economic processes. 
Accordingly, regional economic conditions are constrained if not determined by factors 
that are largely outside the control of regional stakeholders. This, view, however, does 
not withstand scrutiny. Amin (2002) and most contributors to Vellinga (2000) clearly 
demonstrate that regional stakeholders can indeed affect the environment in which 
economic development takes place and even exert influence on higher levels of economic 
realms such as policies on the nation state level and international treaties. Judd and 
Parkinson (1990: 14) criticise that in many studies "little significance was attached to the 
role of human agency in accelerating, retarding, or reversing the process of economic 
change." They go on to contend that places are not "helpless pawns of international 
corporate elites" (Judd and Parkinson 1990: 14). Globalisation not only affects regions 
but it is also made there, even if the two categories are not always located in the same 
place. It could be argued, for example, that old-industrial regions have very little room 
for manoeuvre because governmental and private-firm decisions that shape these regions 
are largely made outside their borders. It is certainly the case in Britain, and to a degree 
in Germany, that the nation state and the EU are the places where the dominant economic 
and state-distributional power is held. Secondly, old-industrial regions often lack a 
successful institutional framework for leadership. However, public officials in regions 
cannot be seen as merely reacting to external pressures and "shoot[ing] anything that 
flies, claim[ing] anything that falls" (Rubin 1988, quoted in Reese 1997: 225). Instead, 
similar global pressures and constraints have often produced highly place-specific 
outcomes, "leaving local leadership enough room to be agents of their own destinies even 
in cases of severe economic constraint" (Reese 1997: 226). 
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Diametrically opposed to the notion of globalisation as a one-way scalar downward 
process and located on the other end of the structure-agency continuum is the "Great 
Men" theory (cf. Chemers 1997, Gleitman, Fridlund and Reisberg 1999: 518-521) which 
argues that if it had not been for these men (as they mostly were in the Western world 
until recently) the fate of a certain nation or region would have taken a different political 
path, following a different development trajectory. Admittedly, this theory has been 
developed out of and applied to historical figures such as Napoleon, Ghandi, Lenin or 
Hitler, but parallels could be drawn with contemporary regional leaders such as Jordi 
Pujol, who during his 23 year-long presidency of Catalonia transformed what was then an 
administrative province in a highly centralist and unitary state into an autonomous region 
within a now de-facto federal Spanish state (The Economist 2004a: 37). Another, though 
much less successful example, is Umberto Bossi, leader of the separatist Lega Nord, who 
gained popular support for demands for an independent state for Italy's rich northern 
provinces. While these regional leaders are associated mainly with their region's struggle 
for greater political and cultural autonomy, this chapter looks at the more mundane 
process of leadership in economic development and, more specifically, image building 
efforts in inward investment promotion. It is clear, of course, that politics and economics 
are mutually dependent as economic development strategies are linked to a wider socio-
economic context, and image building etTorts can themselves play a vital part in any 
campaign for greater regional autonomy. 
In a rare case study on the role of leadership in the sub-national context of urban 
regeneration in general, Boy le ( 1990: 114) found, in the case of Glasgow, a high mutual 
dependency of leadership and structural factors: 
"Perhaps the only certain conclusion from media and academic attention on 
the city is that change cannot be attributed to any single cause or decision. 
( ... ) Similarly, the search for the key politician or city official or leading 
businessman tends to exaggerate the personality factor as an ingredient of 
urban change. Rather, the improvements that have attracted attention to 
Glasgow are illustrative of a much more complex and possibly fortuitous 
combination of chance, historical circumstances, political, economic and 
social context, national policies, and local endeavour." 
This chapter will look at evidence for the leadership (agency) elements in the explanation 
of recent image-building efforts, embedded in the context of governance (structures) 
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outlined in chapter 6, Governance. It will conclude with an analysis of whether leadership 
in the image building process is contingent on situational circumstances in the region 
such as wider socio-economic processes and governance structures. Could it be argued 
that leaders had little choice but to adopt image building for two reasons? Firstly, as 
examined in the section on corporate decision-making in chapter 2, there is evidence that 
investor behaviour has become more image-led as pressure on profitability increases and 
as the patterns of traditional competitive advantage of towns and regions are gradually 
being eroded through the "ubiquitification" of now 'standard' locational factors (Maskell 
and Malmberg 1999) such as good transport infrastructure, a highly skilled and adaptable 
workforce, financial incentives and, more generally, a good 'investment climate' with 
regional policy-makers and bureaucrats having a positive attitude towards firms in 
general and inward investment in particular. Secondly, both regions had strong normative 
discourses of competitiveness, where many economic development policy makers and 
practitioners were motivated in their support of image campaigns by the desire to 'keep 
up with fashion' and to 'do what has to be done because it is being done by other 
regions'. 
Chapter 6 has examined the impact of administrative and governance structures on the 
image building process. Bryson and Kelley ( 1978) found that rapidly changing 
environmental factors increase the potential for leadership. I would therefore expect that 
in North East England the potential for individuals and organisations to lead on the issue 
of image management is greater than in the Ruhr as the North East currently experiences 
a period of profound changes in political and economic governance. While these 
structures certainly are a central part of the explanation their nature cannot account for 
the full extent of change. This led Rudeng ( 1989), in one of the earliest systematic 
accounts of leadership in regional development, to criticise previous research as being too 
strongly structure-oriented. To offer a more balanced view this chapter therefore 
examines the role of a particular case of agency and looks at issues of leadership of 
individuals and between organisations engaged in image building. 
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8.2. Key concepts 
Parkinson and Judd ( 1990: I 0) report their experience of scholarly debate at a 1990 
conference on leadership and urban regeneration, concluding that 
"Leadership is an elusive phenomenon. We found it relatively easy to discuss 
the restructuring of the world economy and the changes in national policies 
toward cities. We were able to describe the impact of economic change on 
cities ( ... ). But the cities discussed at the conference responded to the 
changes in very different ways. What role did leadership exert in defining the 
responses? Answering that question turned out to be difficult indeed." 
To arrive at a clearer idea of what constitutes leadership it is therefore necessary to define 
the key terms first. Distinguishing two different objects of analysis, leadership can be 
viewed as both process and property: "As a property, leadership is seen as a set of 
characteristics- role behaviors and personality attributes- that make certain people more 
effective in attaining a set of goals. As a process, it is seen as an effort by a leader, 
drawing on various bases of power 16, to influence members of a group to direct their 
activities toward a common goal." (Kets de Vries 200 I: 8574). The object of analysis of 
this chapter is the latter- starting from the contention that the current image management 
process in the two regions did not come out of a vacuum this chapter is concerned with 
finding out who was the driving force behind a more co-ordinated image etTort. 
Secondly, the emphasis of this section lies on non-constituted leadership as opposed to 
institutionalised leadership 17• Elgie (2001: 8578, drawing on Tucker [1981] and 
16 The term "various bases of power" is crucial here. According to another definition (Eigie 200 I, see 
below), leadership is a largely non-coercive process. Thus I want to concentrate here on persuasion and 
convincing as the major tools, as opposed to the use of strictly coercive methods in hierarchical structures. 
A common, nominally non-coercive method is the use of 'carrots' such as financial incentives. In the Ruhr, 
'Projekt Ruhr' was set up by the Land government specifically as a 'networking agency' to foster common 
projects between Ruhr cities and counties. In the current time of financial austerity local governments can 
more easily be enticed with financial incentives. For example, Projekt Ruhr is giving financial assistance to 
local governments only on the condition that they work together with other local governments in the area. 
'Carrots' like these are, for the Land government, the only viable way around coercive methods as 'sticks' 
could easily be identified as an blatant attack on the constitutionally guaranteed planning powers of 
German local governments (cf. chapter 4, Regional Case Studies). 
17 Note that the use of the term "institutionalised leadership" is a deliberate departure from the tenn 
"institutional leadership" which is commonly used in the literature. The latter tenn is conventionally used 
to refer to the fonnal powers of leadership granted to a person by his or her holding of a high office 
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Kellerman [ 1984]) points to the fact that formal and de-facto leadership do not 
necessarily coincide: "Leadership does not have to be exercised by leaders and, secondly, 
( ... ) there can be leaders who do not lead." The first situation refers to leading by 
persuasion, the second situation to the fact that occupying a high office (complete with 
formal power and authority) in a hierarchically organised organisation does not 
automatically make the office holder a leader (see figure 8.1 ). The latter group of "people 
are still( ... ) leaders in the institutional sense of the term, but they are unable to influence 
others and exercise leadership in the behavioural sense of the word" (Elgie 2001: 8578). 
The concept of leadership in a 
Dimension behavioural sense institutional sense 
Actual form of leadership De-facto Formal 
Source of authority Moral authority, power of Hierarchy 
persuasion 
Main mechanisms of Negotiation, consultation, Orders, pressure, coertion, 
delivery convincing, persuasion, also persuasion 
sometimes 'hidden' coertion 
Coerciveness Non-coercive Coercive and non-coercive 
Main disciplines with this Psychology, sociology, constitutional law, public 
focus anthropology, business and administration, political 
management science 
Fig. 8.1: the two basic concepts of leadership 
Source: author's own work, based on Elgie (2001 ), Kellerman (1984) and Tucker (1978) 
Both categories of leaders, or groups of leaders (also referred to as elites), allude to the 
notion that leaders (or el ites) occupy their status not only because of factual power, but 
more because of their ideas and their perceived integrity. According to Bock (200 l ), 
leaders gain their drive from their power of persuasion and ability to initiate discussions 
and mediate consensus. In other words, leaders use co-operation rather than hierarchy, 
persuasion rather than command (Comperl 2001 ). "In this sense, leadership is a 
reciprocal and essentially noncoercive relationship." (Elgie 2001: 8578). Leadership 1s 
often 
whereas I use it here to refer to leadership carried out by institutions, thus referring to the authority granted 
to a person by his or her holding of a high otlice as "institutionalised leadership". 
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"exercised by someone who does not occupy a formal position of authority. 
For example, social movements are often formed by individuals who are able 
to articulate demands which are latent within a community. By creating a 
sense of mutual purpose towards a particular goal, political leadership is 
present. ( ... ) It is often exercised by unelected people who do not hold any 
formal office, ( ... ) Martin Luther King being a prime example." 
The power of persuasion often stems from the leader having a 'vision', or at least being 
able to convince others that (s)he has one. The other quality of a leader is integrity, built 
on the followers' notion that the leaders are not primarily motivated by own interests or 
the interest of an organisation they belong to. For example, in both the Ruhr and North 
East England the leadership of a bishop was crucial for inducing regional stakeholders to 
seriously consider an image strategy. 
8.3. Leadership in organisational networks 
According to Chemers (2001: 8580) "leadership is a process of social influence in which 
one person is able to enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a task 
or objective." This is a rather loose definition and different strands of leadership research 
work with different definitions. There are two broad categories into which most of the 
existing body of research can be divided: leadership within organisations, and political 
leadership. The first category is almost exclusively concerned with leaders of commercial 
private-sector companies whereas the second has traditionally focused on top-level 
politicians, most notably US presidents. Both categories have the disadvantage that they 
are looking at one-on-many or many-on-one interactions (Gieitman, Fridlund and 
Reisberg 1999: 506-521) in distinctly hierarchical or power-asymmetrical relationships 
such as CEO-employee or president-electorate. In contrast, the situation in "self-
organizing, interorganizational networks" (Rhodes 1997: 53 18) is often one inter pares, 
between leaders of organisations. Consequently, a fusion of leadership and elite theories 
18 Prominent scholars of governance such as Rhodes ( 1997) and Jessop ( 1997) use the concept of the self-
organisation of inter-organizational relations to characterise a trend in governance towards an increasingly 
complex co-ordination of activities between an ever-increasing number of organisations involved (which 
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is needed to explain leadership in image-building as this process potentially involves- if 
it is to be consistent and successful - a plethora of organisations in a changing 
environment of governance structures. Accordingly, my working definition of leadership 
has to be modified as follows: "Leadership is a process of social influence in which one 
person is able to enlist the aid and support of other leaders in the accomplishment of a 
task or objective." 
Another problem with economic and political leadership theories is that the foundation 
for leadership is based on legitimacy: a leader is in a position of formal power either 
because (s)he is the owner and/or chief executive of a private-sector company, or an 
elected politician. Concepts of political leadership cannot really be applied to the study of 
image management because many of the leaders of this process are unelected 
bureaucrats. In a survey of leadership in local economic development Reese ( 1997) found 
that both elected officials and unelected professionals are in the key positions of 
economic development. 
Within the two dominant foci of leadership research (within organisations versus political 
leadership) initial studies concentrated on the leaders' personality traits in an effort to 
find commonalities present in all leaders. It was only later that research took into account 
structural variables of their organisations, trying to establish in which situations leaders 
can thrive and take the initiative. The most recent and most relevant approach in the 
context of this thesis is the environmental approach, which has sought to explain 
leadership through variables in the wider environment of both the leader and the 
organisation. The contingency approach tries to combine individual, structural and 
environmental factors of influence into multidimensional models of explanation. 
As mentioned earlier on, leadership research has predominantly focused on the superior-
subordinate relationships of leadership in organisations (as opposed to more fluid 
relationships between organisations), and on political leadership on a national scale. 
are increasingly specialised in the design or delivery of narrowly defined policy areas). For a full 
explanation see chapter 6, Governance. 
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There has been little effort to date to examine connections between leadership and 
institutions. The question "to what degree does leadership affect the creation of 
institutions, the process of institutional change, and therefore policy outcomes?" largely 
remains unanswered (Eigie 200 l: 8579). Thus, the evidence for the implications of 
leadership for inter-organisational relations is thin. Power approaches to the 
understanding of leadership could still provide clues to inter-organisational leadership in 
image building as they 
"( ... )seek to explain leadership effectiveness in terms ofthe amount and type of 
power possessed and exercised by leaders. A classic distinction of forms of 
power was presented by French and Raven (1960): 
• reward and coercive power, that is, the capability to offer incentives and to 
make use of organizational sanctions; 
• legitimate power, when followers believe that the organizational or 
positional power over them is rightful; 
• expert power, when high experience, knowledge, or ability are attributed; 
• and referent power, when a person is referred to, or group norms are 
identified with, due to appealing personal qualities or values systems." 
(Brodbeck 2001: 8571, added bullet points) 
An added benefit of this approach is that it incorporates the other side of the structure-
agency debate, the situational variables, in its realization that the extent and nature of 
leadership is highly context-specific, not least with regard to existing institutional and 
organisational frameworks in the two case study areas. 
Building on the power approach, Lukes ( 1974, p. 24) contends that power is often 
exercised in a subtle way, being aided by strong normative discourses: 
"[Lukes] argued that power can be used to shape perceptions, cognitions, and 
preferences to the extent that individuals accept their role in the existing order 
of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they view it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial. Consequently, the study of power cannot be 
confined to observable conflict, the outcomes of decisions, or even 
suppressed issues. It must also consider the question of political quiescence: 
why grievances do not exist; why demands are not made; and why conflict 
does not arise." (Hardy 2001: 10956, original emphasis) 
This definition coincides with Foucault's concept of systemic power which lies in the 
"power ofthe system in the unconscious acceptance of the values, traditions, cultures and 
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structures of a given institution or society" (Hardy 1994: 230). More specifically, 
systemic power is based on "sets of power relations that are deeply embedded in the 
taken-for-granted rules and practices that constrain action." (Hardy 2001: 1 0958). 
This begs the question whether image building is uncritically assumed to be necessary. 
As examined in the previous two chapters, there has been a powerful normative discourse 
in the two regions, especially in the North East, of entrepreneurial policies being 'natural' 
'inevitable', 'unavoidable', or simply 'necessary'. This may facilitate leadership, as 
leaders can rely on a broad, sometimes implicit, consensus. Territorial applications of this 
explanation have been the theories of 'growth coalitions' (Logan and Molotch 1987), 
'growth machines' (Molotch 1988), 'class alliance' (Harvey 1985) or 'urban 
entrepreneurialism' (Harvey 1989), whereby powerful territorial actors have taken 
control of the agenda, and 'monopolised' discourse, thereby suppressing dissident views 
or preventing opposition from arising in the first place (for a discussion of this 
phenomenon in North East England, see Robinson 2002). In their survey of case studies 
on the role of leadership in urban regeneration Judd and Parkinson (1990: 22) point out 
that governing elites "may be limited by their own vision or ideology." 
It seems that the message of the necessity of image management fell on fertile ground 
and was easily picked up by leaders in both case study areas. While there was 
considerable discussion over on what scale and by which methods image management 
should be undertaken, there was little doubt and no opposition as to whether image 
management is indeed necessary. Image improvement is enshrined in the North East's 
Regional Economic Strategy (ONE 1999, ONE 2002a), both as contained within a cross-
section of measures and as an economic development and inward investment promotion 
tool in its own right. The sub-regional economic development partnerships happily 
accepted the necessity of an image campaign; the only criticism came from academics 
such as Professor Fred Robinson (University of Durham) who traced the region's history 
of "suspending disbelief' and "subduing opposition" back to the NDC's first image 
campaign 'The Great North' .19 
19 This claim has been examined more closely in chapter 7.2, Policy Learning 
213 
The Ruhr has had a similar history of consensual politics albeit with a stronger corporatist 
character, where much of the promotional work has traditionally been undertaken by the 
Ruhr's large private firms. Accordingly, private sector companies have been leading the 
push towards a more systematic image management process, a message which was 
readily accepted by virtually all economic development stakeholders of the region, 
including local authorities, many of whom had already been involved in image building 
activities themselves. None of the interviewees in the Ruhr questioned the need for image 
improvement, even though, just like in the North East, there was considerable debate 
especially as to what was the appropriate scale for such promotion, and what techniques 
should be employed. A more detailed discussion follows below. 
Bachelor and Jones ( 1993: 15) argue that "different leaders with differing abilities will 
exploit the situation differently, and different outcome will be produced". Unfortunately 
-as Reese (1997: 231) remarks- "the literature is essentially silent on the relationship 
between ( ... ) leadership and economic development outcomes." However, there is some 
research on the process of leadership in economic development. Baumgartner (1993) 
noted that new, emerging policy fields usually leave more room for inventive leadership 
than do issues that are well-defined and well-understood. Such periods of change "are 
ripe for leadership as prior problem definitions and solutions are challenged" (Reese 
1997: 236). Image management is a relatively novel policy field and thus is likely to be 
more open to leadership or even requires leadership to emerge in the first place. 
Bachelor and Jones ( 1993) and Baumgartner ( 1993) found that leadership is most easily 
exerted around an issue of high symbolic value. To Reese ( 1997: 237) "the challenge for 
leadership in economic development, then, is to direct policy making and build consensus 
using the symbols through which the issues are framed." It remains to be investigated 
whether the construction and management of a region's image falls into the category of 
such as 'symbolic' project and, accordingly, is amenable to leadership. 
Leadership can in itself be a vital component in the projected image of a region, in 
portraying it as a region 'that knows where it's going', a coherent region, a region led by 
capable, business-friendly leaders with vision and charisma, a region that can look after 
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itself. This raises aspirations among inward investors that their enquiries will be dealt 
with efficiently, grants packages are attractive, planning permits are granted quickly, 
training assistance will be available promptly and of good quality, and generally, that the 
region as a whole is welcoming of inward investors and has 'a good business climate'. 
8.4. 1Leadler§I!Dip and! nmage bUlliDdling 
The following analysis of leadership issues in the two case study areas is divided into 
three categories. Firstly, political and economic factors, outlining the environment in 
which leadership operates. This includes issues of governance and national policies. 
Secondly, leadership as exhibited by organisations in the case study areas. This section 
deals with government and agencies with a public mandate on the regional level as well 
as business and labour associations or individual businesses. The third section looks at 
the leadership of persons, as individuals or as members of an organisation. This category 
contains eminent regional leaders who drove forward image management. 
8.4.1. Political-environmental and economic-environmental factors 
As outlined in chapters 4 (Regional Case Studies) and 6 (Governance), regional policies20 
operate in two rather different environments. Britain is characterised by a complex body 
of governance networks with institutional structures very much being in flux, whereas 
Germany has a more stable system of institutions and could be regarded as a government 
still being in chief control, but with an increasing tendency towards governance. This 
move from government to governance is epitomised in the Ruhr by the creation of 
Projekt Ruhr, a Land-owned agency, that interferes directly with regional policy in the 
Ruhr (details have been examined in chapter 6). 
20 In this context the term 'regional policy' refers to both policies designed by supra-regional governments 
(i.e. Whitehall in Britain and the Bund/Land governments in Germany) and to be applied on the regional 
level as well as to policies designed by regional bodies such as regional government or regional 
development agencies. 
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It is unclear which effects these institutional/governmental differences between the North 
East and the Ruhr have on issues of leadership. Two competing arguments can be 
offered: the first argument is that emerging regional government structures offer a great 
chance for leadership, organisations and their leaders demonstrating with the example of 
a particular project that the region 'can get its act together' and act decisively. Moreover, 
the most recent image strategy in the North East can be interpreted to be as much an 
exercise in region building as it is an economically motivated tool of inward investment 
promotion. On the other hand it could be argued that the existing structures hinder 
leadership as there is little room for leaders to emerge; few platforms or fora to prove 
themselves as leaders exist. One North East's Director of Communications, who is also in 
charge for the image strategy, shared the widely held view amongst regional image 
stakeholders that 
"There isn't an established mechanism for setting up things like an image 
strategy on a regional level. We (One North East, M.B.) are clearly trying to 
champion this issue. We want to lead, but it is a bit cumbersome having to 
approach each organisation individually - government, businesses, 
community leaders- dealing with all of them separately.( ... ) It takes a lot of 
time and effort, and just when you think you've got them all together 
someone pulls out." (interview) 
Moreover, according to my interviews it seems to be a common perception that there still 
is a 'dependency culture' in the North East which hinders the emergence (and 
acceptance) of leaders, and that there are few (potential) regional leaders as the region's 
political and economic fortunes have traditionally been determined by central 
government. It is true that during the 18-year Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997, 
regional policy in the UK has largely been a case of prescriptive action by Whitehall, 
sometimes described as 'Whitehall knows best and regions should do as they're told'. A 
high degree of public ownership of 'old' industries the North East meant that, until the 
end of the 1980s, the region had a state-managed economy (Hudson 1985, 1989). Adding 
up the political and economic dominance of Whitehall it could be argued that the North 
East was nothing short of a central government-managed region (Hudson 1998). The 
Director of Economic Development of Wear Valley District Council in County Durham 
remarks, 
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"[There have been] generations of people who have grown up with a 
dependency culture. We live in a dependency culture around here. People are 
used to working for a big employer. Entrepreneurship, the number of people 
starting their own businesses, isn't very high. That's got to change over a 
period oftime." (interview) 
As indicated earlier on in this chapter, 'vision' seems to be vital in the provision of 
leadership. The lamented 'dependency culture' might stem from, or at least be 
compounded by, a lack of vision. As Robinson (2002: 327) argues, "in a declining old 
industrial region, vision is especially important but is only poorly articulated in the North 
East." In his view, 
"part of the problem is the nature of politics and the structures of governance 
in the North East. Decades of domination by one party (the Labour Party) has 
not served the region well. Debate has been stifled and local politics is sterile, 
lacking imagination and vision. Local government, run by a male 
gerontocracy, looks and sounds out of date and paternalistic. There is a 
widespread disaffection with politics and politicians in the region and an 
apathy- or, more correctly, a sense that nothing can ever change." 
This might explain why there is a reluctance among regional leaders to enthusiastically 
embrace new initiatives such as the regional image strategy. As a past president of the 
North East Chamber of Commerce put it, business leaders are disillusioned because of 
the perceived failure of previous image management attempts: "there's a bit of cynicism 
about, particularly in the business community, of 'we've seen it all before."' (interview). 
Similarly, the Ruhr has been ruled by one party, the Social Democrats (SPD), since the 
end of World War 11, until the 2002 local elections brought the conservative Christian 
Democrats (CDU) to power. Now that the CDU now holds a majority in the KVR the 
debate about the future of the KVR and its responsibilities has become livelier again. The 
K VR is now controlled by the opposition to the SPD Land government which has made 
obsolete earlier plans to merge the KVR and Projekt Ruhr. Rather than reducing the two 
regional government bodies to one the KVR is likely to be as politically contested as it 
has been since the 1970s when ideas first surfaced to reduce its powers or abandon it 
altogether. This puts the KVR in a weaker position, without a clear and unanimous 
political mandate to lead the image management for the Ruhr as a whole. 
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In the Ruhr, central and Land government intervention also has a long tradition. Large 
parts of the Ruhr economy have, after the Second World War and even more after the 
economic slump in the 1970s, been controlled, albeit not owned, by central government. 
This degree of state control, coupled with the above-mentioned 'dependency culture', 
raises concerns about the lack of conditions that could bring about leaders: 
"The Ruhr still suffers from its expectations that others decide on the region's 
economic fortunes. Joe Bloggs looks to the industrial giants who used to care 
for him from the cradle to the grave. Those giants look to the government 
hoping that it will bail them out. The region as a whole is looking at the 
government, waiting for them to put things right, as they have done in the 
past. Clearly, those times are over, but regional political leaders emerge only 
very hesitantly. Nobody's keen on putting their head up. Only the interests of 
big business are well-organised. That's still a bit like in the past - big 
industry is leading the region." (original emphasis, interview with Chief 
Editor, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ), the Ruhr's most widely 
read newspaper) 
Notwithstanding the long-standing involvement of higher tiers of government, the Ruhr 
has been enjoying a political-institutional environment which allowed room for regional 
leadership to emerge. The Ruhr has had a local 'parliament' since 1929 when the 
Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohle (SVR) was formed and assumed wide-ranging planning 
powers. Secondly, from the onset of industrialisation the Ruhr has contained numerous 
company headquarters, which has given rise to the lively engagement of private firms and 
their associations in the economic development of the area. The impact of both KVR and 
the firm associations will be examined in the next sub-section on organisations. 
Having said that the two regions are converging m their governance structures it is 
important to underline that the directions of the processes are very different between the 
two regions. In the North East the region is in advance, in the Ruhr the Land government 
is trying to roll back the region. 
In essence it can be said that institutional structures per se are neither inductive nor 
adverse to leadership. The nature, remit and power of organisations themselves seem to 
be more important, and this will be the focus of the next sub-section. 
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8.41.2. Organisations 
In organisational terms, the Ruhr has well-established administrative routines for dealing 
with the emerging policy area of image management, whereas no formal procedures exist 
in North East England as yet (these points have been examined in more depth in chapter 
6, Governance). In both regions the elements of regional government that already existed 
or were evolving took the lead in regional image strategies. This applies to the initiation 
(the 'airing' of the idea), the development, and the execution of image management. In 
1999, the regional development agency One North East and the North-East Regional 
Assembly took on together the idea of an image improvement initiative as one of their 
first projects- both organisations had only been created several months before. 
"The fact that we are having a discussion about regional image campaigns -
whatever they are - seems to be a product of the fact that we already have the 
RDA and the regional chamber. These institutions can at least provide a 
forum in which these debates can take place." (Interview with John Tomaney, 
Professor of Governance and Chair ofthe Yes for the North East campaign) 
was unable to trace down, through a literature review or through the collection of 
primary data, the origin of the idea of image management (who first proposed it in or to 
these two organisations) but two interviewees pointed at John Bridge, then chairman of 
One North East, having revived his "old love" of image campaigns. 
One North East's motivation for suggesting the idea of an image strategy to the North 
East political and business community was that the RDA felt that the objectives of the 
Regional Economic Strategy (ONE 1999 and 2002) could only be achieved if outdated 
perceptions of economic decline and social dilapidation could be turned into a more 
positive image (interview with ONE and NEA communications officers). 
In the "Great North" campaign of the late eighties the NDC, One North East's 
predecessor organisation, took a stronger leadership role, implementing the strategy in a 
top-down approach. According to the chairman of County Durham Economic 
Development Partnership "the first involvement we had was when it [the campaign] was 
launched" (interview). 
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In the Ruhr, the process had been initiated by the Ruhr Local Government Association 
(KVR). The impetus came from two events. Firstly, in a major reorganisation in 1979 the 
KVR was stripped by the Land government of a number of important functions, most 
prominently planning powers, but gained legal responsibility for public relations and 
place marketing for the Ruhr (Blotevogel 2001a). A senior official of the NRW Land 
government suggested that the KVR's first image campaign was partly born out of the 
KVR's desire to prove its usefulness. Since the K VR was, after the 1979 reform, 
regarded by many as purely a talking shop, it put great effort into one of its remaining 
functions, public relations/marketing, and through a highly visible image campaign drew 
attention to the fact that it was 'doing something'. A similar coincidence in timing could 
be observed when, in 1998, the KVR started its second advertising campaign, at a time 
when criticism of the KVR's alleged ineffectiveness had reached new heights to the 
effect that its very existence was under threat. 21 This narrative, however, is contested. A 
senior official of K VR' s public relations department pointed out that in the adoption of an 
image campaign the K VR was exclusively motivated by its efforts to meet its newly 
created legal obligation of undertaking PR for the region. 
Despite the well-developed administrative routines in the KVR to cope with the image 
management process there is now an increasing administrative and organisational 
fragmentation in the once 'monolithic' image management process. The most prominent 
competition for the KVR's responsibilities comes from Projekt Ruhr, of which many 
observers believe that it was set up as a 'rival' organisation to keep in check the KVR. 
Projekt Ruhr's job is "to develop ideas and fire with enthusiasm those necessary for the 
implementation of the idea. We support the process until it is able to stand on its own 
feet" (interview with Projekt Ruhr's Head of Communications). While Projekt Ruhr does 
not have image management as one of its explicit goals it does in practice sponsor 
projects which are highly image-relevant. This approach is has been branded by critics as 
21 Since 1998 the K VR has been under constant political attack. Both local governments and the Land 
government questioned its effectiveness and whether it was indeed necessary to have an organisation like 
the K VR on the Ruhr scale altogether (Blotevogel 200 I a). In January 2004 the Land parliament passed 
legislation to reform the KVR one again. From I October 2004 the organisation will be called RVR (Ruhr 
Regional Association, WAZ 2003b). 
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piecemeaf2, and there seems to be little co-ordination between Projekt Ruhr's projects 
relevant to the region's image and KVR's overall regional image strategy. As Projekt 
Ruhr does not have any direct legislative power over the Ruhr it leads with 'carrots', as 
Projekt Ruhr's Head of Communications admits: 
"It is financial austerity that forces [Ruhr] cities to cooperate as they are not 
strong enough to succeed on their own.( ... ) The pressure of empty coffers is 
on local government ( ... ) and we are guiding a process that decides how 2.1 
billion Euros [of EU objective 2 funding] are being spent in the region. We 
make sure that the money is well spent, that the local governments' projects 
are well-coordinated." 
He goes on and quotes another example how Projekt Ruhr's own operative money IS 
being spent on image-related projects: 
"For example, we managed for the first time to get all local governments to 
have one joint stall at the Expo Real fair23 • Of course this new-found unity 
also had to do with the fact that we said, okay, we'll dig in our pocket for this 
but with strings attached [that they had to have one joint stall]. Again it was 
financial austerity that made them put aside their reservations and say, in 
principle it is better to do it together. But not out of strategy but because of 
the pressure. But at least we showed them that a joint effort is possible, and 
they might notice the benefits and do more of this [cooperation]. The first 
step has to be for the cities to realise that one regional strategy gets us further 
than many single local strategies." 
In addition to competition from the 'rival' organisation Projekt Ruhr the KVR also faces 
resistance to its leadership on the margins of the Ruhr. The KVR is trying to lead on the 
issue of image management, but only about two thirds of the Ruhr local governments 
follow. Some cities, notably on the margins of the Ruhr, have been resisting attempts to 
create and market an image for the Ruhr as whole. For example, the managing director of 
Dortmund Project, Dortmund's economic development partnership, said 
22 To be eligible for funding by Projekt Ruhr, projects must have the promise of a "communicative yield". 
However, Projekt Ruhr's regulations state only that the planned project must show promise of attracting 
media attention, but not that the projects fit into an overall communication strategy. For example, Projekt 
Ruhr supported the creation of 'Ruhr-Networker', an association of the Ruhr's IT companies (most of them 
local start-ups or SMEs). Ruhr-Networker is supposed to represent the Ruhr's IT industry abroad and thus 
contribute to the Ruhr's image as a high-tech location, but no efforts were made to integrate this project 
into the region-wide image management led by the K YR. 
23 Expo Real is Europe's second biggest real estate fair, held annually in Munich. 
221 
"To be very clear, we are not prepared ( ... ) to give up our identity and say 
'We will join forces with the other [cities] and work for the gain of the Ruhr 
only'. We do not do this because we are convinced that we in Dortmund need 
identity. We cannot become Essen Ill or Ruhr VII.( ... ) The Ruhr has to be a 
region of strong cities all having their own profile but cooperating where 
necessary. ( ... ) The Ruhr is an invention. ( ... ) And just like it has been 
invented years ago we now might as well bin it. ( ... ) When Dortmund was 
asked by the KVR to say yes or no [to the Ruhr image campaign] we told 
them 'you can do whatever you want', but we don't identify with this 
[campaign] and we won't contribute any money." 
8.4.3. Persons 
Apart from organisations that championed new opportunities there have also been 
persons within these organisations who have shown a degree of leadership. In general, 
however, there is a feeling in both regions that they are ill-equipped with (potential) 
leaders who could act on a region-wide scale to advance image management efforts. A 
past president ofthe North East Chamber of Commerce lamented that 
"We don't have any regional figures. There is an opportunity [in the image 
strategy]. But it needs to be championed. And I am not sure where the 
champions are. Ten years ago John Hall24 was trying to go that way. He 
didn't succeed, but he had ambitions. Amongst the local government leaders 
there's no major regional figure. ( ... ) We would need one or two key figures 
in the region to pick it up and promote it. The campaign could only be 
successful on the back of one or two strong regional personalities. And they 
have yet to emerge." 
It could be argued that the fluid organisational set-up and the unstable, constantly 
changing partnerships with little institutional routines do require strong leadership, but at 
the same time there do not seem to be any strong leadership figures. This could be a 
central element in the explanation of the fact that in the North East four years have now 
passed since the first attempt of the recent image strategy, but apart from a short-lived 
advertising campaign in early 2002, which was withdrawn after only six weeks, the North 
East image strategy still has not got beyond the consultation stage (as set out in chapter 5, 
Changing Images). 
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Similarly, and as explained above, the Ruhr lacks political leaders on a regional scale, but 
the robust administrative routines ofthe KVR seem to make up for this. Indeed, the KVR 
seems to have transformed itself to allow for greater leadership in the issue of image. In 
the wake of its reorganisation of 1979, the KVR created a new department for public 
relations and established a public relations committee25 • Its increased commitment to 
public relations was reflected in the first-ever recruitment of a number of PR 
professionals. One of them, Udo Thies, a former lecturer of communication studies at 
Essen University, joined in 1985 and was the first to propose a systematic approach to 
image improvement, resulting in the suggestion to develop an image campaign in the 
form of advertising. First thoughts of an image campaign surfaced in the K VR as early as 
1982, but evidence for this is no more than anecdotal as I was unable to find an 
interviewee who had been with KVR pre-1985. In 1984 the decision to go ahead with an 
image campaign was made, and in the same year the first perception study was 
undertaken. In 1985 a contract was awarded to an advertising agency and in late 1985 the 
first advertisements appeared in the national press (pers. comm. with KVR's head of 
design). 
While there has been a well-organised and -resourced body in the Ruhr that succeeded in 
establishing a systematic image management in the Ruhr, the private sector was initially 
reluctant to support the effort. In the North East, attempts to establish a systematic, 
consistent and sustained image building effort has failed to date, but at least there have 
been extensive consultations and two drafts have been produced. In both regions, the 
leadership of figures who appeared to be neutral and have no self-interest was crucial for 
the effort of getting all parties around one table. 
24 Sir John Hall, one of the most influential North East business persons, has developed Gateshead's Metro 
Centre (at its opening Britain's biggest shopping centre) and has revived the fortunes of Newcastle United 
Football Club as its president for thirteen years. 
25 The K VR is democratically controlled. All programmes and activities have to be passed by the 
Verbandsversammlung, a steering board which is made up from representatives of local government, trade 
unions, employers and other socially relevant groupings (W AZ 2003a). In addition, for each area of the 
KVR's activities there exists a specific committee, including a public relations committee. The latter is 
where most ofthe discussion took place, whereas the Verbandsversammlung usually passes projects which 
have been agreed on in the committees. 
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In both regions it was senior church leaders who performed this task. In the North East, 
the Rt Rev Michael Turnbull, Bishop of Durham from 1994 to 2003, was not a leading 
actor in the image management process per se but he was very active in paving the way 
to increase the capability of the region to deal with such issues. During his nine years at 
Durham he pursued his long-standing interest in devolution and economic regeneration. 
He has been active in the House of Lords as the lead bishop on constitutional affairs and 
has been prominent in the movement towards regional government in the North East (Yes 
for the North East 2003), with one of his politically most eminent positions being Chair 
of the North East Constitutional Convention from 200 I to 2003. As a result of his 
activities regional stakeholders agreed to meet frequently to discuss issues of 
regeneration, among them image building. His motivation for becoming involved was 
that he 
"perceived that [regeneration] needed to be drawn above party politics. 
Because if the discussion ran along party-political lines the whole thing 
would be very predictable and it would lead to an argument on traditional 
political lines. ( ... ) I got involved not to win political battles but because I 
want to see a more wholesome common life where more people have 
opportunities and where there is justice. Those were my motivations." 
(interview) 
He felt that he could help the process of bringing the region's leading figures together: 
"I was encouraged to get involved partly because I was seen as politically 
neutral. I wasn't aligned with any political party. And therefore people would 
come together initially to the meetings which l said were one-off 
conversations, knowing of course that a lot of other things would ensue from 
them. They realised they weren't really joining an organisation. They were 
just coming to parley, to talk with people whom they had mutually regarded 
as demons. ( ... ) There were questions that l could ask because I was seen 
impartial and therefore l had a certain freedom that other people might not 
have had." (interview) 
It can be followed from Bishop Turnbull's comments that there was a vacuum of 
leadership in the region, as the success of the meetings he called was evident: 
"People did show up for these meetings, for a number of motives, l suspect. 
At its best it was, we have a problem here and this is one way of having a 
fresh look at it and therefore we will come and talk. Another, less worthy 
reason might have been that these meetings were quite highly publicised in 
the regional press and they may have thought, if we don't go it may look as if 
we're not interested. There's probably a mix of motivations there. On each of 
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those occasions I always got the impression that people went away thinking 
'that wasn't just a talk shop. It was worthwhile. To the very least it has 
enabled us to identify the key players on the sides that we've never really 
talked to before'. And to see people face to face rather than just writing letters 
or talking through the press I hope was a little contribution to the whole 
process of rebuilding." 
In the Ruhr, it was also a senior church leader who attempted to break the political 
stalemate in the 1980s. The late Kardinal Hengsbach, formerly Bishop of the Ruhr 
diocese, founded the Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet (IR), an association of large private sector 
companies that wanted to meet their corporate responsibility towards the region in which 
they operate (interview with his former executive). The IR has supported the KVR's 
image campaigns. Kardinal Hengsbach was a leading figure because of his high 
reputation and his ability to communicate with all classes of society (interview with his 
former executive). 
Another highly 'image-relevant' figure whose success in pulling people together stems 
from his perceived impartiality was Professor Karl Ganser. He is widely regarded as "the 
architect" of co-operation in the Ruhr through his position as chief executive of the IBA 26 
from 1989 to I 999 (Rossmann 1997: 99). Many interviewees attributed him with creating 
a sense of unity in the Ruhr. He was an external person with no previous involvement in 
the Ruhr and was thus perceived to be above Kirchturmdenken ('church steeple politics'). 
"It was not before the mid-1990s that many of the Ruhr's cities re-developed 
a sense of belonging to the Ruhr. One of the reasons for this surely was the 
involvement of Professor Ganser and his 'baby', the IBA Emscher Park.( ... ) 
He has achieved a lot because he was credible and came from outside the 
Ruhr." (interview with Director of Strategy, Essen Chamber of Commerce) 
26 IBA (lnternationale Bauausstellung Emscher-Park, Emscher Park International Building Exhibition) is 
widely regarded as the seminal project to the Ruhr's 1990s renaissance as it led to wide-ranging 
environmental changes. This included a cleaning-up of the natural environment, the erection of many 
innovative buildings and landscapes, and the conversion of many old-industrial buildings in the most 
deprived areas of the Ruhr. The 120 projects covered roughly half of the Ruhr's area and half of its 
population. For example, the former steelworks of Duisburg-Meiderich (fig. 8.2) was converted into an 
entertainment centre consisting of a nightclub, a diving centre, a restaurant and 'industrial parklands' 
featuring an adventure playground. This change in the physical landscape turned out to be contributing 
immensely to changing and updating the Ruhr's image as the region was trying to establish itself as a world 
leader in innovative design. 
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Fig. 8.2: The converted steelworks of Duisburg-Meiderich, 
one of the flagship projects of the IBA Emscher Park 
Source: www.iba.nrw.de/arbeitsbereiche 
8.4.4. Business involvement 
Business involvement in image management was limited in both regions. Efforts of One 
North East and the Regional Assembly to engage the business community had only a 
limited success. This was not due to businesses' general reluctance in participating in an 
image management effort but because the North East traditionally lacks entrepreneurial 
leaders (interviews with One North East and North East Assembly communication 
officers). Bill Midgley has been in key positions of the North East's economy for 20 
years, including President of the North East Chamber of Commerce. In an interview, he 
observed that " in the industry, who springs to mind as a strong leader, on a regional basis 
rather than in the Newcastle or Middlesbrough area? We lack some key players here" 
(original emphasis). There have been, however, a number of consultations, most notably 
the Durham Castle event where in 2001 regional senior managers agreed to participate in 
an image strategy steering group. 
In the Ruhr, businesses were represented in the official image decision making process 
only to a very limited extent, as no more then I 0 per cent of delegates of the KVR' s 
legislative Verbandsversammlung are from the business sector (made up of 
representatives of employers federations and chambers of commerce, own calculations 
based on W AZ 2003a). Those business representatives lack voting powers and have the 
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right to be consulted only. Furthermore, business associations on their own had been 
inactive in the image management process at the time the first image campaign went 
public in 1985. Pro Ruhrgebiet had been created in 1981, advocating the interests of 
SMEs, but is an organisation with very limited financial and staff resources and little 
interest in image management with a view to inward investors. The more powerful 
regional business body representing the interests of large enterprises, Initiativkreis 
Ruhrgebiet, who is now heavily engaged in its own image building activities, had not 
been founded until 1989. 
8.4.5. Civil society involvement 
Across the case study areas the involvement of civil society in the image management 
process varied. In the North East, the Regional Assembly, one of the two organisations 
that had initially eo-led image efforts, has voluntary sector and trade union 
representatives among its members. In addition, some of the participants of the image 
steering group were representatives of civil organisations, such as Northern Arts, and the 
Workers Educational Association. In the Ruhr, civil society enjoyed little formal 
representation with only five out of 56 representatives to the KVR's 
Verbandsversammlung being from the civil sector. Furthermore, civil society 
representatives do not enjoy voting powers. Overall, there is little leadership from civil 
society in the image management process, apart from the individuals mentioned earlier 
on in the section on leading figures. 
8.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of leadership in regional image management attempts, 
and whether leadership issues account for some of the differences between the 
management efforts undertaken in the two regions. 
Firstly, the evidence presented in this chapter does support the argument that regions are 
not helpless pawns of globalising forces. Indeed, the response in terms of image 
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management has turned out different in the two case study areas. Leaders in the Ruhr put 
the need to improve the region's image on the regional agenda much earlier than their 
counterparts in the North East. This can partly been ascribed to the fact that the North 
East still lacks a regionwide meaningful forum for issues like image improvement. 
Indeed, leadership occurred in different forms in the two case study areas: In the North 
East the dominant mode was behavioural leadership, while in the Ruhr leadership mostly 
occurred in an institutional sense. These results are in line with those of chapters 6 and 7, 
which clearly demonstrated that the process of image building was far more 
institutionalised in the Ruhr than it was in the North East. In the Ruhr it was an 
organisation that took the lead; in the North East the progress, albeit limited, of the 
Regional Image Strategy was mainly due to the leadership of individuals (see ftg.8.3). 
This reliance on individual leadership became obvious when the Regional Image Strategy 
came to a preliminary halt after the key persons at the two lead organisations- One North 
East and the Regional Assembly - had left their posts. 
North East Ruhr 
Mode of leadership Mainly individual, limited Mainly institutional, limited 
institutionalisation leadership outside formal 
structures 
Source of authority Mainly power of persuasion Mainly_ hierarchy 
Main mechanisms decision- Negotiation outside formal Negotiation within formal 
making structures structures 
Main mechanisms of Within formal structures Within formal structures 
implementation 
Fig. 8.3: The main properties of leadership in the North East and the Ruhr 
Source: author's own work 
Secondly, both regions have serious deficits in their institutional frameworks in that they 
impede effective leadership. The two reasons for this are the limited power of the existing 
regional bodies, and, in the case of the North East, a political-institutional environment 
that changes so quickly that it is difficult for potential leaders to even identify potential 
'followers'. On the other hand, there is evidence that leadership has become more 
prominent exactly as a result of those changes. The new political spaces that currently are 
under construction in the North East have opened the chance for leaders to champion 
these opportunities. In the Ruhr the political system has remained fairly stable over the 
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last decades, but the regional body K VR has seen its leading role curtailed by a Land 
government that is increasingly tightening the reigns on the autonomy of the Ruhr, 
stifling the regional potential for leadership. 
Thirdly, the success or failure of image management is intimately connected to the ability 
and willingness of individual persons to lead on the issue. The North East has so far 
failed to produce a prominent figure that could permanently lead this process in a 
sustainable manner. As demonstrated above, the administrative routines of the North East 
are ill-developed and fragile when an unexpected event occurs. While the institutional 
stability in the Ruhr partly explains the consistency and success of its image management 
effort, the stability of leaders that succeeded in bringing the whole region together 
certainly accounts to some degree for the success of previous image campaigns. Those 
individual leaders were part of successful regional organisations such as the KVR or IBA 
Emscher Park, both of whom have had a remarkably low staff turnover. Another central 
factor in successful leadership seems to be the perceived integrity and impartiality of 
potential leaders, and church leaders were in both regions able to put to their status to 
good use. 
Fourthly, leadership on image management fell on fertile ground and regional players 
have been very supportive of the idea of image management, if not always of the 
proposed instruments of implementation. This support can be attributed to the leadership 
capabilities of central figures, but also to the existence of strong normative discourses 
about regional entrepreneurialism and FOI-led regeneration. 
In essence, none of these single factors can account for the whole extent of leadership or 
for the differences between the two regions. One has to agree with Boy le ( 1990: 144) 
who has described the factors behind successful regeneration as a "complex and possibly 
fortuitous combination of chance, historical circumstances, political, economic and social 
context, national policies, and local endeavour." It is also clear, however, that leadership 
has played an important role. This becomes most obvious at the failure to date of the 
implementation of the North East's Regional Image Strategy. In other words, the 
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influence of leadership on successful image management initiatives is hard to isolate, but 
an absence or failure of leadership is rather plain to see. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter seeks to draw together the findings presented in the previous four chapters. 
It summarises my answers to the research questions, and identifies areas for future 
research. It includes a section on how current theories of social/policy learning, 
governance and leadership may need to be reconsidered in the light of my findings. This 
is followed by a look at the 'bigger picture' in an attempt to relate the observed patterns 
of governance to wider processes of state rescaling and regionalism. The second part is 
concerned with policy implications, suggesting ways in which the practice of image 
building and the underlying organisational and institutional arrangements can be 
developed to facilitate a more effective and efficient image management. I aim to show 
here both the lessons that the two regions can learn from each other, but also provide a 
critique of the practice of image building in both regions based on evidence from other 
places and derived from own reflections. 
9.1. The governance of image building: revisiting the research questions 
The study set out to compare the image building efforts in two regions that share the 
characteristic of being an old-industrial region, and yet responded very differently- as far 
as their involvement in image-building is concerned - to similar challenges of 
restructuring. Both regions have a long history of intervention and state planning, from 
early attempts to retain traditional industries to re-industrialisation and the attempted 
conversion into a knowledge-based service and high-tech economy. Various tools have 
been used to achieve these ends: supply side solutions, including the upgrading of 
infrastructure, the (re)training of labour, the proactive construction of office and factory 
units, and the redesign of public administration to allow for quicker and more inclusive 
decision-making. Attempts to stimulate demand have included financial incentives, the 
creation of business networks, and, eventually, the correction of what was identified as a 
major obstacle to regional development: outdated and unfavourable perceptions of the 
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region as an unattractive location for 'future-proof' private-sector investment. Set in this 
context, the central aims of the study were to answer these questions: 
I. How are regional images being constructed? Which actors are involved in this 
process, and how do they interact? Is there any coordination to ensure a coherent 
message, and what means are used to achieve this? 
2. How do organisations on different scales interact? To what extent is the image 
management process affected by national as opposed to regional influences? What 
influence do national political systems of governance have on the image-management 
process? If 'the rules of the game' are set by national/Land governments, are they 
(re)interpreted in different ways on the regional scale? 
3. How do organisations of different sectors (public, private, civil society) interact? 
How much power does that state hold in the image-management process? Has its 
influence diminished, or has it merely shifted from direct to more indirect control, 
from hierarchy to coordination? What is the role of the organisations 'officially· in 
charge of the image management process, the RDA in the North East, and the KVR in 
the Ruhr? 
4. Finally, what is the content of the representations that place promotion agencies and 
economic development stakeholders are seeking to construct? 
The first question, how regional images are being constructed, cannot be easily answered, 
if understood in a wider sense. There is still a debate among psychology, communication 
and media scholars about how place images come about. However, this was not the most 
central question of the thesis. After all, the potential sources of images are virtually 
infinite, and economic development organisations and stakeholders can therefore only 
make a partial contribution to the perceptions of a particular place. In my research the 
construction of place images is seen as the conscious effort of economic development 
stakeholders, and this process can be illuminated by my empirical findings. As set out in 
chapter 6 (image and governance), a relatively small set of organisations in both regions 
are actively engaged in image management and image building, notwithstanding the fact 
that the range of organisations contributing to regional images ('image-making') is far 
greater. In the case of North East England, the main drivers of recent image improvement 
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efforts were One North East (the regional development agency) and the North East 
Regional Assembly. On the national level, UK Trade & Investment exerts an influence 
on the process in as far as it tries to ensure, through the North East Government Office, 
that the image efforts of the region are in line with UK Trade & Investment's overall 
image strategy. 
The four sub-regional economic development agencies were invited to contribute their 
ideas on a regional image strategy but are not formally involved in the process and do not 
have any decision powers. One North East and the Regional Assembly also encouraged 
business participation but, again, businesses were merely consulted to achieve a strategy 
that is sufficiently informed by the target group of inward investment promotion, private 
sector companies. In the Ruhr, one single organisation is responsible for public relations 
and marketing of the Ruhr, the KVR (fig. 9.1 ). As part of its promotional activities the 
organisation has designed and implemented the region's two image campaigns since 
1985. In contrast to the North East, where interaction took place chiefly through 
networks, the Ruhr has used a very different approach. Since the KVR had public 
relations added to its portfolio of responsibilities in 1979, matters of public relations that 
have a region-wide importance (as long as they are not the exclusive responsibility of the 
Central or Land governments) have been decided in the 'Ruhr Parliament', as the KVR is 
sometimes dubbed. In this 'parliament', employers, trade unions and the civil society are 
represented through a quota system. In addition to their representation within the KVR, 
business associations also sought to influence the Ruhr's image outside the formal-
structural decision-making system of the KVR through their own image-building 
activities. Most notably the lnitiativkreis Ruhrgebiet (IR), an association that comprises 
most of the Ruhr's 50 biggest companies, organises high-profile events that attract media 
attention. On the national level, the German inward investment agency, FDIN, has had no 
involvement in the Ruhr's image efforts, as the KVR is independent of the national 
government and exclusively funded by its member local authorities, who were ultimately 
in control of the image efforts as they not only finance the KVR but also hold the 
majority of votes in the 'Ruhr Parliament'. 
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My second question asked whether these differences in governance structures could be 
held to account for some of the differences in the image management process in the two 
regions. Lacking a formal legislative or administrative structure for image management, 
the drivers of the North East regional image campaign had to rely on networks to get 
stakeholders on other scales and from other sectors involved. The material presented in 
chapters 6 to 8 clearly demonstrates the instability of network membership, differences in 
accessibility of the network to various groups, and the varying degree of actual use of the 
ability to access these networks. One North East and the Regional Assembly had to 
establish a sizeable initiative to draw in stakeholder views. While stakeholder 
participation was initially balanced and fairly comprehensive, many of the persons 
interviewed for this thesis reported the rapid setting-in of feelings of alienation from the 
process, as they only had a consultative role and many felt that their suggestions were not 
taken seriously enough. Secondly, the network approach might explain why the process 
towards a regional image strategy (RIS) has to date continued for more than four years 
without actually producing a campaign that has seen the light of day - apart from a short-
lived advertising campaign in 2002 that was withdrawn after four weeks. This long delay 
illustrates the vulnerability of the process in the North East. A fully developed strategy 
had been launched with great fanfare in 2002 in the North East, London and Brussels, but 
only lasted for four weeks, as the key person at One North East took ill. It bespeaks of a 
severe lack of established administrative routines and the instability of the network ifthe 
absence of one person results in the abandonment of an image strategy. One North East 
has since made a fresh start, this time without the Regional Assembly, but the structural 
problems remain. It seems that in organisational-institutional tenns the North East is in a 
kind of vacuum where the central state has transferred responsibility to the regional level 
but the latter is incapable of performing some of its new duties. In other words, while the 
central state is still setting the goals, the elements of an emerging regional government 
still struggle to 'find their feet' in this new freedom and find it particularly difficult to 
establish effective policy networks. However, as much as these problems may be due to a 
policy vacuum in a time when decentralisation has occurred but true devolution has not 
yet been achieved, these problems might also stem from the fact that image management 
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is an emerging policy field, for which initial arrangements are generally often weak and 
unstable. 
In contrast, in the Ruhr the idea of image management fell onto the fertile ground of a 
developed administrative routine in a stable and well-established institutional framework 
and an organisation who 'championed' the new opportunity. On the other hand, in the 
Ruhr the price to pay for these functioning routines was a less inclusive consultation 
process in that the range of stakeholders consulted was largely limited to those parties 
officially represented in the KVR. 
As far as question three, the degree and the ways of interaction between various actors 
involved in image building, is concerned, the state seems to be firmly in control of the 
image management process. Two issues have to be distinguished here: the first issue is 
connected with the assertion that because of financial austerity and because of the 
growing complexity of policies and the environment in which they operate the state 
increasingly has to rely on the private sector and civil society to successfully implement 
(and to a certain degree also to design) economic development policies. Overall, the 
image management process in the North East is characterised by rather loose and 
unstable networks, whereas in the Ruhr the mode of coordination is mainly by hierarchy. 
The second issue is one of re-scaling, in which the central state is losing powers 
downwards to regional and local actors and upwards to supra-national organisations. This 
argument is at the core of the hollowing-out thesis. In both regions the organisations that 
developed and drove forward the concept of a regional image strategy were state 
organisations on the regional scale. In the North East, the process was influenced top-
down by central government through the Government Office for the North East (GO-
NE), whereas in the Ruhr the regional body driving image management (KVR) is made 
up of and controlled by the Ruhr's local authorities, resulting in a more bottom-up 
approach. 
The North East has seen an apparent re-scaling of the responsibility for inward 
investment promotion from the national to the regional level with the establishment ofthe 
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RDA. However, as my research has shown, the central state still yields significant power 
in this process. Financial aid given to the RDA is no longer attached to conditions but 
granted as a single block. However, central government still retains a veto over how the 
money is spent in case it identifies what is sees as major faults in the RDA's spending 
and activities. In the Ruhr, however, the KVR is largely independent in its operations 
from Land government influence. However, the Land parliament of North Rhine-
Westphalia pushed through in 1979 a major reorganisation and stripped the KVR of a 
significant share of its powers. Both regional organisations share the weakness that they 
are largely 'toothless' when it comes to inducing sub-regional organisations to submerge 
their interests to a regional, consistent image-building effort, as demonstrated in chapter 
6. One North East is dependent on the voluntary collaboration of sub-regional actors such 
as the three county-level economic development companies and the one economic 
development department. The KVR is in the paradoxical situation that its strength of 
being a bottom-up organisation is also its weakness as this restricts its ability to act. The 
KVR is governed by its members, that is all Ruhr local governments, and its decisions 
should therefore have the authority of democratic legitimacy. As outlined in chapters 4, 5 
and 6, however, because of party-political struggles there is a genuine lack of will to 
cooperate among many Ruhr local governments and the KVR is therefore often forced to 
take the line of least resistance to accommodate the political diversity of all its members. 
This is ensured through often month-long negotiations in the 'Ruhr parliament' before a 
decision is reached with which all members are satisfied. This was exactly the case with 
the two image campaigns which were considerably 'watered down' from their original 
design and took several months to be agreed. Yet these decisions were taken in the 
framework of long-standing and well-institutionalised organisational structures and took 
much less time than the attempts of creating a regional image strategy in the North East 
where first consultations started in 2000, without the strategy being implemented at the 
time of writing (June 2004). As mentioned earlier on, the KVR's capacity for a regional 
image campaign is also strengthened by its legally clear mandate for the policy area of 
public relations, notwithstanding that political support by some of the Ruhr's local 
governments was lukewarm at best. In the North East, the mandate for an image strategy 
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on a regional level is much less clear and reflects the weak organisational structures and 
division of labour on the regional level. 
North East England The Ruhr 
Political environment in which Unstable (rescaling of Relatively stable (little image management takes 
place governance, decentralisation) rescaling, centralisation) 
Organisation(s) responsible One North East, Central State of NRW Ministry for for economic development on Government (represented 
the regional scale through GO-NE) Economic Development 
Organisation(s) responsible One North East, North East for public relations/image Regional Assembly (pulled out KVR 
management on a regional during the process) 
scale 
Sub-regional economic 
Other main contributors development companies, private- Local governments 
sector companies 
Method of stakeholder 
involvement: state on other Networks, out-of-house Mainly hierarchy, in-house 
scales 
Method of stakeholder Hierarchy; in house. 
involvement: other sectors Networks, out-of-house Additionally: through 
(businesses and civil society) networks 
Influence of central state High, but decreasing Low, but increasing 
Role of private sector and Purely consultative Largely consultative 
civil society 
Type of network in the Marsh Issue network Policy community 
and Rhodes typology (1992) 
Main opportunities for Through the creation of new Through external threat to 
leadership political spaces brought about by 'self-rule' of the Ruhr by decentralisation/devolution Land government 
Content of promotional Usual imagery toolkit Usual imagery toolkit plus 
message industrial heritage 
Main methods of delivery of Attracting media attention Advertising campaigns, through flagship projects, direct Attracting media attention 
message 
marketing through flagship projects, 
Examination of PR Limited and very recently Comprehensive and regular 
effectiveness since 1985 
Fig. 9.1: Some of the main characteristics of the image management process in the two case 
study regions 
Question four asked about the content of the representations constructed, the results of 
the image building process. While both regions seemed to rely on a standard toolkit of 
promotional messages there were some important differences in the themes that were 
used. The representations constructed by both the North East and the Ruhr contributed to 
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what Gri ffiths ( 1998) termed "the making of sameness". Recurring themes were the 
knowledge-based, high-technology economy, yet low costs for all factors of production, 
including a well-trained and very adaptable (some would call it desperate) workforce that 
is prepared to work for lower salaries than in other areas of the country. The other, less 
tangible central theme was that of a culturally vibrant and diverse region with a high 
density of cultural venues. The drafts of the North East RIS that are currently available 
demonstrate the desire to represent the region as 'having everything that the other, more 
prosperous regions of the UK have'. The early image efforts of the Ruhr in the 1980s 
followed the same theme, but in the 1990s moved away from this approach in favour of 
not only admitting but actively promoting the fact that the Ruhr was and still is 
fundamentally different from all other German conurbations. Since the mid-1990s the 
focus of the promotional effort lay in conveying the industrial heritage of the Ruhr, not 
only the physical structures but also the connected social milieu of honest, hardworking 
and straightforward people. Industrial monuments were restored on a wide scale and 
often converted to contemporary uses - and now feature prominently in the projected 
image of the Ruhr. Table 9.1 summarises the points made here and contrasts North East 
England with the Ruhr. 
Apart from structural explanations leadership (or a lack of it) plays a role in the 
explanation of the findings. Both regions have serious difficulties in their institutional 
frameworks in that they impede effective leadership. The two reasons for this are the 
limited power of the existing regional bodies and, in the case of North East England, a 
political-institutional environment that changes so quickly that it is often difficult for a 
potential leader to even identify potential 'followers'. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that leadership has become more prominent exactly as a result ofthose changes. 
The new political spaces that are currently under construction in the North East have 
opened the chance for leaders to champion the image-management process and to add to 
the raison d'etre of their organisation. In the Ruhr, the political system has remained 
fairly stable over the last decades, but the regional body KVR has seen its leading role 
curtailed by a Land government that is increasingly tightening the reins on the autonomy 
ofthe Ruhr. 
238 
9.2. Reconsidleidng theory 
The theoretical framework of this dissertation includes theories of state rescaling and 
territoriality, governance, social and policy learning, and leadership. The findings offer 
some insights into possible modifications of learning and leadership theories but the main 
contribution of this thesis lies in the identification of a number of implications for 
theories of governance. The empirical evidence from the two case studies also permits a 
number of conclusions as to how appropriate new regionalist thought and theories of state 
rescaling are in placing the observed processes into a broader explanation of political and 
economic restructuring in 'mature' capitalist regional economies. Some of the findings 
confirm existing theories of governance, especially in the North East, where the breadth 
of organisations involved in image-building reflects the move from government to 
governance. On the other hand, as demonstrated in chapter 6 (Governance) the present 
literature can be criticised for overestimating the decentralisation of power in the North 
East. My argument is that presently the North East is still very much centrally governed 
while only the mechanisms of policy design and delivery have changed. In other words, 
the North East has seen decentralisation but no real devolution. Claims such as the 
'hollowing-out' of the state are not supported by my empirical findings. The governance 
literature is also overly centred on processes ofrescaling ofthe British state. In the terms 
ofthis debate, the German state has always been 'hollowed-out'. 
As far as the first point of criticism is concerned, the empirical findings deliver 
ambiguous evidence, especially in North East England. One the one hand central 
government still controls to a significant degree the key driver of image efforts, One 
North East. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) monitors the RDA, is the 
key contributor to its finances, and has a right of direct intervention in the formulation of 
the Regional Economic Strategy. Secondly, central government still ultimately controls 
the organisational environment in which One North East and the other actors of image 
management operate. There is still significant direct central government intervention in 
areas that are contributing significantly to image-building, for example through Urban 
Development Corporations who create 'flagship developments' or through grants to local 
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governments with which the latter engage in their own image-building activities. Land 
government intervention has become more prominent in the Ruhr with the establishment 
of Projekt Ruhr, an organisation widely seen to rival the KVR. While Projekt Ruhr does 
not have an explicit image strategy, it supports projects only if they have a 
'communicative yield', again including many flagship projects. Still, the KVR is largely 
autonomous from the Land government as it not only reports to its member local 
governments but is also funded by them. 
A central theme in the literature is the widely-made assertion that governance (as 
opposed to government) involves inter-organisational networks that are self-regulating 
(Jessop 1997, Rhodes 1997). In the case of North East England there is no evidence for 
such self-regulation, as the process of developing a regional image strategy came to a 
temporary halt when one key person in one of the two key organisations took ill. This 
illustrates the vulnerability of the network and that its self-regulation broke down due to a 
relatively minor event. This particular network exhibits the characteristics of what Marsh 
and Rhodes (1992) termed an issue network (as illustrated in figure 6.9 in chapter 6): 
relatively large number of participants, encompasses a range of affected interests, 
memberships contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity, consensus is reached only for 
a limited time, and the basic relationship is consultative rather than an exchange of 
resources. This illustrates the fact that the term policy networks is used rather loosely, 
describing any kind of policy-developing or policy-implementing relationship that 
comprises any number of organisations and lasts for any amount of time. Inter-
organisational relations in the Ruhr are situated on the opposite end of the continuum (in 
as they are stable, consist of a small membership, reach a durable consensus, and can 
deliver its members), yet the term 'self-regulation' cannot be applied here either as the 
relationships are almost exclusively hierarchical and thus do not constitute a network in 
Marsh and Rhodes' sense. 
Chapter 2 included a discussion of the 'new regionalism', on which much of 
contemporary regional-economic or regional-political research is based. A key focus of 
new regionalist thought is on regionalism as a bottom-up movement to defend or advance 
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regional interests. My case study results do not confirm this prevailing notion of 
regionalism as a bottom-up process. In North East England and the Ruhr local and 
regional governments (or emerging elements of it) might be articulating and pushing 
regional interests, but as the case of image improvement initiatives showed it is not the 
regional scale, and the local scale only to a limited extent, that effectively advances 
regional interests. In both countries the regions are at the mercy of superordinate 
governments: central government in Britain and the Land government in Germany27 . The 
bulk of new regionalist thought has overestimated the extent to which the advancement of 
regional interests emanates from the regions. The two case studies clearly demonstrated 
that regional image-improvement initiatives were to a large degree induced by 
superordinate governments. The adoption of image policy by the KVR, the Ruhr Local 
Government Association, was dictated by an act of the NRW parliament, even though 
there was strong support for this function from some local governments. In North East 
England the adoption of an image campaign was heavily encouraged by central 
government as it established RDAs and put responsibility for the regional economy into 
their hands. This enhanced interregional competition and the pressure to perform. In the 
case of a region with relatively little indigenous growth such as the North East this 
included the pressure to increase inward investment. Consequently, while much of what 
has happened in the case study regions could conventionally be interpreted as 
regionalism, I argue that what has actually occurred is regionalisation or, at the most, 
'forced' or 'induced' regionalism. Most regional agents became engaged in 'partnerships' 
or in regional networks simply to meet concrete targets set by superordinate 
governments, receive earmarked government funding, or respond to increasing inter-
regional competition imposed (or at least encouraged) by central governments. 
In both case studies image building was decisively controlled, either indirectly or at arm's 
length, by central government, as there was little evidence of the bottom-up regionalism 
27 As demonstrated in chapter 6, theoretical debates on regions are confused by the lack of agreed definition 
of what constitutes a region, and the area it covers. In this analysis I refer to the regions in England as 
defined by Government and covered by the RDAs, and in Germany as sub-Land entities. An obvious 
exception are the German city states of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin and the small state of the Saarland, 
all of which are too small to allow a subdivision into regions. In the case of city states the functional region 
extends even well beyond the formal-regional, i.e. city-state boundaries. 
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propagated by new regionalist thought. This contrasting evidence might stem from the 
fact that the present thesis examined old-industrial regions which are atypical compared 
with much of new regionalist thought. As discussed in chapter 2.3 most of the evidence 
which underpins theories of new regionalism stems from economically successful regions 
and regions that mostly are culturally distinct from the rest of the nation state. Those 
shiny examples contrast sharply with the 'dim-and-grim' realities of ordinary regions. 
While usefully focusing attention on the regional scale as an arena of policy-making 
battles, the explanatory power of new regionalism is actually rather limited in the case 
studies of this thesis because of the generalisations and idealisations derived from 
successful regions (cf. Lovering 1999). To use an analogy from football, while the 
empirical evidence underpinning much of regionalist thought was collected in Premier 
League regions, both the Ruhr and the North East compete in the Third Division. 
One of the key propositions of new regionalism, that most economic affairs are best 
regulated on the regional level, may appear to have materialised on the surface, but in 
reality control is still being exerted by central government, and Wong (2000: 83) 
observed that "the continuous process of delegation of power to local actors to implement 
economic initiatives is ironically undermined by the ever strengthening process of 
centralisation of funding and performance control." New regionalist thought also focuses 
attention on the critical importance of robust regional institutions for the health and 
success of regional economies. As examined in section 9.1 the two case studies have 
exhibited different degrees of institutionalisation, and the implications of these 
differences will be revisited in section 9.3, policy implications. 
As the case studies revealed, the location of the fault lines of power struggles differ 
considerably between the two case studies. In the North East the conflict is almost 
exclusively between central government and the region, whereas in the Ruhr, with its 
established regional body, it is between the region and superordinate governments (Land 
and federal) on the one hand, but also between the region and the local authorities, who 
are keen on preserving their statutory powers. Given its strong focus on the region in the 
global economy, new regionalism as an analytic concept is good at shedding light on 
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national-regional or global-regional fault lines but less able to account for the 
localisation-regionalisation tensions. As examined in chapter 2, new regionalist thought 
focuses on the emergence of the region as an economic and political arena, but mainly in 
relation to challenges by the nation state (which is often perceived at the regional level as 
an economic and administrative 'black hole') and the increasingly global economy. 
Accounts of state rescaling and territoriality, as subsumed in the work of Brenner ( 1999, 
2003 and 2004) was the other body of theory reviewed in chapter 2. What explanatory 
power do Brenner's (admittedly heavily jargon-laden) arguments about a de- and 
reterritorialised regional space and changes in state spatial selectivity hold for my thesis? 
In a theoretical context, it is certainly possible to locate both regions in the "rescaled, 
territorially differentiated configuration of state space in which interlocality competition, 
divergent local development pathways, and the intensification of intranational 
sociospatial polarization are actively promoted through state institution and policies." 
(Brenner 2004: 259). The image building efforts in both regions can in this context be 
interpreted as attempts of reterritorialisation, countering the deterritorialising forces of 
European and global economic integration. Indeed, the image campaigns initiated in both 
regions sought to promote the respective region as an ideal inward investment destination 
in an attempt to catch a bigger share of increasingly volatile investment flows. 
Brenner insists, however, that these efforts - as much as they are about economic 
development - are in practice often no more than "a form of crisis management" (2004: 
266) designed to alleviate the polarising effects of competition-driven, growth-first 
locational policy (Standortpolitik). While most regional economic development 
stakeholders, above all One North East and the KVR, see image improvement as a 
conditio sine qua non and integral part of a sustainable, competitiveness-driven regional 
policy, it is indeed questionable whether image improvement can be more than a 
temporary solution to the economic problems of the two regions. These solutions are 
unlikely to outlive the varying instable regional coalitions on which they are based, and 
on whose collaboration they rely. It seems therefore likely that without stable and 
institutionalised routines the image building activities can never be long-lived enough to 
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transcend their current state of 'piecemealness'. The other problem is that ultimately the 
image strategies have to respond to the conditions of the 'game' set by higher tiers of 
government, central government in the English case, and Land and central government in 
the German case. As long as image management is subject to the centrally-defined 
imperative of competitiveness it is unlikely to reflect a more inclusive picture of the 
region, which may include regional realities that might not sell well. Currently, the 
marketing of the North East employs the classic stereotypes of success, such as thriving 
culture, inventive entrepreneurialism, high quality of life, and friendly, adaptive 
workforce. In the Ruhr the messages are more inclusive and actively tackle many of the 
negative stereotypes such as poverty and environmental pollution. This greater degree of 
inclusiveness can be attributed to the fact that the main driver of the Ruhr's image 
campaigns, the KVR, is a democratically controlled body that can be (and frequently has 
been) held to account by its constituting members, the individual cities and counties of 
the Ruhr. The perceived positive link between democracy and economic success is 
frequently advocated by proponents of regionalism, and was used in the 'Yes' campaign 
for devolution for Scotland (Garside 2000: 139). Similar arguments were advanced in the 
debate on whether or not North East England should get a regional government. 
The empirical findings of this thesis largely confirm recent explanations of the 
restructuring of state spatiality over the last two decades. As outlined in chapter 2, one of 
the central arguments of this literature was that the tension between deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation has qualitatively but not necessarily quantitatively altered the 
extent to which economic development is governed by the nation state: 
"National governments have not simply downscaled or upscaled regulatory power, 
but have attempted to institutionalize competitive relations between subnational 
administrative units as a means to position local and regional economies 
strategically within supranational (European and global) circuits of capital. In this 
sense, even in the midst of the wide-ranging rescaling processes that have unsettled 
traditional, nationally focused regulatory arrangements, national states have 
attempted to retain control over major subnational political-economic spaces by 
situating them within rescaled, but still nationally coordinated, accumulation 
strategies." (Brenner 2004: 260) 
It is therefore questionable whether the relativization of scales as observed by Jessop 
(2002 and 1999) has really occurred in the two case study regions. There are no signs of 
244 
the hollowing-out ofthe nation state, but there is some indication of a 'squeeze-in' ofthe 
regional scale. On the one hand the regional scale is expected to take on more 
responsibility, especially for economic policy, but on the other hand its efforts are 
hampered by having to defend regional interests against interventionist central 
governments (more so in the North East than in the Ruhr) or local governments reluctant 
to voluntarily upscale any of their powers, even if only temporary and project-based. 
While both case study regions can be seen as squeezed in, the direction of the pressure 
varies between the two. 
In essence, while the recent changes in the North East can be seen as regionalisation, the 
example of image building suggests that central government has retained its grip on 
regional policy, even though the mechanism and scale of delivery have changed. It is thus 
questionable whether there really have been any significant changes in territoriality (i.e. 
control over space). What has occurred instead is a rescaling of governance, with an 
increasing importance of the regional level, but mainly as a scale of delivery of central 
government strategies and policy instruments. In the Ruhr, the fault lines are mainly 
between local and Land government, and a tightening of the reigns of the Land 
governments and more direct interventions in regional matters can be observed here. 
Both regions share the results of the latest round of state rescaling, which brought about 
the involvement of a multitude of actors in "interscalar webs" (MacLeod 200 I) and a 
mushrooming of special purpose bodies and programmes. The big, unanswered question 
is therefore "how various strategies in the region can be translated into strategies for the 
region" (Valler, Phelps and Wood 2002: 189, original emphasis). 
Leadership is a field of theory that is currently underdeveloped in geographical research, 
presumably because it involves a number of theoretical and empirical difficulties. The 
main theoretical problem with researching leadership is the vagueness of the concept. It 
is difficult to separate issues of leadership from issues of governance or learning, as the 
latter two form the structural environment in which leadership succeeds or fails, and the 
effect of leadership on issues of economic development cannot easily be isolated. This 
partly stems from empirical difficulties. The origins of leadership research lie in 
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psychology, which has traditionally relied on laboratory experiments, but these 
conditions cannot be replicated in applied research on the practice of economic 
development. Leadership cannot easily be observed in the form in which it occurs in the 
design and delivery of policies. In other words, from looking at possible outcomes of 
processes of leadership it is hard to judge the individual contribution of leadership as 
opposed to other factors of influence. Taking research on leadership in image building (or 
indeed in any other policy area) further would require a fundamentally different 
methodology and involve the use of ethnographic methods to observe processes as they 
happen. In my research, the non-participant observation of stakeholder consultations 
regarding the development of an image policy would have had the additional benefit of 
being able to collect very robust evidence on other theories as well, most notably, in this 
context, learning. It would have been very interesting to have directly observed the 
consultation and decision-making process as it occurred, for example in the Durham 
Castle event, rather than to rely purely on written documentation and the recollections of 
participants, as both are usually limited. Written records are often not available or 
accessible, and the memory of participants might be selective, or they might withhold 
certain facts. Unfortunately, I had only found out about the Durham Castle event after it 
had occurred. This epitomises, I assume, the research experience of many PhD 
candidates, who in practice find it difficult to time their research to coincide with 
important events that they could observe directly. But it would be worth to make the 
effort, as leadership in economic development is a very promising yet under-researched 
field oftheory. 
9.3. Policy implications 
The research findings point at a number of variables that could be improved in order to 
achieve a more effective and efficient image management process. Two sets of measures 
are considered here: first, how the process could be improved, and secondly, how an 
institutional/organisational framework should ideally look if it were geared towards an 
image management programme. 
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It seems that image management has a long way to go before it is widely recognised as a 
tool of economic development. For example, the European Union Commission's 
Directorate for Regional Development has identified in the Objective 2 funding 
guidelines several policy fields through which it believes economic restructuring can be 
aided. As set out in chapters 6 and 7, image management is not included on this list. It 
may be worth for the EU to reconsider this omission. The EU Objective 2 funds are, in 
both regions, playing an important role in forging intra-regional co-operation. Even 
though these partnerships are not always entirely voluntary but driven by the necessity to 
form partnerships in order to be able to access ERDF funds, the ERDF has, as it was 
reflected in many interviewees' comments, contributed to the formation of functioning 
policy networks on this issue and has thus fostered the exchange of ideas, a realistic 
debate and self-evaluation between the regional partners. It must be said that while image 
management has not been suggested by the ERDF, it has neither been specifically 
requested by regional actors, neither in North East England nor in the Ruhr. However, the 
ERDF could play a more vital role in forming policy networks that are more effective in 
dealing with image management. 
As far as the intended or projected images are concerned, place promotion agencies have 
to walk a fine line between trying to appeal to the target group (in this case, inward 
investors) and being creative and differentiating their own 'place product' from 
competitors. Place promotion strategists and practitioners seem to have a fairly concrete 
idea of what appeals to potential inward investors, and many agencies therefore employ 
the 'standard toolkit' of quality of life, skilled and adaptable labour force, excellent 
accessibility and infrastructure, good land availability, yet all at reasonable prices and set 
in a positive 'business climate' where investors are being welcomed with open arms. Yet 
there is only anecdotal evidence for the appeal of this projected image, and systematic 
perception research on a large scale has largely been missing, at least in the North East. 
This has two implications: first, market research is an essential prerequisite for successful 
image management. Existing perceptions need to be uncovered, and during an image 
campaign regular surveys are necessary to track changes in these perceptions, even 
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though it is methodologically difficult to establish a causal link between image 
management and improving perceptions. The K VR has monitored both of its campaigns 
in a systematic way, where a communication studies department at a local university was 
commissioned to compile an 'image profile' every second year during the course of the 
campaigns. When the KVR at the end of the first image campaign (that lasted for ten 
years) learned that the negative perceptions had effectively been overturned, it was clear 
that the next campaign had to take a different approach. Now the KVR no longer had to 
work purely with facts and figures to counter outdated perceptions but was able to run a 
more emotional and provocative campaign. 
This observation has taken us to the second point. In the case of the Ruhr, avoiding 
"making sameness" (Griffiths 1998) has paid off. Rather than relying on the standard 
toolkit of promotional messages, the Ruhr has shown self-esteem and has, in the latest 
campaign, stressed how it is different from all other German agglomerations. It is 
remarkably obvious to see the change from the early years of Ein starkes Stiick 
Deutschland to its later years, and even more so to Der Pott kocht: the message moved 
from "we're not as bad as you think" to "we, too, have everything you can expect from a 
large city" to "we are different". The latter point included emphasising the industrial 
heritage of the area, a theme that is almost completely denied in the promotional material 
of the North East. It could be argued that the thorough removal of most hints to previous 
mining and heavy-industrial activities from the North East's landscape has been mirrored 
in the images created by its place promoters. Of course the task of projecting images to 
attract investors is a difficult one, as the projected image is trying to make potential 
investors believe that the region has already achieved the economy that it is only hoping 
to achieve, not least through the contributions of investors of 'future-proof' industries. 
Accordingly, in order to aid structural change and mitigate its socially polarising effects, 
the representations have, to a certain degree, to contain a measure of glossing-over or 
denial. However, this raises doubts over the credibility of the images, and important 
questions of ownership. Is it appropriate to deny the industrial past in the 'official' place 
image when in the North East this past is still deeply embedded in the region's culture 
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(Robinson 2002, Byrne 1999, 2002), as demonstrated through the liveliness of events like 
the Durham Miners Gala? 
On the other hand it needs to be made clear that the promotional budget of the Ruhr was 
much higher than that of the North East, but this should be an even bigger incentive to be 
creative, as with a small budget any promotional material has to stand out through its 
originality to get noticed. This originality could stem from an open declaration to the 
positive aspects of the region's industrial past. 
The second category of recommendations has to do with the institutional and 
organisational framework for effective image management. The first and foremost 
recommendation is to strike the right balance between networks and hierarchy. One the 
one hand, networks allow the flexibility of involvement of stakeholders as and when 
required or desired, but on the other hand the image-policy-network of North East 
England demonstrated considerable weakness when the Regional Image Strategy came to 
a temporary halt simply through the illness of one key person. As Rhodes ( 1997) 
demonstrated with his example of the 'many hands', when things go wrong it is hard to 
hold one particular organisation responsible for the failure. Since the establishment of 
Regional Development Agencies in 1998 the North East has experienced a 'governance 
overkill': As outlined in one of One North East's consultation documents (ONE 2003a), 
the Regional Image Strategy has to be integrated with and adjusted to no less than 13 
other regional strategies, involving an estimated 120 organisations of both central and 
local government, the private sector and civil society. 
The empirical results of my thesis form a strong case for considering a streamlining of 
regional organisations, giving organisations a much clearer responsibility for place 
promotion and image management, and a clearer mandate to lead on these issues. In the 
Ruhr, the KVR has the remit and responsibility for PR and marketing for the region but 
not for inward investment promotion, let alone economic development. While one could 
distinguish between promotional efforts and actual 'nuts and bolts' economic 
development work of improving the physical conditions of the place it is almost 
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impossible to draw a line between place marketing and inward investment promotion. 
Yet, for the Ruhr these two functions are carried out by two different bodies, the KVR 
and the Land's Economic Promotion Agency (GtW). It seems that this distinction does 
not make much sense from an image management perspective: firstly, promotion is just 
one instrument of marketing, and promoting a 'product' is difficult if the quality of the 
'place product' is beyond the marketer's control. This is a strong argument for having 
one regional body that controls both economic strategy and policy and place 
promotion/image building. 
Secondly, this institutional fragmentation is likely to hinder the development and 
communication of a coherent message, as the evidence from both regions suggests. In the 
North East, intra-regional animosities between Tyneside and Teesside and between urban 
and rural parts of the region are likely to further impede the progress of the Regional 
Image Strategy. In the Ruhr, the delivery of a set of coherent messages has suffered from 
the rivalries between the Ruhr and the Land government. In the current political climate 
where the KVR is dominated by the Christian Democrats and the Land government is 
controlled by the Social Democrats the fault lines are even more difficult to bridge. The 
current institutional arrangement in the Ruhr is testimony of ongoing power struggles and 
half-hearted administrative reforms. It remains to be seen whether these obstacles will be 
removed and the institutional jungle cleared with the reform of the KVR, who will be 
modified once again in its competencies and be transformed into an organisation called 
RVR (Ruhr Regional Association) later this year. While the exact nature and 
competencies of the new RVR are not yet known, it is certain that it will not be the one 
regional body that controls both economic strategy and policy and place 
promotion/image building. 
Similarly, the future of the regional organisations of the North East is unclear. Since 
devolution in the UK is a slow process and riddled with ambiguities it is far from certain 
where One North East and the proposed regional government will go, and whether their 
competencies will be far-ranging enough to effectively control both the 'place product' -
that is, the material realities of the North East- and the image. If the people of the North 
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East say Yes to a regional government in the referendum on 4 November there is a 
realistic chance that the North East could get an organisation that is able to co-ordinate 
the full spectrum of policy-making and -delivery on the regional scale, including image 
management as a task that cuts across a range of policies. 
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